WAR DIARY
? German Naval Staff
Operations Division
j
PART A VOLUME 44
J:
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APRIL 194 3 ^
UNCLASSIFIED _ \*™
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A-6599
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington 25, D. C.
In reply
refer to
Op-292/LM/gd
Ser 02312P29
19 December 1956
From: Chief of Naval Operations (Director Naval History)
To: Distribution List
Subj : Transmittal of Translations of German War Diaries from
Tambach Archives
Encl: (l) War Diary of German Naval Staff Operations Division
for April 1943, Part A, Volume 44
(2) War Diary of German Naval Staff Operations Division
for August 1940, Part A, Volume 12
1. Forwarded for your retention are Enclosures (l) and (2),
number of copies of each as indicated in Distribution List,
2, Attention is invited to the co-ownership of The Admiralty,
London, England, and the Department of the Navy, of the Tambach
Archives. Permission of The Admiralty is required for disclo-
sure of contents of subject translations for purposes other than
U.S. Official use. The Chief of The Admiralty's Historical
Section is custodian for The Admiralty.
3„ Because of the cost of publication, only a limited number of
copies could be made.- If any recipient of these War Diaries does
not need to retain them, it is requested that they be returned
to Naval History Division (Op-29).
E. M. ELLER-,
By direction
DISTRIBUTION LIST
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R-^ar '.dmiral Roger II. fiellairs, R.ii.) (2)
Capitaine dc Frigate RCSTAAD, Chef du Service liistorique de la
Aarine, 3, Avenue Octave-GrAard, '• PARIS VII, FR-i Or, (2)
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•*-
Editorial Note:
The translation of this German
tfar Diary was made in London, England, under
the guidance of Commander S. R. Sanders, USNR.
i'Jhen his London Office was closed and the trans-
lation project was discontinued, much unfinished
material was sent to Naval History Division,
(Op-29). Volumes of these diaries have been
periodically distributed as funds and other con-
ditions permitted.
The translations and stencils
have not been checked by the Director of Naval
History Division for accuracy of interpretation,
phraseology, and spelling of officers' names
or geographical names. Distribution under these
conditions seems justified because of the ex-
cellent reputation of the London personnel and
because translators are not available in Naval
History Division. Research to correct possible
inconsistencies did not warrant the time involved.
The rJar Diaries of the German
Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part a, are
important because they contain a day by day
summary of the information available to the
German Naval Staff and the decisions reached
on the basis thereof.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Naval History Division
Washington 25, D. C.
1957
*
1 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
I tens of Political Importance
Nothing to report.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. The Chief, Naval Communications Division reported on the
present position of radar gear in the Sicilian-Tunisian
area and along the French coast. ',
Chief, Naval Staff ordered investigations as to whether
destroyers could not actu'all'y'b'e prevented from making
locations by introducing jammers on submarines.
II. Report of Quartermaster General on ships' anchorages in
Alta Fjord; on the organization of the fire fighting
services in the French Atlantic coast naval bases j and
on the difficulties encountered in the establishment of
the transit route from Auxerre to Chalon-sur-Saone . It
was thought, however, that April 18, the date set on the
basis of Organization Todt's report, would be adhered to.
III. Our Naval Attache reported that the survivors of sub-
marine U "77" have been released by the Spanish Navy.
IV. Chief, Intelligence Division submitted the confirmed
results of warfare against merchant shipping for March
1943.
Copy as per l/Skl 10111/43 geh. In War Diary, Part C,
files "Enemy Shipping Losses 1943u .
In a Highly Restricted Circle;
V. Report of Chief, Operations Branch; Operations Division;
a. The Naval Staff proposed leaving the LUETZOVJ In the
Northern Area until fall 1943. Chief, Naval Staff
concurred. Corresponding instructions will be issued
to Group North in Teletype l/Skl I op. 965/43 geh.
Gkdos. Chefs. Copy In V/ar Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.
b. Operations Division's plans for the Iberian Peninsula
(copy as per I Ski I op (no reference1 No. given,
Tr.N.) In War Diary, Part C, file ;?GiselaM) coincide,
according to information from Armed Forces High
Command, Operations Staff, Navy, with the Fuehrer's
ideas which arc similar as far as the question of
regaining the initiative from the Western Powers is
-1- CONFIDENTIAL
1 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
concerned, except that they also deal with the
possibility of s-eizing Iceland.
The Naval Staff does not feel that an operation
against this island would justify the effort and
the very considerable military risks involved. The
supply problem would be Insoluble, and new supply
problems are definitely to be avoided, even if only
because of the unsolved problem in the Mediterranean
and the strained situation prevailing In the Norwegian
and Channel traffic.
Special Items
I. In accordance with the decision of the Commander in Chief,
Navy, Quartermaster Division has issued orders on the
cession of six PT boats to Spain. Copy corresponding to
l/Skl 95901/43 Gkdos. in iar" Diary, Part B, Vol. V,
II. The Naval Staff has sanctioned the proposals of Group -
North on the allocation of minelayers (see War Diary 29
March) in the cases of the BRIMMER, OSTMARK and SIL.GERRAIL
The KAISER and ROLAND are, for the time being, to remain
at the disposal of Commander, Minesweepers , Baltic.
Further instructions on the allocation of minelayers will
be issued to Group North. Copy In accordance with Tele-
type l/Skl I op. 9475/43 Gkdos. In War Diary, Part C d.
III. With reference to the report from the Naval Attache, Rome
on the administration of the Toulon arsenal (see 'Jar Dia.ry
23 March), Naval (Ship) Construction Division considered
the Italian Navy Department's apprehensions to be ground-
less in view of the agreement reached in Italy with High
Command, Navy's representative for naval ship construction
in Southern France on 31 March 1943.
IV. Special Radio Monitoring Report 13/43 contained a
compilation of enemy intelligence obtained from radio
deciphering and radio intelligence between 22 and 28
March. There is no need to call attention to - any special
Items net already dealt with.
-2- CONFIDENTIAL
1 April. .1943 .... CONFIDENTIAL/
Situation 1 April 1943
I -, ~.Yar in Foreign ".Vaters i
1 . Enemy Situation :
Nothing to report,-
2 . Own Situation;
The DOGGER BANK has not answered our request of 28
March for a position report from her position 300
miles south of the Azores. If she has been sailing
at a lower speed than assumed, and her position on
28 March was farther north than the above-mentioned
line, she should be off Cape Ortegal by 6 April at
the latest. According to dead reckoning, the fuel
supply can only last up to 4 April, or if a slower
speed has been maintained over a long period, ten
days longer. The Naval Staff will have to give her
up as lost after 7 April, if no clues concerning her
fate have been established by then.
Group West has been notified in Teletype l/Skl I k
985/54 Gkdos . Chefs . '
Naval Staff transmitted a weather report to the
DOGGER BANK in Radiogram 1403, and a submarine
warning for the inner part of the Bay of Biscay in
Radiogram 1906, mentioning a torpedo hit against the
PIETRO 0RSE0L0 whilst putting in, about 60 miles off
the mouth of the Gironde (see ''Situation West Area1')
Radiogram 1906 furthermore included the estimated
positions of the reported enemy convoys.
The following instructions were dispatched to the
IRENE in Radiogram 0052;
o-
1. Prom 4 April our submarine will be waiting at a
position 1° farther north and 1° farther east of
Point Isegrimm.
2. The rendezvous is to be approached five hours
after dawn, then she Is to wait within a ten mile
radius until dark. If the meeting does not take
place, the same procedure is to be repeated the
following day.
3. Special recognition signal for submarine: painter;
-3- CONFIDENTIAL
1 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
stages are to be hung up on both sides amidships
if weather favorable , firehose on after mast if
unfavorable, as well as merchant vessel recognition
signal.
4. Naval Staff anticipates that the meeting place will
be reached on 4 or 5 April.
The IRENE was informed in Radiogram 1424 that on 27
March numerous icebergs and floes ?;ere reported to be
in 57° 10' N, 42° W, and floes alone in 58° 42' N, 40°
49' Vi/\ The ALSTERUFER was ordered in Radiogram 2234,
thus canceling order 2306 of 31 March, to steer a
southwesterly course from Point Odde for 200 miles,
only then altering course to the south.
The PORTLAND and the 0S0RN0 were informed that on 3
April they were to anticipate being passed west of
the island group by the IRENE (formerly SILVAPLANA)
still a reciprocal course.
All ships in foreign waters were informed of enemy
warship movements In the South Atlantic in Radiogram
1514, and of the estimated positions of convoys in
the North Atlantic in Radiogram 2105.
The Naval Attache, Tokyo reported that in the interests
of subsequent blockade runners all blockade runner
movements were without exception to be treated as top
secret in Tokyo and requested that reports on incoming
vessels be submitted in special officers' cipher. ■
II • Situation Jest Area;
1 . Enemy Situations
According to an intelligence report, two 18,000 -
20,000 ton transports with men and equipment, left
Plymouth on the evening of 30 March for Gibraltar,
escorted by three heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier
and 16 torpedo boats.
At 0943 a British vessel was approximately located
about 240 - 390 miles south of Brest.
According to an intelligence report from England via
the Ostrow intelligence agency, dated 24 March, no
large-scale plans for launching an attack on the
-4- CONFIDENTIAL
ft
1 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
continent were perceptible in London. Troop
concentrations were not extensive. No leave was
being canceled in the Army and Navy and only to a
limited extent in the R.A.P. Concentrations of
heavy transport tonnage were not observed. Single
divisions could,, however, be embarked from places
in the southwest of England and in Fife at very
short notice. The warships reported in I/lilford
Haven were still there on 27 March,
According to further intelligence reports, it was
said that preparations were in progress for sending
a considerable number of troops out from England to
North Africa in April.
2 . Own Situation;
Atlantic Coasts
On its return to Bordeaux, the 8th Destroyer Flotilla
reported on the execution of Operation "Elisabeth",
that it had had to take evasive action in the Bay of
Biscay because of planes carrying radar gear.
Otherwise Operation "Elisabeth" had proceeded according
to plan and without incident. The Flotilla was once
again sighted by enemy air reconnaissance on the
evening' of 30 March before picking up the PIETRO
0RSE0L0. Enemy reports decoded aboard ship, however,
contained no references whatsoever to the PIETRO
0RSE0L0. The Flotilla assumes that the enemy
operations on 30 and 31 March were diverted from the
PIETRO 0RSE0L0 by the destroyer group and the
repeatedly sighted steamer HIMALAYA. Although the
Flotilla took evasive action to the south to get away
from the HIMALAYA, In order to shake off the enemy
air reconnaissance flying round that ship, ov/ing to
a difference in fix contact was made with her at the
limits of visibility. A recognition signal from
destroyer Z "32" was not answered by the HIMALAYA..
Following an SOS from the HIMALAYA, containing the
positions of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla, destroyer
Z "32" was detached, but failed to find her, despite
a thorough search. The Flotilla thought she might
possibly have scuttled herself, although a ruse on
her part was not out of the question. The PIETRO
0RSE0L0 was picked up by the Flotilla according to
plan. At 0445 on 1 April the PIETRO 0RSE0L0 was
attacked by the enemy submarine . The Flotilla even
suspected two submarines, as two torpedo spreads were
-5- CONFIDENTIAL
1 April 1943, CONFIDENTIAL
observed. As visibility was less than 1,000 meters,
the Flotilla thought it quite likely that the sub-
marines fired according to location data. A sub-
marine chase was carried out by two destroyers
Without result. The PIETRO 0RSE0L0 received a hit
level with hatch 2, but it had very little effect ,
as the cargo consisted of rubber. Destroyer Z H23,? ,
too, v/as hit by a torpedo which did not explode,
because the track angle was too acute. She was not
damaged. At 1330 PIETRO 0RSE0L0 dropped anchor off
Le Verdon.
The incoming blockade runners were obviously picked
up with success owing to' synchronization with the
escort of vessels outward bound.
The PIETRO 0RSE0L0 had 4,000 tons of caoutchouc on
board, part of which may have been unfortunately^ lost
through the leak caused by the torpedo hit, 1,108 tons
of tin, 2,369 tons of fats, 556 tons of tea and 15
tons of quinine as well as various other goods for
Germany. The tin and part of the tea are for Italy.
The remaining goods are in short supply and of con-
siderable importance to Germany's economic warfare.
On the suggestion of the Commander, 8th Destroyer
Flotilla, the 4th Coast Patrol Force has assigned
the 6th Hinesweeper Flotilla the task of salvaging
drifting bales of rubber southeast of the scene of
the disaster.
The HIMALAYA reported at 1630 in answer to our patrol
vessels near St. Jean de Luz . The ship is undamaged
and Is being taken along the coast to La Pallice by
escort vessels.
A further report is still outstanding. It is thought
that the ship's SOS signal v/as possibly sent out as
a result of contact with our own 8th Destroyer Flotilla.
For further details about Operations '^Elisabeth'" and
i?Anke" see '.Yar Diary, part C, Vol". II b, file Operation
;i Elisabeth'"' .
Group West has been Instructed by the Naval Staff to
continue long-range reconnaissance for the REIHER,; at
least with a few planes, until 6 April. Group West
reported in this connection that it will not be
possible to resume the reconnaissance until 3 April,
as Air Commander, Atlantic Coast has, at his own
-6- CONFIDENTIAL
1 April 1943
CONFIDENTIAL
urgent request, had to be given two days' respite to
re-establish the operational readiness of his planes.
Naval Staff has informed Group West, Supply Ship
Unit, West, Naval Special Service, Bordeaux, with
copy to Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Section
III and Chief, Naval Communications Division that all
blockade runners which have not sailed by 1 April
1943 will then be unable to do so until late fall.
•The preliminary measures so far taken will have to be
rescinded unobtrusively. The sailing orders issued
should be canceled but not destroyed.
Order to this
in War Diary,
Channel Coasts
effect l/Skl I
Part C, Vol. I
k 976/43 Gkdos . Chefs
Nothing to report .
Ill* North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:
1. North Sea;
Minesweeping operations and escort duties were
canceled owing to the weather. The patrol positions
were not taken up-
One mine-exploding vessel was in action merely In
order to sweep the channel from Elbe I to Wesermuende
2 . Norway /Northern Waters ;
Enemy Situations
Radio intelligence reported four Russian submarines
off the Arctic coast of Norway. One submarine left
Polyarnoe for the Barents Sea„ Russian PT boats are
expected to put out from the bays of the Rybachi
Peninsula on 2 April,
According to an Intelligence report, a convoy of 40
steamers is said to be leaving Belfast for Murmansk
on 5 April .
Own Situations
There Is nothing to report from the area of Naval
C ommand , Norway .
-7-
CONFIDSNTIAL
1 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Group North informed the REGENSBURG of weather con-
ditions . As the ship has not been located either by
the Air Force or by submarines, she has been ordered
by Group North in Radiogram 1735 to report passing
longitude of Point ,?Luziei? by a short signal.
Naval forces have been ordered to wait at Point
"Caesar" until 2000 on 2 April,
The same air reconnaissance as for 1 April is planned
for 2 April.
IV, Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea;
The patrol in the Skagerrak during the night of 31 March
had to be canceled as the patrol boats were on escort
duty. It was carried out by five patrol boats during
the day .
Escort duties were postponed for 24 hours, partly owing
to the weather. Vessels were sent out to sweep the
channels . One mine was swept off Cape Kullen, one west
of Anholt and one off Pillau. The German diving tender
HARI.1SD0RF sank off Zings t, presumably having struck a
mine . :. -- -
Both Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic
States had nothing to report.
V. Submarine Warfare ;
1. Enemy Situation;
There was brisk reconnaissance activity in the Bay of
Biscay, 30 planes having been observed.
2 . Own Situation;
In the North Atlantic a now group, "Loewenherz5* , con-
sisting of 15 submarines, has been formed which is to
take up position in reconnaissance line from AK 2516
to 5919 at midnight on 2 April and lie in wait for the
eastbound convoy on course 260°. No reports of
successes have been received either from the North or
the South Atlantic, or from the Cape area.
For further details see "Supplement to the Submarine
Situation51 in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.
-8- CONFIDENTIAL
1 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
VI . Aerial Warfare;
1. British Isles and Vicinity;
The 3rd Air Force had 140 planes out on operation
over the west area and 12 over the Mediterranean.
A place on the Isle of Wight was bombed and machine-
gunned by three FW 190' s in the late afternoon.
During the day planes were observed three times over
the coast of northwestern France.
Between 1600 and 1800 the air force station and city
of Trier were heavily raided. For further details
see "Daily Situation Report'5.
2 . Mediterranean Theater;
The 2nd Air Force has been concentrating on supporting
the defensive action of Army Group } Africa.
The enemy repeatedly attacked our Tunisian airfields.
Such raids are expected to Increase. Five Spitfires
and four bombers were shot down.
3. Eastern Front;
On 31 March 20 enemy planes were shot down over our
lines s two of our planes were lost.
The 4th Air Force's report on the result of its
reconnaissance of the Black Sea ports has furnished
us with no fresh information.
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean;
The FORMIDABLE entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean
on the evening of 31 March.
ko
On the forenoon of 1 April a convoy of 14 steamers ,
1 naval landing craft and 6 escort vessels left
Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.
In the afternoon the RODNEY carried out a firing
practice east of Gibraltar. Towards noon, the Swedish
Red Cross ships BARDALAND and FERRIS entered
-9- CONFIDENTIAL
1 ApriT 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Gibraltar from the Aegean Sea, while the Swedish vessels
AKKA and YARRAWONGA left making for the west.
Only slight shipping traffic was observed in the
Western Mediterranean,
Submarines were observed near San Vito, south of
Palermo, where the coast was under fire, and also
west of Cape Bon. According to Italian radio
intelligence, one convoy entered Tripoli from the
east on 31 March. Nothing to report from the Eastern
Mediterranean.
2 . Own Situation Mediterranean.
A PT boat minelaying operation has been planned for
the night of 1 April. The minesweepers M "6021", "6023"
and five auxiliary motor minesweepers entered La Spezia
on 51 March. The minesweeper M "6024" and the sub-
marine chaser UJ "2210" sailed from Naples to Trapani.
The report of moored mines off Cape Spartivento (see
War Diary 31 March) has been corrected. It was a
drifting mine .
German Naval Command, Italy reported that 602 German
soldiers were missing and 340 saved, when the two
Italian destroyers struck mines and sank off Cape Bon
on 24 March,
German Naval Command, Italy reported that in agreement
with the German Staff attached to the Italian Naval
High Command, the HERMES will be specially commissioned
for minelaying operations, and that the Italian Naval
High Command was therefore requested not to attach her
to the 7th Coast Patrol Force for operations, but to
place her directly under the. German Naval Command;.
The Naval Attache, Rome reported that according to
information from the Italian Navy emanating from a
reliable source, the movements of warships and merchant
vessels in French south coast ports were being
regularly betrayed to the enemy in detail. V/ho
discloses the information has not yet been discovered.
The Intelligence Servic e has been brought into action.
Two steamers were sunk and a third set on fire during
an enemy air raid on Cagliari on the afternoon of 31
March.
-10- CONFIDENTIAL
I April 1943 COITFIDBITTIAL
3 . Sea Transport Situation;
Of the eight ships which left for Tunisia on 23
March , only the tanker BIV01TA has reached Bizerta,
and the steamers 3ELLUIT0 and PIEHRE CLAUDS Tunis.
The following were lost; the steamer ITUORA (3,075
G.R.T.) by bomb and aerial torpedo hits off Cape Bon
at 1345 on 31 March; the steamer CREI.IA (1,684 G.R.T.)
in a PT boat attack 18 miles east of Bizerta at 0145
on 1 April; the steamer BEMEVENTO (5,229 G.R.T.) was
torpedoed and beached. One PT boat was shot up by a
German submarine chaser. The steamer LE B0RG1TE and
the destroyer LUBINIA as well as the steamer AQUILA
were beached.
The transports ;;5;?, i?6n, w7'li , "9;i and "IS1'1 were
expected to enter Tunis on the evening of 1 April.
Their arrival has not yet been reported. Of the 46
small craft which left Marsala and Trapani, so far
only seven Italian naval landing craft have reported
their arrival in Tunis .
The resumption of transport traffic with the improve-
ment in the weather, has occasioned a very regrettable-
number of losses. According to reports received by
Operations Division, the following vessels wore sunk
by enemy action in the Mediterranean during March l
28 ships, totaling 78,223 G-.R.T. as well as 2
destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 2 submarine chasers, 5
tugs, 3 motor sailing vessels, 3 harbor defense
vessels, 6 Siebel ferries, 1 landing boat, 2 naval
landing craft and 1 lighter . In addition, 9 ships
totaling 45,769 G-.R.T., 4 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats,
3 German motor minesweepers s 2 German naval landing
craft and 2 landing boats were damaged. The balance
sheet is appalling.
It has been reported in connection with the progress
made in the transfer of ships from south coast French
ports to Italy, that so far 99 French and 24 neutral
ships have been transferred.
4 . Area Naval Group South;
Aegean Seas
Two Greek fishing vessels were stopped by a submarine
-11- CONFIDENTIAL
1 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
off Kassandras on 31 March. One of them was sunk.
According to an Italian report, another enemy sub-
marine was fired on by an Italian net layer group
northeast of Khios on the same day. The report is
rather doubted, as air reconnaissance did not spot
anything.
A submarine chase has started off Kassandras and
Khios. Escort duties in the Aegean Sea are being
delayed by the submarine menace. An attempt to
dynamite the quarters of the Port Commander, Canea
was made on the evening of 31 March, causing only
slight material damage.
The Naval Staff pointed out to Group South that the
proposals for the defense of the Corinth Canal will
have to be dealt with by German Naval Command, Italy
as being the competent authority, for Vice Admiral
Ruge at the Italian Admiralty is only carrying out
the limited task of safeguarding the supplies for
Tunisia.
Black Sea:
Enemy Situation:
Nothing to report.
Own Situation;
The tanker torpedoed by submarine U "24" was not
sighted again by our air reconnaissance.
The 1st PT Boat Flotilla did not put out owing to
deteriorating weather conditions .
The Crimea convoys and the Constantza-Sevastopol
convoy service have been carried out according to
plan, as has the 12th Anapa transport. The west-
bound ferry service across the Strait of Kerch
carried, among other things, approximately 5,000
men, 370 motorized and 560 horse-drawn vehicles,
and 2,317 horses; the eastbound, 1,224 soldiers and
approximately 2,500 tons of supplies.
Admiral, Black Sea reported that 101,665 soldiers,
17,970 prisoners, 14,961 civilians and 1,910 wounded
136,500 men In all - more than 38,000 motorized and
more than 15,000 horse-drawn vehicles, and nearly
60,000 horses were transferred by sea up to 1 April.
-12- CONFIDENTIAL
1 April, 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
In answer to a request from Group South for further
submarines, Naval Staff stated that it had decided
not to allocate any more for the time being, in view
of concentration of forces and slight prospects of
success in the Black Sea. Any reinforcements at a
later date vrould depend on the results- achieved by
the six submarines now operating there.
Admiral, Black Sea reported that one of the pre-
requisites for the proposed use of the naval
artillery lighters was that the crews be accommodated
on board. This matter will be further dealt with by
the Quartermaster Division (see teletype 1240) .
VIII. Situation East Asia;
It is reported from Tokyo that the following vessels
took part in the action west of Attu; on the Japanese
side, 2 heavy and 1 light cruiser and 4 destroyers; on
the American side, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser and
4 destroyers. Neither side was supported by Its air
force. According to Japanese observation, the forward
turret of the cruiser PENS AC OLA was put out of action
and there was a large fire in the stern. There were
also fires on a light cruiser of the OI.IAKA class. Two
destroyers were damaged. There were no Japanese losses.
The American ships took evasive action to the east.
The Japanese were escorting supply transports bound for
Attu and Kiska.
Aerial warfare in the area of New Guinea and the
Solomon Islands has been further increasing In intensity.
Enemy air raids have been mainly directed against the
Japanese air base at Iiunda . Japanese naval anti-
aircraft guns brought down 41 planes in the middle of
March.
On 19, 22 and 26 March Japanese planes successfully
raided the American air base on Canton Island. On 25
March two carriers and ten destroyers were sighted
southeast of the Solomrn Islands.
On 28 March there were Japanese air raids on Oro Bay
(south of Buna). An 8,000 G.R.T. transport, a 5,000
G.R.T. one, a destroyer and a patrol vessel were sunk.
In the course of an engagement with 30 enemy fighters,
11 were shot down for certain and probably 8 more .
Three Japanese planes were lost.
-13- CONFIDENTIAL
1 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
On 13 March there was a Japanese raid on Port Darwin;
16 planes were shot dov/n. Only slight damage was
caused by enemy raids in the Alfura Sea.
On 19 March the Japanese passenger steamer TAKACHIHQ
MA.RU (8,154 G.R.T.) was sunk off Formosa. Only 200 of
the 1,000 passengers were saved.
\
-14- CONFIDENTIAL
2 April- 1943- CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance .. .'.... J* . . . . . .-"■
Great Britains . . -• •
.. In the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill once more refused to
discuss submarine warfare on 1 April.
In the Canadian Parliament, Mr. Eden declared that the sub-
marine was still the greatest menace. He furthermore stated
that Germany,, Italy and Japan would have to bo completely
disarmed, and that there would always be 'differences of
opinion among the Allies but they were hot insurmountable.
United States ;
Secretary Knox stated in a speech that the main responsibility
for the victory at sea rested with the United States, because
she had the largest fleet. Naval warfare would as never
before in history be the decisive factor in the achievement
of victory. This war was a naval war to an infinitely greater
extent than ever before, a global" war, involving every ocean.
France s
According to Router G-eneral-»-de Gaulle- ha-s;- announced his great
desire to go to North Africa immediately, accompanied by
several members of the French National Committee of Liberation,
Turkeys
According to our own News Agency it has been announced in the
Turkish press that the State Aviation Department has decided
to have seven new airfields built in various parts of the
country.
Japan;
According to Domei, Piear Admiral Prince Kuni has been
appointed Chief of the Combined Naval Air Forces.
Hungary;
The Hungarian Premier arrived In Rome on a visit on 1 April.
-15- CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division reported that the
ships' anchorages in Alta Fjord are well defended. Admiral,
North Sea Station gave an account of Wilhe lms haven* s
inadequate air defenses. Until the number of anti-aircraft
batteries has been increased, supposedly by the end of
October, Wilhelmshaven will continue to be unsuitable for
berthing important vessels .
II. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reported that the
question of the iron quotas for constructions had not
yet been definitely solved. In any case, subordinate
authorities were refusing to deliver the quotas
promised to the Navy. It was suggested that the Commander
in Chief, Navy, after having studied a preparatory report
by the Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament, should once more
broach the matter to Minister Speer on the occasion of
the coming visit to the Berghof .
III. The Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reported among
other things, that strikes and boycotts have been
occurring in the heavy industries of Milan.
In a Highly Restricted Circle;
IV. Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section, Operations
Division reported on the situation regarding long-range
reconnaissance planes.
V . Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:
a. German Naval Command, Italy plans to use the HERMES
for mine laying operations . Naval Staff felt that an
agreement with. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South
would have to be reached on this question. Chiefs
Naval Staff concurred.
b. No news of the DOGGER BANK has been received. Recon-
naissance operations for this ship will be continued
until 6 April. A submarine rendezvous with the IRENE
has been agreed on with Submarine Division. Neither
has a report been received from the RSGENSBURG. The
destroyers GAL3TSR and RIEDEL have sustained severe
sea damage and have had to break off operations.
Naval Staff felt that it had been most unwise to send
out the destroyers in such weather.
-16- CONFIDENTIAL
v_
2 April .1943 CONFIDENTIAL
VI. The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff suggested that the
HIMALAYA should, if possible, put out immediately In
order to take advantage of this month's remaining new
moon period. The Chief, Naval Staff concurred.
VII. The Chief, Operations Division reported that the Japanese
Naval Attache had been informed about the Italian trans-
port submarines.
Special Items
I. Vice Admiral Ruge reported on the activity to date of
the German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty. It
would appear that the German Staff's work is beginning
to bear fruit. The general situation is being very
greatly influenced by the enemy air force's numerical
superiority. Our own escort forces are at present
."inadequate, both in number and armament. Copy of the
report as per l/Skl 1043/43 Gkdos. Chefs, in War Diary,
Part C, Vol. XIV.
II. A record of the investigation up to 1 April 1943 Into
the possibilities of a special delivery of 18,000 tons
of fuel oil from the stocks of the German Navy to the
Italian Navy in view of operations by Italian battleships
in defense against enemy landings, will be found in
l/Skl 9661/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part- C , Vol-. -IS. —-It -
would only be possible by foregoing the proposed transfer
of the NUERNBERG and of a destroyer- and two torpedo-boats
from Norway back to home waters, and of four destroyers
from Western Prance to Norway via home waters, -and by
abandoning all other plans to exchange light naval
forces. The resulting economy might amount to some
4,000 tons which would then be available in the second
half of April. (See also War Diary 3 April.)
III. According to information from the Naval (Ship)
Construction Division, the Italian Navy has requested
that In order to increase the capacity of the Italian
'shipyards, repairs to German submarines In the Mediter-
ranean be carried out as soon as possible in Toulon
instead of in La Spezia and Pola. The Naval (Ship)
Construction Division has come to an agreement whereby
this change will be effected by 1 August 1943. It will
-17- CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
mean increasing the submarine repair capacity in Toulon
from five to sixteen submarines by the end of July.
Naval Staff will have to point out to the Italian Navy
that the strength of the Toulon air defenses will have
to be increased accordingly.
IV. The Commander In Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff
replied as follows to; Naval Staff's request for sub-
marine protection by attacks on the enemy air force in
the Bay of Biscay (see War Diary 5 March) :
"The Commander in Chief, Air Force is aware of the
situation described by the Naval Staff. But it Is for
the present impossible to effect a change as there are
no better types of planes available. In order at least
to Improve reconnaissance, an order has already been
issued for one of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast's
reconnaissance squadrons to be re-equipped with the Ju
88 T 1 as soon as this type comes off the assembly lines,
This change will probably begin in April. The advantage
of this new type lies in the air-cooled BMW engine which
Is far less vulnerable to gunfire than a water-cooled
engine, as well as in the fact that the entire series
is equipped with a cold starting device (G-M !)..."
Situation 2 April 1945
I . war in Foreign Waters;
1. Enemy Situation;
Radio Daventry gave details of the sinking of a large
German blockade running tanker about 600 miles west-
southwest of Cape Finisterre at 0945 on 26 Feb. It
was spotted by a U.S. plane with R.A.F. Coastal
Command. The heavy cruiser SUSSEX reached the .reported
position six- hours later and opened fire at a range
of nine miles. The blockade runner caught fire and
was abandoned by the crew. It sank at 0610 the next
morning. A FJ 200 having been reported shortly before
the sinking of the ship, and submarines having been
sighted nearby, the British cruiser was unable
-18- CONFIDENTIAL
/
2 April 1943 2 CONFIDENTIAL
pick up the survivors'. The British, le arnt from • •
statements made by prisoners that our submarines
were being sent out to meet the. incoming blockade
runners. In conclusion Radio Daventry stated that
" within eight weeks five German blockade runners had
been sunk.
This all referred to the loss of the HOHENFRIEDBEKG.
According to an intelligence report , the convoy from
Pensacola to Dakar is scheduled, to leave round about
7 April. It is said to include eleven troop trans-
ports filled to capacity, and seven large tankers.
2 ; Own Situation;
The following instructions have been issued as a
precautionary measure to the DOGGER BANK in Radiogram
1923 ^
1. Naval Staff has no Information on position of
DOGGER BANK.
2. According to Naval Staff's calculations, fuel
'supply must be nearly exhausted. Refueling
possible in Cadiz, Vigo and Ferrol. Any one of
these ports may be resorted to if need be.
3.- Radio communication permitted, If thought necessary
and likely to result in assistance from here.
Weather report was transmitted to DOGGER BANK In
Radiogram 1540.
In Radiogram 1130 the KARIN was instructed to report
her position at a suitable opportunity, as no news
of the ship's fate was available.
Group West was informed of Radiogram 1923 to the
DOGGER BANK with the additional remark that the
request for a position report south of the Azores
had not yet been answered and that a direct request
for a position report might Well, in the opinion of
the Naval Staff, greatly endanger the ship between
the Azores and the Portuguese coast, so that the
commander would be only too justified in forbidding
the transmission of radio messages except in
cases of special emergency. Copy of Instructions in
accordance with l/Skl I k 997/43 Gkdos . Chefs, in War
Diary, Part C, Vol. I.
-19- CONPIDENTIAI
2 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
II. Situation West Area:
1. Enemy Situation:
At 1020 air reconnaissance spotted two destroyers
320 miles northwest of Cape Ortegal making for the
north.
2 . Own Situations
Atlantic Coast:
Two ELM/ J mines were swept off Brest. The town and
dockyard area of St. Nazaire were raided by about 15
enemy planes at 2303. The locks were undamaged. One
four-engined plane was shot down by two patrol boats
on the outer Gironde .
The PIETRO 0RSS0L0 entered Bordeaux at 1930.
The HIMALAYA dropped anchor in Paillax Roads at 1830
on 1 April and entered La Pallice at 1330 on 2 April.
The Naval Staff informed the Naval Attache, Madrid
that the HliiALAYA had broken off her preparations for
scuttling and had returned to Western Prance.
Group West was ordered to investigate and report at
the earliest opportunity whether the HIMALAYA would
be able to sail again soon (condition of the ship, crew
and conduct of the captain). If the results are
satisfactory, preparations will have to be undertaken
at once - issue of Naval Staff's operational orders
translated into Italian, and recognition signal
instructions for overseas by ,f3etasoml? (Italian sub-
marine station in Bordeaux, Tr. N.), replacement of
the captain, if necessary, etc. The signal equip-
ment has been arranged by the Naval Staff.
Commanding Admiral, Group West submitted a short
report on Operation "Elisabeth" (Blockade running
operation in Bay of Biscay area - Tr. N. ). supplementing
reports made during the operation. Copy as per l/Skl
1003/43 Gkdos. Chefs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.
The report rightly stresses that the credit for the
successful execution of this operation was essentially
due to the long-range reconnaissance of Air Commander,
Atlantic Coast. On the conclusion of Operation
-20- CONFIDENTIAL
I
2 April- 1945 CONFIDENTIAL-
''Elisabeth'1' , ten blockade runners totaling 60 ,,053
G-.R.T. had been escorted out, and five- totaling
38,080 G.R.T, brought in by G-roup West since 1 Oct.
1942. Two homeward bound and two outward bound
blockade runners totaling 30,687 G,R.T were lost by
enemy action in Group West's area within the same
period. These losses are to be attributed to the
lack of long-range reconnaissance which then prevailed.
Naval Staff fully concurred with the opinion of the
Commanding Admiral, Group West.
Channel Coasts
Nothing to report.
III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters %
1. North Seas
Escort duties were postponed for 24 hours owing to
the weather. Ivline sweeping was canceled,- patrol
positions were not taken up. In the Dutch area, an
enemy plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft
guns .
2 . Norway/Northern Waters g
Enemy Situation;
The 5th Air Force's reconnaissance of the areas
southwest of Jan May en and off the east coast ©f
Scotland did not produce any sighting reports . Nine
planes were detected by radio Intelligence over the
central part- -of the North- -Sea y -there -.was., .slight
activity by the Iceland air squadrons .
Own Situation;
At 2250 on 30 March two Russian vessels were1 sighted
off Kimoniemij they withdrew to the north after
being fired on by the Battery Petsamo. A mine was
cut loose west of Makkauer on 31 March. A Norwegian
sea rescue cutter was unsuccessfully attacked by
bombs and machine-guns in Varanger Fjord on 29 March.
Slight enemy air activity- was reported over the ■
Vardoe - North Varanger area and Petsamo-; no bombs
were dropped. Escort duties were carried out
according to plan.
■ ■ -21- CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
The 6th Destroyer Flotilla with the GALSTER, JACOBI
and RIEDEL had to break off the exploratory sweep
undertaken to pick up the REGENSBURG owing to sea
damage and engine trouble. The flotilla started its
return passage to Narvik.
The torpedo boats GREIF and JAGUAR completed their
submarine chase off Ands Fjord. The JAGUAR sustained
sea damage and developed engine trouble. The boats
put in to Harstad. The four submarines of the second
wave are being formed into Group ;tTaifunn with orders
to proceed at high speed and occupy grid squares
AB 3255, 8267, 8227 and 8261.
Group North informed the REGENSBURG that air recon-
naissance had been canceled, owing to weather conditions,
and that the destroyers were putting in for the same
reason, but that our submarines would be stationed in
defense positions at Point "Caesar" from 1600 on. The
REGENSBURG- received instructions in Radiogram 1030 that
as soon as Point "Caesar" is reached, according to her
own fix and she is not picked up by our own forces
there, she is to steer straight for the southern point
of the Lofoten Islands and enter West Fjord, where she
will be taken under escort by our forces at the
entrance. The REGENSBURG is to report her departure
from Point "Caesar" in a short radio message. The-
first submarine will not reach Point "Caesar'' until
about 2200 owing to delay. The REGENSBURG was
furthermore directed to transmit five-letter groups
beginning with the letter nJ" for a period of two
minutes, after having passed Point "Luzie", at 2300/2 .4.
or 0400/3.4. for bearings to be taken.
IV. Skagcrrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea;
The patrolling of the Skagerrak was carried out by three
patrol boats. Eleven vessels were detailed to sweep tho
channels- In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses,
Baltic. The Aarhus - Oslo shipping traffic was postponed
"for two days owing to the lack of escort vessels . One
ground mine was swept north of Buelk and one southwest
of Anholt. Shipping in the western part of the Baltic
Sea was warned of drifting mines .
According to information from the Naval attache, Stockholm,
the Swedish Navy is insisting on channel 90 being used for
the. time being. Until such time as an identical form of
course instructions has been worked out by tho Swedish
Navy and the Naval Attache, Stockholm, divergences In the
-22- CONFIDENTIAL
3
")
2 -April- 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
descriptions of the channels by the German- and Swedish
stations issuing these instructions , will have to be
accepted.
Commander, Minesweepers , Baltic reported that the first
partial minefield ;? Na shorn IV" had been laid. The Net
Defense Unit is continuing Operation !iV/alrossu . The ,lB"
group of the 31st Minesweeper Flotilla put in to Licpaja
on account of the weather with 18 ships bound for Tallinn.
Special Items i
The Minister of Transportation requested -escort- and
anti-aircraft protection for ferry boats between
Trclleborg and Sassnitz. Naval Staff stated that anti-
aircraft protection had already been provided for as
part of the proposed defense measures. A request for
fighter protection was passed on to the Commander in
Chief , Air Force, Operations Staff as being the competent
authority.
V. Submarine V/arfaros
1. Enemy Situation; .'-_..... •..-..•.
Reconnaissance activity in the Bay of Biscay was
normal, 29 planes having been observed.
2 . Own Situation;
In the North Atlantic, submarine U n229iI sighted a
single ship in AK 1576, course .320°, and was ordered
to pursue her as far as the western limit of the
closed area, but not to attack before chocking up on
her type very carefully owing' to the lack of exact
data on the blockade runners .
Submarine U ir17Sn intercepted a convoy In CF 3389 at
1605, course 200° .
Submarine U ;?129u of the southern group sank the
refrigerator ship MELBOURNE STAR (12,806 G.R.T.) in
DD 9929. No further successes were reported from the
Atlantic. For further details see "Supplement to the
Submarine Situation'' in War Diary, Part 3, Vol. IV.
-2'3- CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
VI. Ae rial warfare;
1. British Isles and Vicinitys
So verity- seven planes belonging to the 3rd Air Force
were over the west area and seven over the Mediter-
ranean. During the day there was slight enemy air
activity over the occupied part of the west area.
There were no raids. In the evening, 45 planes were
over the Lorient - St. Nazaire area. For the raid on
St. Nazaire, see "Situation West Area".
2 • Mediterranean Theater;
The 2nd Air Force is supporting the battles of Army
Group Africa with all available forces and concentrating
on the southern sector in repeated day and night attacks.
Reconnaissance, escort and air transport operations
were carried out as usual. Nocturnal enemy air
operations against Sicily were ineffective. On 1 April
three bombers carried out a nuisance raid on Bone.
Three enemy planes v/ere shot down in all.
3. Eastern Fronts
Nothing to report.
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea;
1, Enemy Situation Mediterranean;
On the evening of 1 April a convoy of 15 steamers, 1
transport and 1 tanker entered Gibraltar from the
Mediterranean. The transport and two steamers were
damaged. On 2 April a convoy of 10 steamers and 2
landing craft accompanied by 5 escort vessels reached
Gibraltar from the Atlantic. In the afternoon, the
NELSON and five destroyers ostensibly carried out a
firing practice east of Gibraltar. One corvette and
20 LCT's have left for the Mediterranean.
According to an intelligence report 5 a convoy con-
sisting of 28 steamers and one seaplane parent ship
was said to have left Cardiff for Algiers on 31 March.
■24- CONFIDENTIAL
2 April-1943 CONFIDENTIAL,
..Enemy Situation Branch, Intelligence Division stated
.'that the total shipping space available in the
Western Mediterranean was, once again, 300,000 G.R.T.
below normal. Reinforcements In the shape of three
convoys, reported under way, are anticipated. The
concentration of forces now prevailing in the
Western Mediterranean is emphasized by the continuous
influx of material and landing craft.. This unstable
state of affairs may well continue, particularly if
the enemy wishes to await further developments in
the present fighting around Tunis, so as to be, if
necessary, in a position to attack the supply lines
of the German Army in Tunis with stronger forces.
Brisker shipping traffic has been observed in the
area off Oran; it included an eastbound convoy of
15 steamers at a point 22 miles northeast of the
port at 1722.
A
In Algiers, 7 tankers-, 3 passenger steamers and 54
steamers totaling more than 300,000 G.R.T. were
observed on 31 March. _ Our air reconnaissance sighted
five ships 50 miles southwest of Malta on a north-
easterly course at 2330 on 1 Aprl:l, a convoy of ten
ships off Tripoli at 1030 on 2 April and, for the
first time, 21 LCT's In the harbor. In the afternoon,
there were, seven steamers, one tanker, and additional
small craft in Benghazi.
No important sighting reports, have been received from
the Eastern Mediterranean.
2 . Own Situation Mediterranean;
Two Italian submarines were in the operational area.
Submarine U "755" sank an individually routed 8,000
G.R.T. ammunition steamer in CH 7566 at 0624.
Weather conditions prevented PT boat, motor mine-
sweeper and auxiliary motor minesweeper operations in
Tunisia. The minesweepers M: "6021" and M "6023" and
five' auxiliary motor minesweepers entered Piombino.
The minesweeper M "6024" and the submarine chaser
UJ "2110" were proceeding from Naples to Trapani.
The submarine hunt carried out north of Gape Zebib on
1 April was unsuccessful.
Vice Admiral Ruge reported that It was intended to
carry out minelaying operations in conjunction with
two. Italian destroyers after the arrival of the
-25- CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
HERMES. The Gorman Staff attached to the Italian
Admiralty reported with reference to the disastrous-
events of 31 March and 1 April, that shipping losses
could only be reduced by increasing the air cover and
by using vessels capable of a speed of at least 12
knots, so that most of the danger zone could be
crossed by day and the North African ports entered
before dark.
Following the survey of the situation by the German
Staff attached to the Italian admiralty (sec special
Items, Paragraph I), Vice Admiral Huge depicted the
position of our own defense forces in the Mediterranean
as follows t
Former French torpedo boats arc being taken over. Two
boats will be ready to sail by about the middle of
April; one boat will have had echo-ranging gear
installed by the beginning of May. An aviso will be
commissioned in Port do Bouc on 15 April. The gun
boat YSER is out of commission. Six fast escort
vessels (2 - 3,000 G.-R.T. anti-aircraft corvettes)
and a night fighter control ship will be completed
by the end of June. Six submarine chasers are fully
operational and one partially; one will not be
operational for months as a result of bomb hits .
Six additional submarine chasers (1,000 G-.R.T.
fishing vessels) will be commissioned on 15 April.
Three small motor minesweepers belonging to the 6th
Motor Minesweeper Flotilla are operational \ two are
due for dockyard repairs in Naples; one is lying
seriously damaged at Bizcrta; two vessels on passage
Rhine-Rhone will be ready for action In the second
half of April, four In Kiel dockyard will be ready
to put out on 20 April. Six motor boats will be ready
for operations as auxiliary motor minesweepers at the
beginning of May. Six auxiliary motor minesweepers
(open sea-going lobster boats used as minesweepers)
arc operating in the North African area, five are under
way and will bo ready for operations at the beginning
of April. An additional ten are under way in the Canal
du Midi and will be ready for operations by the middle
of April. One minesweeper (small fishing vessel) is
operating in the North African area, three are on
passage and will bo ready for operations at the
beginning of April. Forty-six motor fishing vessels
for anti-submarine patrols are to be available for
commissioning from the beginning of April onwards.
".York on the overland route, Seine-Saonc, for trans-
porting the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was
■26- CONFIDENTIAL
2 -April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL,
started in the middle of March. The transfer of the
2nd C-un Carrier Flotilla from the west area via the
sane route is under consideration. Eleven nine-
sweeping picket boats in Antibes will bo ready for
loading from the middle of April'.
The German Staff furthermore reported that the 22nd
Submarine Chaser Flotilla confirmed the sinking of
one submarine and the probable sinking of another.
For further details see teletype 1445. ,.
According to a situation report from the -Commanding
General, Armed Forces, South, the hard fighting near
Guettar led to the retaking of the desired defense
position and to an outstanding success. Strong enemy
movements opposite the Faid Pass would suggest that
an attack is also boing planned here.
3 • Sea Transport Situations
The transports KT r'5i?, i?6',?, !i7" and i?9',? entered Tunis
in the forenoon. KT ,?13'" was sunk by a mine or sub-
marine 27 miles north of Cape Bon at 1640 on 1 April.
Three naval landing craft entered Tunis from Trapani
on both 1 and 2 April. According to reports so far
received,, all the Siebel ferries and infantry landing
boats from Marsala, except six, have entered Tunis.
Owing to the most praiseworthy efficiency, it was
possible to unload all the vessels in Tunis and
Bizerta on the same day. The motor ship F03CARINI
entered Naples from Bizerta.
The German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty
made the following report on the incidents of 31
March and 1 April;
1. The fast convoy BELLUNO - PIERRE CLAUDE (13 knots)
reached its destination according to schedule
without being attacked from the' air.
2. The slow convoy (9 knots) of the steamers NUORO,
BENEVENTO and CREMA escorted by two Italian
torpedo boats and two German submarine chasers was
subjected to two .daylight air attacks, the steamer
NUORO being sunk by a bomb and an aerial torpedo
during the second one. Six planes were probably
.shot down, one by a German submarine chaser.
British PT boats launched a night attack immediately
-27- CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
off Bizerta. Sea 4 - 5, The British had a
following sea and withdrew, probably towards
Malta. A large type boat was evidently involved.
The steamer CREMA was stink , the steamer BENEVENTO
damaged and beached. One PT boat was at least
damaged by a German submarine chaser.
3. The very slow convoy (7 knots) consisting of the
steamers LE BORGNE, AQUTLA and 3IV0NA was escorted
by the destroyer LUBIANA, as the convoy leader , a
torpedo boat and three submarine chasers , course
Pantelleria - Cape Bon. Heavy seas caused great
delays , and as a result Cape Bon was passed after
dark. The convoy kept close inshore owing to
minefields . LUBIANA ran aground west of Cape Bon
despite a supposedly accurate fix. LE BORGNE
following in her wake, also ran aground and was
rammed by AQTJILA. LUBIANA broke up. LE BORGNE
was beached and AQUILA and BIVOHA proceeded on
their way. Having sprung a leak, AQUILA was
beached just off Bizerta.
Gorman Naval Command, Italy reported that during
March 1943 the following ships were operating on
the ferry service to Africa;
44 ships totaling 129,339 G.R.T., of which 17
ships totaling 53,110 G-.R.T. wore sunk and 6 ships
totaling 21,323 G.R.T. were seriously damaged. Of
the escort vessels, 3 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats
were lost, 2 destroyers seriously damaged, and 2
of our submarine chasers sunk. Of the small craft,
6 Siebel ferries, 1 naval landing craft, 1 multi-
purpose boat, 1 submarine and 1 landing craft were
sunk. Two multi-purpose boats , 2 naval landing
craft and 2 landing boats were damaged. For further
details see teletype 2015.
4. Area Naval Group Souths
Aegean Sea;
Submarine chasing in the northern part of the Aegean
Soa was broken off owing to the weather. An enemy
submarine opened machine-gun fire on the German DM
(microwave, Tr.N.) Station on the southeastern tip
of the Pcloponnese at 0900 on 1 April. Convoy
traffic was carried out according to plan.
-28- CONFIDENTIAL
2.%iL 1943,. CONFIDENTIAL
Group South reported that with the shipping spr.ee
available at present , the ■..storijig..o£_supplics...on-..-.-..;.
Crete can be carried out in two months if the goods
arc made ready in good time, and if it proves
possible to make extensive use of the ships SINFRA-
and SANTA PS for the undertaking.
Black Seas"
Enemy -Situations
Air reconnaissance reports that there has been
lively shipping traffic along the cast coast.
Own Situations ;" ■ '"•
On the night of 2 April operations by German and
Italian PT boats proved impossible owing to the
weather. -Submarine U u24n has been ordered to
enter Peodosia for •replenishment, and then to return
to the operational area for an additional five days.
Sea convoys were canceled owing to- the weather.
The captured French steamer 3RIGITTE entered Burgas
from the Bosporus on 1 April.
The 13th Anapa transport was carried out with two
naval landing craft, according to plan.
Southeast of Sulina, barrage section i?S 54" was
laid according-, to., plan. Ivlineswoeping. and mine
clearing operations in the Sevastopol area and in
the Strait of . ICerjch were .unsuccessful.
The ferry service across the Strait of Kerch to
Senaya and the fish curing factory was suspended.
All the troops and equipment held in readiness at
Tcman were transported to Kerch. Thus, apart from
what is being transported by air, cast-west trans-
port traffic has been virtually completed.
VIII. Situation East -Asia
Nothing to report.
■29- CONFIDENTIAL
3. .-April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
According to a diplomatic report, since the recent German
successes on the Eastern Front, Britain and the United
States arc afraid lest Russia In the face of the recent
setbacks in her offensive, should surrender. It is therefore
considered imperative that the United States should also give
assurances to Stalin as regards Russia's position after the
war . In London, however, the value of such assurances is not
rated very highly and it is felt that the present waiting
policy should be abandoned and the pressure on the Russian
Front relieved by way of operations on a large scale in
Europe. It is these factors which would point to the
imminence of a large-scale offensive being launched from
North Africa.
according to a Swedish newspaper report from London, the
possibility of a conference between Churchill, Roosevelt and
Stalin Is being widely discussed. The British Minister of
Food stated that at the beginning of the next phase of
extensive military operations Britain would presumably have
to live on her reserves during the initial stage of the
offensive, as military operations would have priority over
all available shipping space. There would therefore probably
be alterations in the food ration.
Conference on the Situation with Chief , Naval Staff
I . Report by Naval Ordnance Division on the Iron quota for
constructions for the second quarter of 1943. Of a total
monthly quota of 387,000 tons, only 8,700 tons are
allotted to the Navy.
This matter (iron allocation) has been earmarked for the
Commander in Chief, Navy's next conference with the
Fuehrer.
There will no longer be any exemptions for the age
groups 1919 to 1922; they are to be conscripted without
exception. The Bureau of Naval Administration will not
conscript the skilled Y/orkers for the Navy. As a
similar decision is not to be expected from the Army and
the Air Force, further difficulties are unavoidable.
-30- CONFIDENTIAL
3' April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
In a Highly Restricted Circles
II. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division
on the situation as regards the REG-ENS BURG- , KAREN and
IRENE. The REGENSBURG is two days overdue. There is
as yet no need for anxiety on this score, as ice and
weather conditions could easily account for the delay.
The fate of the DOGGER BANK Is obscure. The maintenance
of complete radio silence during her capture or sinking
by U.S. patrol forces In the Straits of Natal (narrowest
part of Atlantic between Natal in Brazil and Freetown,
Tr.N.), for instance, is possible, although It should
be remembered that in the case of merchant vessels In
the Atlantic, the enemy Is generally compelled first to
ascertain the enemy character of the ship with great
care, which gives our blockade runners time to transmit
an SOS or short signal. The submarine which tried in
vain to meet the KARIN is now to meet the IRENE.
III. Chief, Operations Division pointed out that the
Commanding Admiral, Group West's summary of Operation
"Elisabeth" (see "Jar Diary 2 April) was most carefully
phrased In the parts dealing with the Air Force.
The survey of the oil situation (see War Diary 2 April)
made by Operations Division reveals an extremely .
critical state of affairs. Any movement of forces will
call for the most careful deliberation. The exploratory
sweep by the three destroyers in Northern Waters was
scarcely justified in view of the fuel oil supply. An
improvement in the situation cannot, from past experience,
| , be expected until June, when there is always a seasonal
drop In Rumania's own consumption.
Special Items
Regarding fuel oil deliveries for the Italian Fleet, the
Naval Attache, Rome reported (in a personal letter to
Chief, Naval Staff based on strictly confidential
information from the German Ambassador) that the Duce
had been informed that the Italian Navy would be supplied
with 2,000 tons of oil. The Duce Is then said to have
once more expressed his unshakeable determination that
the battleships should put out to sea and carry out
unrestricted operations In case of danger despite the
fact that with present oil supplies they will only be
-31- CONFIDENTIAL
3 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
able to remain at sea for 20 hours . The Military
Attache, Rome emphasized the, fact that in his opinion -
not shared by the Chief of Staff, German Naval Command,
Italy in his communication of 17 March to the Chief,
Naval Staff - the spirit of the crews of the Italian
Fleet, above all that of the officers, would guarantee
the ships fighting and being able to put serious
difficulties in the way of any enemy attempt at landing.
The British Intelligence Service will be equally well
aware of this, and is no doubt likewise accurately
informed of the oil situation. Each additional 1,000
tons of oil supplied may, therefore, well have a decisive
influence on the enemy's decisions. The Military Attache,
indicating the significance of Sardinia, said to be the
Achilles heel of the Axis, requested that the question
of allocating some further consignments of 1,000 tons of
oil be once again investigated. The Military Attache,
Rome has, ever since the Casablanca Conference, been of
the firm conviction that the British, possibly under
Russian pressure, are deferring their original plans for
an offensive in the Aegean Sea in favor of concentrating
all their forces on breaching the position at present
held by us in the Western Mediterranean.
On the basis of the views of Naval Staff, Chief, Armed
Forces High Command dispatched to the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, South and to the German General attached
to Italian Armed Forces Headquarters the following
decision on oil deliveries to Italys
After a thorough investigation into the oil situation at
High Command, Navy and into oil production itself, the
Chief, Armed Forces High Command, despite recognizing in
principle the demands of the Italian High Command, finds
himself unable, for the time being, to supply the
requested 18,000 tons of oil.
Reasons z
a. The necessary ample stocks for such a delivery are
available neither in the German Navy nor in the German
economy.
b. The total fuel oil production is at present only
barely sufficient to cover the current requirements
of both navies .
The fuel oil supplies delivered by the German Navy to
cover current Italian requirements have already imposed
-32- CONFIDENTIAL
3>
3 April "1943 CONFIDENTIAL
the maximum restrictions on our own operations and they
could not possibly be exceeded.
The German General attached to Italian Armed Forces
Headquarters has been requested to pass this on to the
Italian High Command adding that everything is being
done by the Armed Forces High Command gradually to
improve this situation.
Copy of Teletype 1/Skl 9952/43 Gkdos . in War Diary,
Part C, Vol. IX.
11= The order of Organization and Mobilization Branch,
Quartermaster Division dated 2 April on the re-
organization of the German Navy (Organization of - Naval
Warfare) has been recorded in V/ar Diary, Part 3, Vol V
as por l/Skl 10211/43. By this order Group North/Fleet
is to be set up by merging Group North and Fleet Command.
The Command's Headquarters are to be ili-el. The Command's
tasks will includes naval warfare in the northern area,
control of naval operations also in the operational areas
of the North Sea and Baltic Sea Station commands if an
enemy attack requires the merging of control for combined
defense purposes, as well as direction and execution of
operational measures which, within naval warfare, in the
northern area, call for a general overruling directive
for the operational areas of the Stations and the
northern area, except for the actual distribution of
forces which will be arranged by the Naval Staff.
The area boundaries between the Stations themselves, as
well as in relation to the northern and western areas
are also laid down in the order.
III. For a summary for March 1943 of losses within the Axis
sphere of influence of merchant vessels sailing under
flags other than German see War Diary files "Own
Shipping Losses 1943,! as per l/Skl 9898/43 Gkdos,
IV. Following the discussion between Commander in Chief, Navy
and administrative president Dichls, the reproaches
leveled by the latter against the Navy in the Black Sea
were thoroughly examined at a conference with Commander
in Chief, Navy on 3 April. For the minutes of the
conference see V/ar Diary, Part C, Vol. XI as per l/Skl
9936/43 Gkdos. The minutes have rcver.lcd the charges
to be so unfounded that Commander in Chief, Navy has
ordered investigations to be made as to whether
proceedings against president Dichls would be justified .
-33- CONFIDENTIAL
3 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
W On 15 Fob. the Peris Working Committee of the Gorman
i'4rmisticc Commission submitted a comprehensive report
by the naval section of the French delegation on French
naval action at the time of the Anglo-American landings
in French North Africa and Morocco.
A copy of the report was passed on to the Foreign Office
by the Naval Staff, A further copy is in War Diary file
"Enemy Large-Scale Operations in the Mediterranean in
November 1342;i as p.r l/Skl 5048/43 gch.
Situation 5 April
I . V/ar i:i Foreign ■.Voters l
!• Fne my Situations
Nothing to report.
2 . Own Situation;
The Naval Staff transmitted a weather forecast to the
DOGC-ER BANK in Radiogram 1421.
oJ
Submarine U ;i229l! reported that the steamer sighted
(see War Diary 2 April) was definitely the former
KOTA NEPAN = KARIN. Position at 0200 on 3 April v;as
reported to be 58° 40' N, 33° ".'/, course north, speed
7 knots .
The Naval Staff transmitted this report in Radiogram
2005 to the SARIN adding instructions to continue her
passage north. In Radiogram 2026 a further order was
given for the rendezvous with the submarine to be
canceled, and that the passage along the ice limits
was to be continued via Denmark Strait, whereby
Points ''Hans'', "Jot'J and ',JLlax'', the positions of
v/hich were transmitted in Radiogram 2058, were to servo
as guides .
The woa-thor report for the KARIN was transmitted in
Radiogram 2228. '
IRENE received the following instructions in Radiogram
1543;
1. In addition to operational order and charts, ship
-34- CONFIDENTIAL
'
3 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
is to take one meteorologist and two specialists
with radar Interception gear aboard from the
submarine .
2. Instructions on radar interception are being sent.
Captain must thoroughly acquaint himself with
these instructions before using the set.
3. When transfer from submarine has been completed,
passage is to be continued north with submarine.
Operational order is to be thoroughly studied and
reports requested passed on to submarine.
Submarine is then to be dispatched.
4. Naval Staff Is making every attempt to prevent
ship from being delayed provided weather conditions
favorable .
Naval Staff informed Group North about the IRENE In
Teletype l/Skl I k 1009/43 Gkdos. Chefs. Copy in War
Diary, Part C, Vol. I.
All ships in foreign waters were informed in Radio-
gram 1303 that PIETRO 0RSE0L0 entered tiie.-.Gironde on
1 April and that the HIMALAYA, contrary to her own
report, did not scuttle herself but returned to the
southwest coast of Prance on 1 April.
II. Situation West Areas
Q
1. Enemy Situation;
Our Atlantic reconnaissance was without result.
2 , Own Situation;
Atlantic Coast;
2,500 bales of rubber, each weighing 100 kg., have
been discharged to date from the PIETRO 0RSE0L0 .
The loss through the leak In hatch 2 has been
estimated at 11,000 bales, the equivalent of 25;£ of
the rubber cargo. So far several hundred bales have
been either picked up or drifted ashore. Salvage
operations are still in progress.
Naval Staff shares the opinion held by Group jrest on
planned action by enemy submarines in the southeastern
-35- CONFIDENTIAL
3 April '1943' " CONFIDENTIAL
part of the Bay of Biscay. This area is particularly
vulnerable also on account of enemy submarine attacks
on our ore ships. Group ,«rest has been informed of
..Naval Staff's opinion that it would be expedient to
direct ships protected against enemy air attack by
destroyers or torpedo boats, not via the channel chosen
for the PIETRG Ql'iSEOLO, but farther north, preferably
.via channel "L.ustergatte1' . For non-escorted ships, a
route along Spanish territorial waters will have to
be chosen. Operations ' Division is to investigate
with Submarine Division to what extent it would be
possible for parts of the 3ay of Biscay to be declared
open to anti-submarine activity "while blockade runners
■are entering or leaving. Copy as per Teletype l/Skl
I k 1007/43 Gkdos. Chefs, in War Diary, Part C,
Vol. II b.
r
.. : At 1750 about 20 enemy planes raided Brest, causing
slight damage. During the night of 2 April one enemy
plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns near
Donges. Another plane was "probably shot down near
St . Nazaire .
Channel Coasts
A mine laying operation by the 5th PT Boat Flotilla has
been planned for the night of 3 April in the area off
Start Point.
III. North Sea/Norway /Northern .meters i
Escort-, duties were carried out according to plan. Patrol ^
positions were taken up.
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. reported that, ground
mines and ATE mines have been laid off the Dutch coast,
which will necessitate a barrage escort for merchant
vessels, This- will moan fresh merchant shipping delays
during bad weather when barrage escort will bo impossible.
As all measures taken so far to- prevent Danish fishermen
from breaking through to the west have proved inadequate,
the Commander in Chief , Air Force, Operations Staff was
asked by the Naval Staff to order attack without warning
on all fishing vessels met both within and west of the
West Wall, (Atlantic Wall? - Tr.N,). For copy of this
request see Teletype 1718.
-36- CONFIDENTIAL
3-- April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
1. Norway/Northern Waters ;
Enemy Situations
Our reconnaissance of Northern Waters was Without
result owing to the weather. Radio intelligence
intercepted seven planes over the central part of
the North Sea. The Iceland squadrons displayed no
activity.
Own Situation;
On the evening of 1 April Russian batteries on the
Rybachi Peninsula fired on our eastbound convoy
without causing damage. They were answered by our
guns. A mine was cut loose off Festerneset on 2
April. The area was temporarily closed to traffic.
Convoy traffic was carried out according to- plan
and without incident.
The RIEDEL entered Narvik at 2210 on 2 April, the
GALSTER at 0630 on 3 April. The extensive sea
damage to the JACOBI and the GALSTER is being
repaired by the repair ship NEIMARK. Repairs in
Trondheim dockyard will be necessary for the RIEDEL
which had three cable leads burnt out in a second
fire. The JAGUAR and GREIF will probably be able
to have their sea damage repaired at Harstad. The
destroyer Z "28w and the BEITZEN are being trans-
ferred to Harstad.
Group North did not receive the bearing signals the
REGENSBURG was ordered' to transmit after passing
Point "Luzie11, and issued orders for the transmission
to be repeated at 1300 and, if necessary at 2300.
As nothing was heard even after 2300, another trans-
mission has been ordered for 0400 on 4 April. The
Group attributed the delay in the reception of the
message by the REGENSBURG to weather conditions and
reported that escort measures wore being continued.
IV. Skagcrrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Seas
The Hirtshals - Arendal patrol line was taken up by
four patrol boats, the Hans t holm barrage gap by one.
Two ships and four submarines were escorted within the
area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Sixteen
vessels and two minesweeping planes were detailed to
sweep the channels. The steamer LUMME ran aground In
• the Great Belt south of Korsoer. Owing to stray enemy
planes having flown in as far as the vicinity of
-37- CONFIDENTIAL
3 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Eclsingoer, aerial mines arc suspected in the northern
outlet of Oorc Sound, Isc Fjord, •-■■and north of Zealand.
Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that work on
the "Nashorn" Barrage and the sweeping of the "Corbetha1'
Barrage had to be suspended owing to the weather.
Operation ;,Jalross;i is being continued by the Not
Defense Unit.
V. Submarine V/arfr.ro;
1. Sncr.iy Situations
Nothing to report.
2 . Own Situation;
According to dead reckoning an eastbound convoy is
expected In the operational area of Group nLocwcnhorzi? .
Submarine U "554" reported that the ninclaying
operation off Fedala and Casablanca has been completed.
No reports of successes have been received. For further
details sec "Supplement to the Submarine Situation'
in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.
Special Items;
Naval Intelligence Division has made a summary of enemy
opinions on the submarine war, adding its own point of
view. Copy as per l/Skl 10369/43 gch. in War Diary,
Part C, Vol. IV. It mainly deals with reports already
mentioned in the War Diary.
VI . Aerial \7 a r f ar c ;
!• British Isles and Vicinity;
The .3rd Air Force had 169 planes out on operations
over the west area and 4 over the Mediterranean.
Eastbourne was raided by sixteen fighter bombers at
noon.- One BV 138 did not return from a defensive
reconnaissance in the Bay of Biscay.
A reconnaissance by six planes has been planned for
4 April between 41° and 46° N up to the limits of
penetration.
-38- CONFIDENTIAL
I
l>
3- April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
The convoy reconnaissance, carried out by two FJ 190 5s
for Commander, PT Boats in the direction of Start
Point, was without result. Fifty-four of our planes
mined the Thames during the night of 3 April.
During the day several groups of enemy planes
penetrated into the west area. Twelve Mosquitoes
attacked an airfield near Abbeville without causing
any significant damage. For details of the enemy
air attack on Brest between 1710 and 1735 see
"Situation West Area" .
The Rhine - Westphalian industrial area was attacked
by 120 - 150 planes on the night of 3 April. The
attacks were concentrated on Essen where heavy damage
was once again caused to Industrial plants and
dwellings. Nineteen enemy planes were shot down.
2 . Mediterranean Theater;
The 2nd Air Force went Into action in Tunisia in
support of the Army. Two steamers sailing In an
enemy convoy west of Tenes were torpedoed by seven
Ju 88's. The Italian Air Force reported the sinking
of one tanker sailing in convoy northeast of Tobruk.
During the night of 3 April some torpedo planes were
detailed to attack an enemy convoy off the Algerian
coast .
3 . Eastern Fronts
No special reports were received from the army fronts
or from the 4th Air Force. One Mosquito was shot
down by our fighters southwest of Lister.
VII, Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Seas
1. Enemy Situation Mediterraneans
Three battleships, one aircraft carrier and one
minelayer were observed in Gibraltar at 1300. The
view of the harbor was greatly obscured by poor
visibility.
The infantry landing ship QUEEN EMMA left for the
Mediterranean at 1910 with three destroyers .
No further reports were received from the Western
Mediterranean.
A submarine was northwest of Naples at 0410.
-39- CONFIDENTIAL
3 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
According to an Italian report,, the steamer TERGESTE
was sunk by a submarine torpedo In the Gulf of
Marathonesi at 1930 on 2 April. According to radio
Intelligence , at 1410 a Gibraltar based plane dropped
depth charges on a German submarine in an unidentified
position. Furthermore, a British formation, several
times detected in radio communication with Tripoli,
was in the Eastern Mediterranean.
2. Own Situation Mediterraneans
PT boats were unable to put out on the night of 2
April owing to the weather. Minesweeping operations
along the coastal channel were also canceled for the
same reason. The minesweepers M "6021", "6023"" and
five auxiliary motor minesweepers entered Civitavecchia,
H "6024" Palermo, and the submarine chaser "2210"
Trapani.
The Naval Staff transmitted to German Naval Command,
Italy and to the German Staff attached to the Italian
Admiralty, Its agreement to the proposed commitment
and subordination of the HERMES.
The Chief, Naval Staff does not agree with Operations
Division that the withdrawal of the HERMES from the
Aegean Sea was primarily designed to afford direct
convoy protection to the supply line to Tunisia and
that the resulting disadvantages In the Aegean Sea
could only be borne in view of the urgency of this
particular task.
3* Sea Transport Situation;
The German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty
reported at the request of Operations Division that
the tactical command of the three convoys which
suffered such heavy casualties on 31 March and 1
April, was in the hands of Italian destroyer and
torpedo boat commanders and that In future every
effort will be made for a German Staff officer to
act as Commander, Convoys.
See Teletype 1845 about equipping the escort vessels
with more defense weapons.
Of the 14 Siebel ferries and 14 infantry landing
craft which put out, 7 of the former and 2 of the
latter have not yet entered Tunis, Furthermore, no
-40- CONFIDENTIAL
3 April. 1943.. CQNFIDENTIAL-
reports have been received on the shipping traffic
"between Italy and Africa, or on the ships which ran
aground on 1 April. For the report by German ITaval
Command, Italy on the activities of German small
craft used for carrying supplies to Africa between
1-31 March, see Teletype 0630. Thirteen naval
landing craft and 45 Siebel ferries and infantry
landing craft took part and they carried out -55 and
135 unescorted trips, respectively. This month
every naval landing craft had 10*8 days and every
Siebel ferry and infantry landing craft 5*7 days at
sea. Transport figures up to 21 March were as follows^
2, 760 . 5 tons of ^supplies, 157 vehicles, 15 tanks, 33
guns and 186 men.
4. Area Naval Group South i
Aegean Seas
An enemy submarine was unsuccessfully attacked with
six depth charges by our naval landing craft in the
northern part of the Aegean Sea. Submarine chase by
the Coastal Defense Flotilla, Macedonia and by planes
in the northern part of the Aegean Sea on 2 April was
also without result.
The HERMES left Salamis at 1300 on 2 April for
transfer to Italy. Convoy traffic was carried out
according to plan.
Black Sea;
Enemy Situations
Air reconnaissance did not sight any shipping along
the east coast.
Own Situations
The German and Italian PT boats were unable to put
out for operations on the night of 2 April. The PT
boat operation planned for the night of 3 April also
had to be canceled.
The sea convoys have been once more resumed. A towed
convoy escorted by two naval landing craft en route
from- Yalta to Feodosia was attacked by two enemy
planes with about 20 bombs on 2 April. One vessel
was slightly damaged.
-41- CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
The 15th Anapa convoy was carried out according to
plan. The 14th convoy left Kerch with four naval
landing craft.
Submarine U ,i24w entered Feodosia for replenishment
at 1600.
Arrival and dispatch was impeded by bad roads on the
Taman side of the ferry route across the Strait of
Kerch. Only small amounts for the east-west convoy
were assembled ready at the fish curing factory and
Taman. On 3 April 952 tons of supplies were carried
by the Navy from west to east.
VIII. Situation East Asia?
Nothing to report.
-42- CONFIDENTIAL
4-.April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL,
Items of Political Importance , ;,
Reuter reported that a discussion .took place between Mr.
Churchill and General de Gaulle on 2" Apr £ IT "~
On the same day there was a meeting at Lie 1 ilia 'between
General Clark of the United States and General Orgaz, the
Commissioner of Spanish Morocco.
No further items of importance have been' received.
Special Items
1. The focal point of our submarine warfare continues to be
in the Atlantic. Tonnage sunk there has repercussions in
all the other theaters . The number of large submarines
at Germany's disposal is. at -the moment insufficient for
the submarine warfare In the Indian Ocean to be extended
north of the equator as far as the Arabian Sea. Naval
Staff therefore asked Vice Admiral Nomura to investigate
whether there might not also be chances of success during
the monsoon period by using the far larger Japanese sub-
marines. In view of the situation in the Mediterranean,
action against enemy shipping Is particularly desirable
In these waters. For a letter to this effect from the
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, l/Skl I opa. 986/43 Gkdos .
Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.
It was stated in the same letter that as soon as more
large German submarines were ready for operations, the
Naval Staff would approach the Japanese Admiralty In good
time to discuss extending the operational area and using
the base at Penang or provisioning from a floating base.
2. In brief news on the enemy situation, Enemy Situation
Branch, Intelligence Division reported on anti-submarine
operations, increased convoy escort, auxiliary aircraft
carriers, warship movements, interesting appointments and
also on the losses and damage to warships announced by
the enemy. Copy as per l/Skl 9443/43 geh. in War Diary,
files "Data on the Enemy Situation".
-43- CONFIDENTIAL
4 April
194-3
CONFIDENTIAL
Situation 4 April
I. War in Foreign Waters;
1. Enemy Situations
Nothing to report.
2. Own Situations
A weather report was transmitted to the KARIN in
Radiogram 1217. The ship was informed In Radiogram
1402 that no patrols or locations had been observed
lately In Denmark Strait and that the ice limit
ascertained on 21 March ran north of the line joining
the points WHI?, "J", and HMn . Under present weather
conditions the ice limit is north of these points,
but may quite possibly in parts be somewhat further
south. The best protection for the ship would be
hazy weather. The positions for points UL" and i?C"
are given in Radiogram 1525..
The KARIN received the following directive in
Radiogram 1950;
1. Our air reconnaissance may be expected from Point
l»T
Max-' onwards . The types encountered will be
FW 200 's,
will be a
BV 138' s and Ju 88 l s . Later on there
close air escort along the coast by Ju
2.
88' s and He 115' s or Arado 196 's
On being located by enemy air reconnaissance,
immediately steer a deceptive courses if west of
the island, towards the port; if east of the
island, to the northeast as steered by Independently
routed ships bound for Murmansk.
3. Group North will assume command approximately from
Point "Max" onwards. Group North's radiograms
will contain the letter "Nanni" written three times
after the number.
4. One of our submarines is at .point "Max-'] she
to meet the KARIN
report her later.
but, if possible, to sight
is not
and
5. It is planned that our destroyers, torpedo boats,
or submarines will meet the KARIN at Point ;iCaesar'
and that they will bring charts of Norway and
-44-
CONFIDENTIAL
4. April 1943
CONFIDENTIAL
escort the ship to Narvik via Harstad through
Ands Fjord. The area off the Norwegian coast is
endangered by submarines, planes and mines.
II. Situation West Areas
1. Enemy Situation?
At 2233 radio Intelligence intercepted an enemy
sighting report from the commander of a British-
formation about 20 miles east of Yarmouth. Plymouth
transmitted the suspected presence of our PT boats
in the Portland area.
Air reconnaissance by units of Air Commander,
Atlantic Coast was without result.
2. Own Situations
Atlantic Coasts
Jn.
Seven hundred and sixty-four bales of rubber from
the PIETRO 0RSE0L0 had been salvaged by 1100
according to a report from the Naval Office, Bordeaux.
On 1 April Naval Staff was ordered by Commander in
Chief, Navy to point out to Group West that the
responsibility for the preservation and safety of
the cargo of the PIETRO 0RSE0L0 rested with the Navy,
and that In view of the vital Importance of the
cargo of rubber to our war economy and the impossi-
bility of replacing it, It was necessary to ensure
all possible precautions, quickest unloading and,
if necessary, Immediate dispatch, safeguarding
against sabotage, in conjunction with Commanding
General, France.
On 3 April the attention of Quartermaster Division
was drawn to Naval Staff's directive, dated 19 March,
on the protection of the blockade runners and their
cargoes. All essential measures taken for protection
of the ships and the harbor are laid down in this
directive .
Channel Coasts
The 5th PT Boat Flotilla's mlnelaying operation was
carried out from Cherbourg according to plan and
unobserved during the night of 3 April by seven boats
-45-
CONFIDENTIAL
4 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
in the western part of the Channel. The enemy was
not sighted. For short report see Teletype 1405.
From 01.17 to 0125 the Batteries Lapin and Sangate
each fired two salvoes on targets located wost-
northwest of Calais .
III. North S e a /No rw ay /No r t he r n Wa tors;
1. North Sea;
One of our planes was shot down off Zeebrugge by
patrol boat "1503" at 2137 on 3 April after having
: twice approached the patrol boat without giving a
recognition signal.
Escort duties within the area of the Commanding
admiral, Defenses, North and .the sweeping of the
channels were carried out according to plan.
Otherwise nothing to report.
2. Norway/Northern Waters :
Enemy Situation;
Six Russian submarines were detected by radio
intelligence off the arctic Coast of Norway on 3 and
4 April. There was brisk air rcconnais.sance and
also many raids by the enemy air force along the
south and southwest coasts of Norway. Five planes
belonging to the Iceland squadrons were observed on
operations .
Our reconnaissance in Northern Waters and in the
Arctic was without result. It is perfectly obvious
from material aboard the captured M.T.B. "631" that
enemy PT boats spend days in the skerries, lie in
the fjords and bays close to the convoy route for
considerable periods, and occasionally land scouts
at small places .
Own Situation;
On 3 April nine enemy planes were over the Petsamo area,
and nine monoplanes over Skudcsnes. On the evening
of the same day a submerging submarine was sighted at
the entrance of Ranen Fjord. Submarine chasing has
so far been without result. Shipping has been
-46- CONFIDENTIAL
4 April 1943 CONFI DEI-IT I AL
temporarily suspended.
The steamer ALTAIR was sunk by an enemy aerial
torpedo attack southwest of Kristlansund North at
1040 on 4 April. The steamer was to bring 2 ,,500
tons of heavy diesel oil for submarines north and
was escorted by one patrol boat.
The steamer PATRIA was likewise hit by aerial
torpedoes and sunk near Lister at 1658. The steamer
was sailing in a convoy of three steamers, also
escorted by only one vessel.
These two losses only too clearly emphasize the
precarious state of the convoy escort situation.
Escort duties were otherwise carried out according
to plan.
The BEITZEN and the destroyer Z ;i28i! entered Harstad
on the afternoon of 3 April.
Group North ordered the transfer of the RIEDEL to
Trondheim, whore the dockyard is to check whether
it will be possible to repair her. If not, she will
have to bo transferred to home waters with the
NUERNBERG .
Air reconnaissance for the RSGENSBURG was canceled
owing to the weather.
On 2 April the weather station "Holzaugo" reported
that the police station Eskimonaes was wiped out on
23 March. Two men were captured, one killed and the
others fled, &n order by the Governor of Greenland
was examined on the subject of killing or capturing
the crew of liHolzaugcu . One of the U.S. warship
NORTHLAND ! s planes searched in vain for uEolzaugc'!
on 26 and 27 Aug. (March? Tr.N.).
Naval Staff informed Group North of the directive
to the KARIN. Copy of the Teletype I k 1012/43 Gk.
Chefs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. H'"a.'
IV. Skagcrrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea;
The Eirtshals-Arcndal patrol lino was taken up during
the day by two patrol boats, but not at all during the
night, as the boats were required for escort duties.
-47- CONFIDENTIAL
4 ^pril 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Five ships and four submarines were escorted in the .area
of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.
The Norwegian steamer RYG-JA struck a mine and sank five
miles south of Skagcn. The Commander, Minesweepers,
Baltic reported on the continuation of the assignment
"Na shorn IVa;i.
According to a report from Admiral, Baltic States, the
Battery "Bismarck" received five hits as a result of
gunfire from the battery at Seiskari. One gun was
s 1 i ght ly d ama gc d .
There was lively enemy air activity over the Gulf of
Finland. Bombs were dropped on Tallinn causing damage
to dwellings .
V. 5 ub ma r i no \'i a rf arcs
1. Enemy ..Situation?
Air reconnaissance over the Bay of Biscay was normal
0 planes having been observed.
o
2 . Own .Situation;
In the North Atlantic, the eastbound convoy expected
by G-roup uLocwenherz'y was intercepted by submarine
U i?530n in AK 4645 at noon.
The group has started operations against this convoy.
Submarine U i?229w sank a fast independently routed #r
vessel of the GLEiT EARN type (9,784 G.R.T.) in AK
0193 after midnight on 4 April. No further reports
of results have been received from the iitlantic.
For individual reports sees "Supplement to the
Submarine Situation'' in War Diary, Part 3, Vol. IV.
VI . Aerial Warfares
1. 3ritish Isles and Vicinity;
Three BV 138' s of the 3rd Squadron 406th Group wore
transferred to Air Commander, Atlantic Coast. One
plane had already been lost on 3 April. (Sec War
Diary 3 April. )
-48- CONFIDENTIAL
4 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Forty-eight bombers laid mines in the Thames estuary
during the night of 4 April.
There was brisk enemy air activity during the daylight
hours of 4 April. An air attack on the 'industrial
districts of Paris was carried out between 1415 and
1424 by 70 four-cngincd planes under fighter escort.
For further details sec daily situation report.
Other raids were directed against an Air Force
station near Caen, the railroad station of St. Bricux,
the airfield at Abbeville, and the ".Vilton shipyard at
Rotterdam. Of the planes which went up to intercept
them, 17 were shot down in all.
About 145 enemy planes were reported to have flown in
on the night of 4 April.
Five courier planes were observed flying at an
altitude of 6,400 meters between Sweden and England.
Enemy attacks over Reich territory were concentrated
on Kiel. For details of the damage inflicted see the
daily situation report.
•o"
Considerable damage was caused by incendiary bombs in
small villages and farms. Five of the attacking
planes were shot down by night fighters and four by
naval anti-aircraft guns .
2 . Mediterranean Theater s ■
Four torpedo planes attacked an enemy convoy north-
west of Bougie, scoring a hit on an 8,000 ton steamer.
There was a heavy air raid on Naples between 1515
and 1535 from an altitude of 6,000 - 7 ,,000 meters
causing damage to equipment, planes and harbor
installations. A hospital ship was set on fire. Two
other steamers were hit. Damage in the town is severe.
Fifteen thousand liters of gasoline and 11 Italian
fighters were destroyed on the ground in a near-by
airfield, 2 of our planes were destroyed, and 10
Ju 55' s damaged. The enemy only lost one Fortress
through anti-aircraft fire. A further attack was
carried out on the island of St. Pietro off the
southern point of Sardinia by 21 enemy bombers with
fighter escort.
Eight enemy planes were shot" down over the Tunisian
-49- CONFIDENTIAL
4 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
area where our forces were giving active support to
the Army.
3. Eastern Front;
Eighteen enemy planes were shot down over the front
lines .
The 4th Air Force's reconnaissance over the Black
Sea did not produce any fresh information. One BV
138 was shot down by three enemy planes off the
southwest coast of Norway at 1237.
VII-'' Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea;
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean;
On the afternoon of 3 April a convoy of four loaded
U.S. tankers entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic,
and towards evening, three French submarines and
one U.S. destroyer as well as one submarine chaser.
A cruiser of the DIDO class together with two
destroyers left Gibraltar making for the Atlantic on
the forenoon of 4 April. The cruiser's bow and stern
• appeared to be damaged.
The MALAYA docked. At 1430 the NELSON, the RODNEY,
the FORMIDABLE and ten destroyers put out for the
Mediterranean. From 0612 to 0650 an eastbound convoy
consisting of 15 vessels was observed from Bougie to
Jijelli .
At 1015 three PT boats heading north were reported
about 20 miles west of Cape Serrat.
The following ships were lying in Bone at 0942 s 2
light cruisers, 2 destroyers, 13 landing craft (2
outward bound), 5 torpedo boats, 3 gun boats, 7
small auxiliary warships, 8 steamers and 1 tanker.
Submarines were observed south-southeast of Toulon,
south of Messina and north of Sfax.
The British Admiralty announced the loss of the sub-
marine TIGRIS, which according to radio intelligence
had been operating in the Mediterranean since the end
of November 1942.
-50- CONFIDENTIAL
«
4:. April . 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
In the Eastern Mediterranean 8 small merchantmen with
3 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats were reported by
coastal reconnaissance to be heading west 85 miles
northeast of Benghazi.
>,-....
The reconnaissance was not complete,
2 . Own Situation Mediterranean:
Four Italian submarines are approaching the
operational area. No reports of successes were
received from our submarines. No PT boats were out
on operations owing to the weather. The minesweepers
M "6021n and M l''6023;] and five auxiliary motor mine-
sweepers entered Gaeta.
3. Sea Transport Situations
The convoy of the tanker 3IV0NA and steamer HUT left
Bizerta in the forenoon and joined seven naval
landing craft west of Cape Bon. War. transports KT
"5", u6iJ5 r,7"' and "9n left Tunis for Reggio at the
same time. No sailing report of the 3ELLUN0 -
PIERRE CLAUDE convoy from Tunis to Leghorn has been
received so far. The beached steamers AQUILA and
BENEVENTG were attacked by enemy planes near Cape
Zebib at 1609. The BENEVENTO's bow was hit by bombs.
Of the seven missing Siebel ferries and two infantry
landing craft, three Siebel ferries sank and one ran
aground. One infantry landing craft has run aground
and two Siebel ferries are lying at anchor. There
is no news of one Siebel ferry and one infantry
landing craft .
Six Italian naval landing craft left Trapani for
Bizerta in the afternoon. The sailing report of
four German naval landing craft proceeding from
Tunis to Trapani has not yet been received.
4. Area Naval Group Souths
Aegean Seas
Convoy traffic was disrupted owing to the weather.
Black Seas
Enemy Situation;-
According to air reconnaissance there was brisk
-51- CONFIDENTIAL
4 April 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
shipping traffic off the Caucasian coast during the
forenoon. PT boats were sighted in Anapa Bay on the
night of 2 April.
Own Situations
Escort duties were carried out according to plan.
No attacks by enemy planes and submarines were
reported. The 15th Anapa convoy started out during
afternoon.
The ferry service across the Strait of Kerch was
carried out without enemy interference. There was
no service from west to east.
Group South attaches great importance to the con-
version of six naval landing craft from the June
output into gun-carriers at Linz. (See Teletype
1410. )
VIII. Situation East Asia;
Nothing to report.
-52- - CONFIDENTIAL
i
%)
5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Mr. Eden has returned to London from the United States and
will give an account of his stay In the House of Commons.
Reuter reported that the Deputy Under Secretary of State of
the U.S. State Department declared in a speech that the
United States needed a strong and victorious Russia.
According to an Associated Press report from Rio de Janeiro,
it was officially announced there that Brazilian troops
would be ready to fight the Axis on foreign soil. Brazilian
military missions were already in North Africa, where they
were said to have been accredited to Elsenhower and Giraud.
In a statement on the Swedish policy of neutrality, the
Swedish Premier declared that there would be no change In the
Swedish attitude towards German transit traffic,
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. The Chief, Naval Staff agreed with the Naval Staff's
proposal to express appreciation of the successful
annihilation of the enemy weather station, Eskimonaes,
by the weather station "Holzauge" in Greenland.
II. Quartermaster General reported that the negotiations
with Rumania have led to a slight increase from 30,000
to 35,000 tons in the fuel oil quota to be delivered to
Germany for April.
III. Foreign Affairs Section, Operations Division reported
on the question of action against Brazil as discussed
. in the War Diary prior to Brazil's entry into the war.
For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
IV. Commander Wegener who has returned from the Transport
Operations Staff, Scheurlen in Kerch reported on the
progress of the ferry service across the Strait of
Kerch. No fresh items of any importance came to light.
In a Kighry Restricted Circles
V. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division;
a. Group North advised Naval Staff for Information of
-53- CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
tho directive to Admiral, Northern Waters, on the
defense measures to be adopted by Commander, -Sub-
marines, Norway when bringing in the blockade runners
in Northern Waters . For further details see the
Group's teletype as per l/Skl 1016/43 G-kdos . Chefs,
in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.
The Group furthermore requested Naval Staff to allocate
three at present outward bound submarines of Commanding
Admiral, Submarines temporarily to Commander, Submarines,
Norway, as his forces are occupied to the limits of
their capacity in escorting incoming shippings so much
so that the routine replacement after 25 days at sea
may be impossible and his forces will probably bo
inadequate should a PQ, convoy approach.
The Chief, Naval Staff has decided that not a single
submarine beyond the present number Is to be allocated
to Northern Waters. Tho Group has been advised that
It Is not proposed to allocate any Atlantic submarines
to Commander, Submarines, Norway owing to the weakening
effect this would have on the North Atlantic forces
and our lack of Information on the sailing dates of
the PQ, convoys .
b. Inquiries at Naval Staff about the Pcntland Firth
revealed that all tho shipping there is escorted and
the patrols arc exhaustive. It is therefore out of
tho question for our blockade runners to use this
route .
Special Items
I. Quartermaster Division has decided upon and issued orders
governing the authority to be exercised by the German
Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty. Accordingly,
the Chief of the German Staff attached to the Italian
Admiralty is Immediately responsible to the Naval Staff.
The Gorman staff officers attached to the Italian coastal
admirals in Bizerta, Trapani, Palermo, Messina and Naples
and the Gorman Chiefs of Staff arc to be placed under
German Naval Command, Italy. They will receive orders
and directives for the commitment of the German escort
groups directly from the German Staff attached to the
Italian A dmi r a 1 ty .
-54- CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
II. In the course of intelligence evaluation covering the
• period from 28 March to 5 April Enemy Situation Branch,
Intelligence Division noticed that the extraordinarily
vivid picture gained, consisting largely of reports
planted by the enemy, reached a certain peak during the
week 15 - 21 March and has been f ollowcd by a noticeable
lull since the beginning of the Anglo-American offensive
in Tunis. This decrease in reports has persisted during
the last few days, but this should not deceive us into
thinking that preparations for later concentrations are
continuing without change.
Situation 5 April
I. War in Foreign Waters;
1. Enemy Situation;
Nothing to report.
2 • Own Situation;
Naval Staff informed the KARIN in Radiograms 1210 and
2127 of weather conditions and prospects between 57°
and 70° N.
As the R^GENSBURG has so far not been located and
sighted in Northern Waters, she may have engine
trouble or else be damaged by the ice, or have got
stuck.
The KARIN is, therefore, to expect sighting the
RBGEiTSBURG in Denmark Strait. The necessary
instructions have been issued to the KARIN and the
REGENSBURG in Radiogram 2340.
All ships in foreign waters have been informed in
Radiogram 1132 of the position of the Gibraltar -
U.S. convoy, which was 27° N 42° W at 0800 on 5
April.
The Naval Attache, Tokyo reported the gratifying news
that as a result of the use of the special code, the
. crews of the ships which had returned to Japan had no
knowledge of the movements of the blockade runners,
-55- CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
t
except that the PIETRO ORSEOLO had put In. The Attache
pointed out that in the course of the routine pro-
cedure, it is, despite the most exhaustive counter-
measures, well nigh Impossible to prevent the reports
on the blockade runner movements from filtering through
to the crews, and thereby ashore, via the radio
stations and ship's officers, owing to the tremendous
interest they arouse in all quarters in Japan.
The Chief, Naval Communications Division has been
informed.
II . Situation West Area;
1. Enemy Situations
Air reconnaissance sighted two eastbound destroyers
near the Lizard Head at 1130 and nine merchant *•
vessels of 4 - 8,000 G.R.T. north of Kinnaird Head,
course not given.
Radio intelligence picked up the location reports o-f
German forces on the convoy route off Cape Gris Ncz.
In addition, the British Ivi.I.B. r,306u reported four
trawlers 40 miles off South Foreland at 0230, and a
trawler on fire at 0244. At 0252 M.T.B. iJ306:? made
the following reports ''Going aboard trawler". At
0348 M.T.B. i?306i? received orders to sink the trawler
and secure the signal books. At 0515 M.T.B. "306"
reported that the trawler had sunk. M.T.B. i?243,z
reported to Dover at 0547 that 13 men had been taken
prisoner including some wounded, and that all the
boats had been slightly damaged.
Shortly after midnight two motor gun boats in the
Plymouth area received orders to Intercept enemy PT
boats .
2. Own Situation;
Atlantic Coasts
One mine was swept In the La Pallice area and one in
Qulbcron Bay.
One ground mine was swept south of La Rochclle, two
off the Girondc and two off Brest on 4 April. A mine
exploded in a fishing net off Loriont.
-56- CONFIDENTIAL
*
5 April 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
Group Nest requested Air Commander-, Atlantic Coast
to repeat on 6 April the reconnaissance of 5 April
for the DOGGER BANK, to serve also as preliminary
reconnaissance for the. HI MALAYA which is to put out
again.
Channel Coast;
Our motor minesweepers wore attacked by enemy fighters
off Calais at 1922 on 4 April. The motor mine-
sweepers R "97", R'"96" and R "117" were severely
damaged and suffered casualties. R "95" ran aground
while rendering assistance, and in the case of R !l94n
both engines were put out of action as a result of
explosions under the vessel. All the damaged vessels
were towed in to Calais . The minesweeper il "3630"
reported an engagement with enemy PT boats in AN 8784
at 0214. Further details have not yet been received.
The minesweeper M "3818" sank in 3P 3386 at 0054 as
a result of an enemy air attack. One of our convoys
•off Cape Gris No 2 was fired on by a British long-range
battery at 0020. The steamer IvlALAGE (2,150 G.R.T.)
was damaged and towed into Calais with her steering
gear out of order. Our batteries returned fire from
0022 to 0230.
The harbor defense vessel "06" lying off Ostcnd was
attacked by a British PT boat at 0245, The vessel
reported that all secret documents had been destroyed.
The subsequent developments of the engagement arc to
be found in the information gained by radio intelli-
gence. (Sec "Enemy Situation".) We have merely been
able to ascertain that the vessel and 19 NCO's and
enlisted men arc missing.
The three groups of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla broke
off their unsuccessful torpedo operation as not only
did radio intelligence show that our forces had
definitely been located, but also that the convoy
they had been waiting for was not in Lyric Bay but had
already passed Portland. Contact with the enemy was
not established. For the short report see Teletype
0730.
III. North Sc a/Norway/Nor thorn Waters s
1 . North Seas
Six ELM/ J mines were swept on the convoy routes
-57- CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
within the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses-,
North, three by an escort vessel, and one by a mine-
sweeping plane: furthermore, a heavily corroded Dutch
mine with horns was swept in AN 8582. The sweeping
of the channels was carried out according to plan.
Five patrol lines were occupied during the day. At
night the positions had to bo abandoned owing to the
weather. The patrol boat ''1252" sank near buoy iJL:?
as a result of a collision. The crew was saved.
For the report from North Sea Station on the enemy
air raids on Rotterdam and Kiel on 4 April see Tele-
type 0728.
A severe enemy air raid on Antwerp was carried out
from a high altitude on the afternoon of 5 April.
No damage was suffered in the harbor area.
North Soa Station reported the convoy and transport
figures for March 1943. For copy see Teletype 1710.
363 merchant vessels totaling 645,946 G.R.T. were
escorted;0 of these 196, totaling 385,604, sailed
with Netherlands convoys . In addition, 28 short
distance convoys and numerous Zuidcr Zee convoys were
carried out. The following were lost as a result of
torpedoes fired from PT boats; 1 Swedish, 1 Belgian
and 2 Danish steamers; as a result of drifting mines i
1 Danish fishing vessel and 1 German motor boat. The
following were damaged t 3 minesweepers by drifting
mines, 1 mine-exploding vessel and 1 patrol boat by
bombs, 1 Finnish and 1 Swedish steamer by ground mines.
Altogether 192 mines were swept, 3 planes wore shot
down, 3 PT boats sunk, and 4 PT boats severely damaged.
The laying of ground mines has been intensified
throughout the area. ATE nines have been found off
the- Dutch coast . Enemy PT boat activity against
convoys has increased.
2 . Norway/Northern Waters ;
Enemy Situations
According to radio intelligence, seven Russian sub-
marines were at sea, some of them in Varanger Fjord.
Four PT boats were in the same area. There was
moderate air activity over the North Sea whilst that
of the Iceland Squadrons was lively. Our reconnaissance
-58- CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
between Iceland and Jan Mayen had to be broken off
because ice was forming on the planes. Mo sighting
reports have been received from the Faroes area.
Own Situations
On 3 April a German westbound convoy v/as fired on
without result by Russian batteries on the Rybachi
Peninsula, The fire was returned. On 3 and 4 April
enemy air raids v/ere carried out on Petsamo, causing
only slight damage. The naval battery at Kristiansund
North was approached by three Hampdens on 3 April,
one of which crashed. Twelve ships were escorted
north and twenty- eight south.
Owing to the situation prevailing in February , the
Naval Staff abandoned plans for the further expansion
of all the berths for large ships in the Norwegian
area. But as conditions have once again changed,
Quartermaster Division received a new directive,
ordering the berths in Alta Fjord to be expanded as
originally planned. Not five but ten destroyer
berths will now have to be constructed. To avoid
further aggravating this year's critical transport
situation, work on the inner berths in Bogen Bay
will be postponed for the time being. Fresh decisions
on this matter will be made in the fall. Further
expansion of the berths in the Trondheim area will
likewise be abandoned. Copy as per l/Skl I op 9615/43
Gkdos . in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.
The Naval Staff informed Group North that the IRENE
will receive the operational order of the KARIN.
Group North informed the RSGENSBTJRG that delay is
attributed either to damage by weather and Ice or
else because the ship Is ice bound. Air reconnaissance
between 14° V/ and 5° E as far as the ice limits has
been planned for 6 April,
The Admiral, Northern Waters reported that the JACOBI
and the GALSTER have left Narvik.
IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:
The patrol positions In the Skagerrak were not taken up
during the night of 4 April; during the day there were
four patrol boats there. Five ships were escorted in
-59- CONFIDENTIAL
5 Apr£l 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic;
13 vessels were engaged in sweeping the channels. Kiel
was raided by about 100 enemy planes during the night
of 4 April. Barracks in the Wlk were slightly damaged;
damage was also caused to various industrial and traffic
installations. One warehouse in Kolbe shipyard was
destroyed, otherwise the shipyards sustained no damage.
Naval anti-aircraft guns reported four planes. shot down.
The Commander, Minesweepers"-, Baltic reported that mine-
field ''Nashorn II a'" has now been completed. uNashorn
IV a" and the sweeping of the ,!Corbethau minefield as
well as the work on the ^V/alross'1 minefield were' suspended
owing to the weather.
The Admiral, Baltic States reported normal activity
without anything special to report.
Group North reported the outcome of a further conference
on 30 March between the Commander, Llinesweepers , Baltic
and the Finnish Naval Staff. Copy in accordance with
l/Skl 9907/43 Gkdos . in V/ar Diary, Part C, Vol. III.
V. Submarine Warfare g
1. Enemy Situation;
Air reconnaissance in the Bay of Biscay was normal,
. 21 planes having been observed.
2. Own Situation:
Group ''Loewenherz" was able to maintain contact with
the convoy southeast of Greenland despite heavy defense
forces and an air escort from noon onwards . Six ships
were sunk, three of which were tankers totaling about
44,000 G.R.T.-, some were sailing in convoy, others had
scattered and v;ere proceeding singly; one tanker and
one steamer were torpedoed; and two further hits were
probably scored, Submarines U H635% U n530u, U u563i?,
U il632u, U u706n and n530'' participated In this
successful action. The convoy, consisting of about
30 steamers, was in AK 2829 at about midnight.
A new group ''Adler" is being formed with nine sub-
marines which is to take up patrol positions in AJ
5693' - AK 7174 at 0700 on 7 April and lie in wait for
a convoy bound for the northeast on course 210°. On
the outward passage submarine U ,i487:? intercepted a
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5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
convoy steering course 80° in AL 22. The submarine
was ordered to proceed on her course, as strong
3ritish air cover was anticipated and submarine
U i?487w, being a supply boat, was not to be endangered.
Submarine U i?438u reported having shot down one plane
in the Bay of Biscay.
No reports of successes were received from the
southern group of submarines. For further reports
sees "Supplement to the Submarine Situation1' in War
Diary, Part 3, Vol. IV.
The Naval Staff informed the Naval Attache, Tokyo
that during May and June several submarines will be
in the operational area which has been extended as
far as the equator, and that it is planned to send
one of these submarines to Penang on an exploratory
cruise probably at the end of Juno.
VI • Aerial Warfares
!• British Isles and Vicinity^
There was brisk enemy air activity during the day.
Raids were concentrated on Antwerp, where the
aircraft industry was considerably affected. For
further details see the daily situation report.
Twelve enemy planes were shot down in the course of
this raid, five by anti-aircraft guns. Brest was
raided by light forces in the late afternoon. The
shipyards suffered slight damage. On this occasion
our fighters shot down seven enemy planes.
2 . Mediterranean Theaters
Altogether 442 pianos belonging to the 2nd Air Force
were out on operations. The focal point lay in the
Tunisian area. Two enemy ships were damaged during
an attack on shipping targets in the harbor of Gabcs.
Heavy enemy raids on our airfields in Tunisia and
Sicily as well as on one of our air convoys caused
serious losses, especially In transport pianos. The
town and harbor as well as the airfield of Palermo
were raided in the afternoon. A large ship was
damaged, a small tanker set on fire. Four German
planes were entirely destroyed, 20 others damaged.
Ten German planes, mostly Ju 52 ' s , were destroyed on
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5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Trapanl airfield, a further 50 damaged. Two of our"
fighters and two Ju 52 ' s were totally destroyed during
the landing in Tunis of a transport group. Altogether
16 enemy pianos were shot down in defensive action.
Reconnaissance in the Western Mediterranean produced
much fresh information. For further details sees
"Enemy Situation Mediterranean'' .
?■• Eastern Fronts
On 5 April four enemy pianes were shot down over the
front lines. The 5th Air Force reported an unsuccess-
ful attack by five fighter bombers on shipping targets
in Kola Bay,, and during the night of 5 April a raid
on the town and harbor of Murmansk by five bombers .
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea;-
1. Enemy Situation Mediterraneans
Three French submarines left Gibraltar for the.-
Mediterranean,, a cablelayer loft for the Atlantic.
A small convoy consisting of three steamers and one
corvette entered Gibraltar, presumably from the
Atlantic. A convoy of 1 transport, 2 tankers and 3
steamers left the harbor accompanied by 5 escort
vessels. According to a sighting report from Ccuta,
the transport made for the Atlantic, the remaining
vessels for the Mediterranean. Air reconnaissance
reported that the NELSON, RODNEY and FORMIDABLE
entered Or an in the forenoon. A heavy cruiser and
destroyer lay outside the harbor; according to
photographic evaluation, while a battleship was
already inside.
The presence of a third battleship in this area is
unlikely.
Convoy cctivity off the Algerian coast was brisker.
A westbound convoy consisting of about 30 vessels was
reported 30 miles north of Jijelli at 0945.
Our PT boats sighted 'three destroyers ten miles off
• Philippcvillc at 0135 and two PT boats north of Cape
Scrat on a westerly course at .0539.
Submarines were reported southwest of Naples and cast-
northeast of Pantclloria. According to an Italian
-62- CONFIDENTIAL
I)
5, April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
report, three destroyers were heading west 15 miles
south- southwest of La Valotta at 1100. According to
photographic reconnaissance, 2 light, .cruisers, 1
destroyer, 5 submarines, 2 escort vessels, 3 landing
craft, 1 minelayer, 1 steamer of about 7,500 G.R.T.
and 1 harbor tanker were all lying in La Valetta.
According to a report from the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, South, the harbor of Gabcs is already
being used for enemy supplies.
Air reconnaissance confirmed only slight convoy
traffic in the Eastern Mediterranean. .According to
a German intelligence report from Istanbul, dated 3
April, the Turks have taken over two PT boats bought
from Great Britain.
2 . Own Situation Mediterraneans
Four Italian submarines were in the operational area.
No special reports were received from our own
submarines .
Five vessels belonging to the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla
left Bizerta on the evening of 4 April on a mine-
laying operation off Philippeville . One of the
vessels had to turn back 'owing to engine trouble.
Two vessels of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla also put out
to sea to lure the enemy away from the 3rd PT Boat
Flotilla, and to operate against a steamer and a
patrol boat off 3one . The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla was
pursued without being fired on by three destroyers
ton miles north of Philippeville. All the vessels
returned undamaged. The mine laying operation was
not carried out.
One auxiliary motor minesweeper was sunk during an
enemy air attack on motor minesweepers and auxiliary
motor minesweepers off the Tunisian coast. Some of
the other vessels were damaged. There were
casualties on two motor minesweepers. The vessels
arc no longer operational. Other air raids on
Bizerta and Tunis as well as on the ships beached
near Zobib, caused no damage.
One steamer and one tanker were damaged by bombs
during an air raid on Palermo.
The submarine chasers UJ u2203;i, ii2205u,' H2207r* arc
being used as anti-aircraft defense for the steamers
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5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
which ran aground near Gape Zcbib. The echo-ranging
gear on two of these chasers is out of action, as
also that of submarine chaser UJ i?2210" in Trapani.
The submarine chaser UJ ;I2209U together with a tug
is on passage from Naples to Genoa. The submarine
chaser UJ '"2206l? is lying in Genoa for repairs to her
radio gear. The submarine chasers UJ u2202u and "li2208;
with the steamer MI.N are on passage from Bizerta to
Naples. The submarine chaser UJ "2202ir has presumably
entered Trapani for repairs. This boat brought down
four enemy planes during an air raid on the afternoon
of 4 April.
At the request of the Chief, Naval Communications
Division, German Naval Command, Italy reported on the
means of communication between the Italian escort
forces and the German - Italian fighter cover. For
copy of report see Teletype 2245. An improvement in
the situation can only be achieved by establishing
radio telephony communication between the leading
escort boat and the German - Italian fighters.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South informed
the Naval Staff of the following directive, which, in
agreement with the Italian High Command, was issued
to German Naval Command, Italy and the 2nd Air Force,
with copy to Army Group, Africa s
lo The enemy may possibly undertake a landing operation
at Sfax. To prevent such an operation taking us
by surprise minefields are to be laid in the waters
south of Sfax between the island of Kerkennah and
the mainland.
2. The necessary details for the execution of this
operation will have to be agreed upon between the
Italian Admiralty and German Naval Command, Italy.
The German destroyer HERMES and two Italian
destroyers, fitted with German mine rails, are to
be detailed to this task.
3. The 2nd Air Force, in conjunction .with the Italian
Air Ministry, will provide air reconnaissance before
and during minelaying operations and also fighter
escort and bomber formations.
4. All plans are to be reported. - End of directive.
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5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
The operation is planned to take place between 6 and
10 April, weather permitting.
Group West- reports that seven 20 - 25 ton fishing
vessels which had been requisitioned for the Navy
and were being transferred from Sete to Marseilles
have been overdue since 29 March. Their loss is
probably due to bad weather. Searching operations
have been broken off without success. One officer,
3 NCO's and 17 men are missing.
3. Sea Transport Situation?
The convoy R0VERET0 consisting of four steamers left
Naples with four torpedo boats on the night of 4
April. One steamer returned because of damage to
her rudder; one is assigned to Trapani, two to
Bizerta. The convoy of the tanker REC-INA and of the
motor vessel CARBONELLS was to leave Messina and
join the convoy R0VERST0 at 1400. The OARBONELLE
remained behind in Messina because her engines had
been damaged. The tanker REGINA (9,545 G.R.T.) was
torpedoed by an enemy submarine south of Point Stilo
on the afternoon of 4 April, before reaching Messina,
and is returning to Taranto under her own steam.
The convoy PIERRE CLAUDE - BELLUNO is on passage from
Tunis to Leghorn. The tanker BEVONA and five Italian
naval landing craft entered Trapani In the forenoon
coming from Bizerta. The transports KT ;?5:i, !l6,?, "7U
and w9'! entered Naples according to plan. Ten
Italian naval landing craft from Trapani and Palermo
entered Bizerta at noon. The missing Siebel ferries
and infantry landing craft meanwhile entered Tunis.
One transport submarine and five. Siebel ferries are
on passage from Marsala to Tunis .
4. Area Naval Group South;
Aegean Sea;
Submarine chase in the northern part of the Aegean
Sea on 4 April was without result. A Spanish steamer
sank on 5 April while entering Merica. Further
details are not yet available. It Is very probably
the steamer ISEDORO (335 G.R.T. ). A German plane
reporting post on Kythxids reported sighting enemy
submarines. A plane took off on a submarine chase.
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5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Convoy traffic in the Aegean Sea was restricted In some
areas owing to the weather.
Group South reported that in the event of Operation
''Viktoria'" it was essential that it should be able to
supply all the naval bases In the Aegean area,
including the Dodecanese. Furthermore, it was obliged
to supply the Italian vessels with fuel oil. Without
informing the Italian offices concerned, the Group
therefore requested that its fuel oil quota be
increased by about 2-3 , 000 tons, so that delivery can
be started forthwith as a precautionary measure.
Black ' Sea ;
Enemy Situations
Nothing to report.
Own Situation;
Escort duties were carried out according to plan. An
air raid Yearning was transmitted to the TISZA convoy
southwest of Eupatoria, Further details are not
available. The convoy meanwhile entered Sevastopol.
Owing to an unfavorable weather forecast, It is not
intended to send the German and Italian PT boats out
on the night of 5 April.
The 15th Anapa convoy entered Kerch, and the 16th
convoy composed of four naval landing craft left
Kerch.
Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch proceeded
without enemy interference from the air. The dis-
charging of the cargo was still greatly slowed down
by the poor condition of the roads. The Navy trans-
ported 600 soldiers, 154 horses, and a few vehicles
to the west, and six soldiers and about 500 tons of
supplies to the east. The Strait of Kerch is Ice
free. Mariupol harbor can be reached by steamers
with ice protection.
Group South reported the request of the Rumanian Head
of State that the passenger steamers TRANSYLVANIA and
BESSARABIA be recalled from Istanbul to a Rumanian
port as soon as possible. The Head of State has been
informed of Group South' s opinion which is as follows;
1. As a result of military developments on the Eastern
Front, a change In Turkey's attitude is not to be
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5 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
expected for the present. Therefore no new
indications of threat to the' ships in- the
Bosporus arc seen.
2. In view of the present situation, the withdrawal
of the ships would create excitement and
apprehension in Turkey, neither in the interests
of Rumania nor of Germany.
/
3. Nith the present shortage of escort vessels
urgently needed for the supply traffic, we
cannot allow any of them to be assigned to
transfer operations. The Head of State has not
yet revealed his attitude to our point of view.
The Naval Special Duties Detachment has worked
out the orders for the transfer which will take
place without . orders from the Group. Should
political considerations call for a different
opinion at a higher level, it is requested that
instructions be issued accordingly.
VIII. Situation East Asia;
Nothing to report.
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6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
The Allied Supply Conference in Washington scheduled for 27
April has been postponed for an indefinite period.
General Eisenhower has requested G-eneral de Gaulle to postpone
his journey to Algiers for military reasons.
Reuter reported that the Financial Secretary of the British
Admiralty stated that since the outbreak of fir, well over
50,000 of the Merchant Navy's vessels had been repaired or
overhauled. In 1942 , a total of 10 million tons of merchant
shipping space had been recommissioned after repairs. According
to a British press report, the Admiralty had examined and
rejected the proposal to commission armored merchantmen.
According to the United Press., Mr. Sumner Welles announced that ^
South America would produce a total of 60-70,000 tons of rubber
in 1943.
A Swiss newspaper reported from Washington that Under Secretary
of State Sumner Welles is to go to England shortly, and sub-
sequently to Moscow for political discussions. This is
regarded in Washington as a direct result of the talks Mr.
Eden had in America.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
I. In connection with the boarding of the harbor defense
vessel "06u off Ostend, Quartermaster Division was
instructed to examine the question of armament for
vessels of this type.
II. Chief, Naval Communi cations Division reported on the
results of the experiments on the location of protected
and unprotected submarines at various depths. Under
favorable circumstances the danger of being located can
be reduced to 20 per cent in the case of the protected
submarines .
From British publications It Is clear that the British
are quite familiar with the system of decoy floats.
III . Report by Quartermaster General g
a. The Commander In Chief, Navy Is in agreement with the
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6. April. 1943 : CONFIDENTIAL
suggestion to exclude the Y3ERE and to recommend
Vice Admiral Ruge to obtain two avisos (dispatch
boats) from the Italians in exchange.
b. The Reich Commissioner of liar i time. Shipping tried
to issue direct orders to the Toulon Arsenal. The
Arsenal Commander quite rightly refused to carry
them out, pointing out that he was" under 'orders from
the Navy alone.
c. Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division reported on the
present position as regards the number of torpedo
recovery vessels available. The Commander in Chief ,
Navy ordered the Remote Control Target Unit immediately
to release T ''ISl'1 for duty as a torpedo recovery
vessel, regardless of the fact that the BLITZ was not
yet ready for use.
IV. Foreign Affairs' Section, Operations Division reported
on the re-shuffle in the German Foreign Office.
V. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reported that Reichs-
minister Speer did not consider himself competent to
• 'make a decision on the question of fitting submarines
with anti-aircraft guns, because he felt it a matter
for the Chief, Armed Forces High Command to discuss
with the Fuehrer.
In a Highly Restricted Circles
VI. Report by Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section,
Operations Division on the suggestion made by General
Kessler, Air Commander, Atlantic Coast, to the Chief,
Naval Staff on keeping the Bay of Biscay free of enemy
planes. There would be three possibilities s
a. Attacking approaching enemy planes;
b. Attacking enemy ground installations;
c. Distracting the enemy air force by launching an
offensive against enemy convoy traffic and shipping
around the British Isles. (The Air Force would at
the same time be contributing towards the warfare
against merchant shipping. )
Operations Division could not recommend Air Commander,
Atlantic Coast's suggestion that the Air ?orce3 General
Staff should be approached with a corresponding proposal;
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6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
It was felt that a discussion between the Chief, Naval
Staff and the Reichsinarschall would be far more to the
point. Chief , Naval Staff agreed, and will report to the
Fuehrer, circumstances permitting, after having had a
discussion with the Reichsmarschall.
VII. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division;
a. The Chief of Staff, German Naval Command, Italy made
the following report?
"A few days ago, the Italian Navy, evidently using the
C-erman Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty as a
pattern, established a High Command, Italian Escort
Forces under Admiral Somigli. This High Command has
been made responsible by decree for the entire
organization and training of the Italian escort "
forces, and in the case of operational tasks, merely
for the commitment of submarine chaser flotillas
under special circumstances . Although on the face
of it, no actual change in the powers of the Italian
Admiralty and consequently in Ruge ' s influence has
taken place, it is nevertheless difficult to dismiss
the thought that by means of re-organization or even
further expansion, the effort to weaken German
influence could be tacitly achieved. Somigli, who is
stationed In Rome, and not with the Admiralty, is one
of the ablest Italian naval officers, senior in years
of service to Sansonetti, and from his former
activities as Chief of Staff, Italian Admiralty, a
known opponent of German claims to leadership."
Chief 3 Naval Staff reported that Vice Admiral Ruge ^
welcomed the setting-up of this staff, and had passed
favorable judgment on it .
b. Group South reported its plans in support of the
army operations against the enemy bridgehead at
Hovorossisk with Its naval forces. On the night of
''Xw Day + 1 all the naval forces would be put Into
operation against enemy supplies to, and trans-
portations from the beachheads
aa . 3 motor minesweepers fitted with 3 •! cm. guns
near Llyshakov; •>•;•:.
bb. 4 boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla between
Myshakov and Gelendzhikj
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6„4.pril 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
cc. 6 boats of the Italian PT 3oat Flotilla between
Gelendzhik and Gape Idokopas;
dd. Submarine U i!2.4'! southeast of Cape Chugoropas as
far as Tuapse;
ee. A faked landing with Italian PT boats between
Gelendzhik and Idokopas .
Coastal defense measures will be taken over by the
Army which has strong artillery forces at its
disposal.
Efforts will be made to provide floating batteries ,..
by arming Siebel ferries, for instance, to reinforce
the coastal defenses when the operation has been
carried out .
The Naval Staff approved the plans reported which
exhaust all possible naval resources.
The permanent representative of the Commander in
Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters'! Armed Forces
High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; and the Naval
Liaison Officer attached to the General Staff ,. High
Command, Army, were informed.
The Chief, Naval Staff concurred.
c. In 1940 the Naval Staff considered the supply
problem in connection with the Iceland operation
(Ikarus) insoluble and the Chief, Naval Staff
reported this to the Fuehrer at the time.
Chief, Naval Staff stated that this was even truer
of the position now than then.
d. In the event of .an operation against the Iberian
Peninsula it' will have to be remembered that the
traffic, network in the interior of the country is In
no way_ adequate for the maintenance of supplies.,
which -will mostly have to be brought directly in from
the ports. •■-• -■
VIII. Chief of Staffs Naval Staff reported that Vice Admiral
Nomura has exp-ressed the desire to become acquainted
with the Command Station of the Operations Staff,
Commanding Admiral, Submarines, in view of Japan1 s
-71- CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
future warfare against shipping. The Commander in
Chief, Navy is prepared to inform Admiral Nomura
personally as- far as is judged expedient. A longer
initiation (extending over a period of days) into the
work of the Operations Staff, Commanding Admiral,
Submarines, is however, out of the question.
Chief, Naval Staff will visit Fuehrer Headquarters on
7 April to report to the Fuehrer. His stay will
coincide with the Duce's presence at the Borghof .
Special Items
I. On 9 March Armed Forces Nigh Command, Operations Staff
made the following reports
,JAs a result of the report made by Reichsministcr Spoor,
on 6 March 1943, the Fuehrer ordered a 45,000 ton increase
per month in the Navy's steel quota for the second quarter
of the year for the following purposes s
a. Increased construction of auxiliary warships for sub-
marine warfare (motor minesweepers, submarine chasers,
patrol boats, minesweepers , destroyers, etc.).
b. Increased construction (to full capacity) of naval
landing craft and transports in all shipyards,
including French and Italian ones, equipped for their
construction.
The Fuehrer expected the Navy's plans regarding a) and
b) to be submitted through Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff. "
On 23 March the Commander in Chief, Navy made the
following report on this matter to Chief, Armed Forces
High Command with copy to the Reichsministcr of Armament
and Ammunition and Armed Forces High Command, ,i/ar Economy
Staff: "The increase in the Navy's steel quota for the
second quarter of 1943, ordered by the Fuehrer on 6 March
1943 as a result of a report submitted by Rcichsminister
Spcer, will not serve, as assumed, to increase the output
of auxiliary warships, naval landing craft, etc., but
will merely reduce the enormous present shortage of
approximately 60,000 tons a month to approximately 15,000
tons a month. This will only enable us to maintain the
necessary minimum naval strength for. fulfilling submarine
-72- -. CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
warfare's most urgent tasks and to carry out the present
naval construction program, which has already been cut
down to the minimum for operational requirements;
further delays compared with the planned output will
have to be accepted.
The following survey gives further details?
First allocation for second 119 , 795 tons per month
quarter of 1943
Additional allocation in 45,000 tons per month
accordance with the Fuehrer !s
order
Total steel quota 164,795 tons per month
Minimum essential for
operational requirements 180,691 tons per month
Remaining shortage 15,896 tons per month
In order to carry out the naval construction program to
the fullest possible extent, I utilized the additional
steel allocations as follows:
Submarines l Increased allocation to accelerate sub-
marine constructions ordered. (Submarines and transport
submarines . )
Destroyers ; Z 43 - Z 45 full allocation
Z 46 - Z 47 85 % allocation
Torpedo boats; T 37 - T 42 90 % allocation
T 44 - T 48 "60 '% allocation
Torpedo recovery Start of full production (so far
vessels ; only quota had been for the
engines ) .
PT boats and motor Full allocation inclusive of
minesweepers g spare engines .
nesweepers : Full allocation.
Escort vessels; G "1" and G l!5" full allocation
(G SI5H to the extent possible In
Dutch shipyards ) .
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6 April 1943
CONFIDENTIAL
Naval landing; craft;
Italy;
S outhe rn Pr anc e s
Others ;
Transport vessels;
Fishing vessels
Allocation for 40 naval landing craft
per quarter.
Allocation for 30 naval landing craft
per quarter.
Allocation for 60 naval landing craft
per quarter.
Totaling 130 naval. landing craft
per quarter.
as compared with the total allocation
for 80 naval landing craft possible
up to now.
Increased allocation for 20 trans-
ports in order to speed up the
constructions already In progress
in accordance with the new facilities
available.
Increase In the allocation for 39
fishing vessels from one quarter to
one half of schedule.
Submarine Chasers ; Full allocation for continuing
construction, no fresh orders for
new constructions.
Multi-purpose boats; No orders for new constructions.
Full allocation.
Mine- exploding
vessels 2
Auxiliary vessels; 85%' allocation.
Maintenance vessels; 65% allocation.
Guns, mines, torpedoes, and other urgent operational
tasks of submarine warfare have been taken into
consideration accordingly.
*
*
■74-
COHFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943
CONFIDENTIAL
II. Commanding Admiral, Submarines reported submarine
strength as on 1 April 1943s
1. In commission; on 1- March 1943
commissioned In March
March losses
in commission on 1 April 1943
411
submarines
27
;j
438
•I
15
«
423
n
plus foreign submarines
The 15 losses were accounted for as
follows s
In the. Atlantic type VII c
In the Atlantic- type IX
In the Mediterranean type VII c_
In Home Waters type II
2. Distribution?
n
7
ii
5
n
2
;?
M,,.
it
On operations
On trials
For training purposes
235
n
124
ii
64
u
423
ij
3 . In March
New additions In the operational
areas
Increase In the number of submarines
in the operational areas
4. Distribution of submarines In' the
operational areas as on 1 April 1943
20
6
K
Atlantic
Mediterranean
Northern Waters
Black Sea
194
ii
17
!!
21
SI
3
J!
Q^c;
ii
5. Daily average of submarines at sea
in the Atlantic In March
116
EI
in the operational area
on passage
49
67
i!
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CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
III. The authorization for minelaying operations requested
by Group North, and the directive for the delivery* of
the mines was issued by Operations Division in the
order I E 9741/43 C-kdos . Copy in War Diary, Part ..'■'£*■.
Vol. VI,
IV. The Naval Staff's directive for the control and
distribution of mine transport vessels was issued in
order l/Skl I op. 9806/43 Gkdos , Copy in War Diary,
Part C d. '-
V. In the Enemy Situation Report No. 7 for 1 April the
Army General Staff, Foreign Armies, West made the
following assessment of the general situation for
the period 16 - 31 March 1943.
1. The 'assessment of the general situation does not
differ essentially from that of 15 March 1943;
subsequent developments serve rather to support the
conjectures made then on the intentions of the enemy
command.
The situation is characterized bys
a. the large-scale battles in Tunisia, in which the
extraordinary numerical and material enemy
superiority built up over a number of months is
being brought to bear;
b. the extensive shipping space being kept available
round the British Isles and In the ports of
Northwest Africa;
c. troop movements in England apparently aimed at
gradual transfer of units to the embarkation
areas ; ""' ~r -
d. the reinforcement of the uncommitted Anglo-
American force in Morocco and Western Algeria;
e. the swift and far-reaching assembly of landing
craft o"f various types in the enemy ports of the
Western Mediterranean, so that their numbers have
been almost doubled within a very few days;
f . ceaseless activity in the Western Mediterranean
where the enemy naval forces there are being
reinforced;
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%
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
g. the disclosure of comprehensive Turko- British
commitments which are decisive for the developments
anticipated in the Eastern Mediterranean.
2 . Shipping space for men and material ?
The amount of transport space available, rather than
the more than adequate number of enemy forces, is
still the decisive factor in all the enemy plans.
According to a s'tatement by Intelligence Division,
transport and freighter tonnage sufficient for 11 to
12 divisions (including the Air Force) is available
in the area around the British Isles and in the
V/estern Mediterranean. In addition, two or three
divisions can.. be.:. embarked on landing craft in the
port's' of Northwest Africa. ...
Consequently, the enemy command has the following
forces at its disposal for its first wave in landing
operations s
a. for any given operational area 11 - 12 units
b. plus , for the northern area of the French
Atlantic coast only, parts of three British
airborne divisions
c. plus, for the Western Mediterranean area
only 2-5 units .
It will thus be possible for the
enemy command to launch as the first
'wave in its landings in the Western
European area a total of
13 - 15 divisional units
Parts of three British airborne divisions .
If sea transportation were used to the fullest extent
as above, it would cause a temporary lack of
additional shipping space for troop transportations
from England and America to other Anglo-American
operational areas. It should, however, be remembered
that shipping would be speedily released again after
landing operations at short distances away. This
may influence Anglo-American decisions.
.. ..:■• -77-. CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
There are numerous reports on the shipping con-
centration round England which have of late been
confirmed by extensive withdrawals of shipping space
from the Western Mediterranean to England. According
to Intelligence Division, however^ there are so far
no signs of this shipping being assembled- into any
single area. In view of British ingenuity at --■-
camouflaging such movements, and remembering the vast
embarkation possibilities which Britain as a whole can
offer, unexpected large-scale operations from the
British theater should, however, be anticipated at any
time.
3 . Signs of forthcoming enemy operations i
a. Scandinavian
The persistent support given to sabotage in Norway,
and the lively naval activity in Norwegian coastal
waters j continue to emphasize the enemy command's
interest in this theater. Furthermore, reliable
reports dating from the middle of March, on troop
concentrations near the ports, on the reinforcement
of anti-aircraft defenses, and on various other
activities pointing to --preparations for overseas
operations, have been received from the east coast
of Scotland (Aberdeen, Firth of Forth) . Our
extremely ' scanty air reconnaissance (the last,
incomplete results were obtained three weeks ago)
adds nothing to the picture,.
The all-round impression, based then on incomplete
data, continues to give no Indication of any plans
~:-— . for a large-scale operation against -Norway. The
number of troops reported, and the extent of the
preparations would at present rather point to
operations of limited scope only, serving to
deceive and split up German defense forces and to
gain a local foothold from which to spread further
insurrection in the country. Operations of this
kind will probably have to expected, however.
There are only very isolated indications that the
Danish coast may be a landing area. They give the
Impression of being deliberate foils.
b • Channel and Atlantic Coasts :
Reports and statements' on plans for a fairly large-
scale operation against the French Atlantic coast
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6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
■-,_„.. still continue. These includes
aa. Troop movements In the south of England
especially in Devonshire. The transfer of
a division from the Midlands has been
definitely confirmed. Tank concentrations
have also been several times reported from
this ar.ea# Included In these movements is
the probable transfer to the Isle of T.Vight
of a Canadian division alleged to be engaged
in intensive- commando training (presumably for
landing operations) In a closed area.
bb. Reference has already been made to the
concentration of large ships in British home
waters . This measure proves nothing but it is
the necessary prerequisite for any landing on
the Atlantic Channel coast.
In England the assembling of landing craft of
all types appears to have made considerable
progress. There are numerous indications of
intensive construction there and a large
consignment of these vessels appears to have
arrived from the United States . Reports that
a larger type of boat is under construction
whose design enables it to be" used in coastal
sectors. where unloading possibilities are
small should be noted in. this connection
(Intelligence Division). The development of
% this type of boat together with the increase
In the number of LSI's would Indicate that
the enemy is preparing means of landing in
more distant coastal sectors (e.g. Brittany,
G-irondc estuary?), and not jus-t for crossing
the Channel.
The exact distribution of landing tonnage has
not yet been ascertained owing to incomplete
...air reconnaissance. The fact remains that
at least there has been no reduction In the
number of vessels (several thousand craft of
all descriptions) lying in British south coast
-ports, which means that vast quantities of
landing tonnage are available there at any
t imc .
cc. The closed area regulations for the entire
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6 April 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
coastal region of southern and southwestern
England which were relaxed during the winter
of 1942/43 have been enforced again as from
1 April 1943.
dd. The continuation of organized and insidious
underground activity in France, with clearcut
objectives as regards armament, organization
and training also helps to substantiate the
present assessment. The discovery of enemy
intelligence instructions to reconnoiter suitable
landing fields for airborne troops in Brittany
Is a further indication, as are the continuous
British air attacks on Northern Prance aiming
at a progressive dislocation of the French
railroad network.
oc. The most noteworthy of the numerous utterances
reported from military and political quarters
appear to be those of an American general which
stressed the intensive preparations for an
offensive against Northern France which were
to be deliberately covered up by giving as
much publicity as possible to the plans being
drawn up for the one in the Mediterranean.
It can therefore generally speaking be said that
the Anglo-American command is continuing
preparations for landing operations on the
Channel - Atlantic coast and has the necessary
moans for launching them at any given time.
More distant sectors (Brittany, Girondc?), as
opposed to the French Channel ports, arc
gradually coming to the fore as target areas.
c . Western Mediterraneans
aa.As regards plans for a landing on the Iberian
Peninsula , there are merely fresh rumors of
doubtful origin; concrete military clues arc
still lacking. The political development on
the Iberian Peninsula Is marked, as before, by
an attempt on the part of the Anglo-American
powers gradually to gain ground there, and appears
to be based on long term plans. It is, therefore,
still maintained that a landing on the Iberian
Peninsula Is not actually under preparation.
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S April 1943'- • CONFIDENTIAL
bb . North Africa and the Western Mediterranean
Islands %
Throughout the Mediterranean it is firmly
believed that the enemy command is planning
a large-scale operation in the Balkans for
some future date. With this end in view, the
enemy is at present clearing the Western
Mediterranean sea route to the Near East of
enemy forces, consequently a landing operation
on a fairly large scale in the Western
Mediterranean is to be expected In the near
future. The grounds for this standpoint have
meanwhile been further substantiated.
The concentration of Anglo-American forces in
the region between Oran and Casablanca is
above all an indication of operational plans
for the Western Mediterranean area, for it
not only exceeds the numbers required for the
Tunisian fighting but also for the necessary
occupation forces (three or four infantry
divisions - these recently appear to Include
- cither the whole, .or part of an American
Marine division which has to be counted as a
definite landing unit - and 1 -or 2 armored
divisions). It is reported that these forces
are to be reinforced by sending British troops
from Great Britain equipped for fighting in
Africa and by the imminent departure of an
American convoy. The continued and apparently,
accelerated transfer of comriahdo and paratroop
units to Gibraltar and North Africa is very
striking. There are at present four or five
British Commando units - i.e. about a third
of the total available - and several
battalions of British paratroops in North
Africa, Gibraltar and Malta which have not
yet taken part in large-scale operations.
According to Intelligence Division, the
shipping transfers from England at .the end
of March mean that the numbers of amphibious
landing craft in the Western Mediterranean
are now sufficient to embark about three
divisions, including one armored division.
These numbers correspond approximately to
-81- CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
the strength of the Anglo-American forces
still available around and west of (Fran.
The withdrawal from the Western Mediterranean
to the Atlantic of about 330,000 tons of
shipping in ballast will not jeopardize landing
possibilities, as the required tonnage (see
above) still remains available for the landing
forces presumed there; rather the additional
shipping in England will increase the
opportunities of transferring fresh forces
from there in one operation, by way of the
Straits of Gibraltar, for a largo-scale
landing in the Western Mediterranean. In this
connection, the periods during which large
Atlantic convoys are approaching Gibraltar
(at present approximately between 4 and 10 m
April 1943) ,■ always demand special attention.
The recent increase in British naval forces
in the Gibraltar area to a strength corresponding
to that reached immediately prior to the 'first
African landings is worth noting.
Information on the conjectured point of landing
continues to alternate between Sicily, Sardinia,
Tunisia and the French Mediterranean coast;
Sicily is the most frequently mentioned and
apparently also considered the focal point of
reconnaissance by enemy intelligence. This
plan would appear the most probable one In view
of the decisive effect of an Anglo -American
base on Sicily. It should be stressed, however, *•
that the Information on which this conclusion
is based is not nearly as reliable as that
gained on the enemy commandTs plan for a landing
as such. The early detection by air reconnais-
sance of the direction of approach will be of
decisive Importance for taking countcrmcasurcs
against any landings. The importance of this
can hardly be sufficiently emphasized.
With reference to the conjectured dates for
landing operations, all our sources stress
their extreme imminence . They may be planned
to take place cither during the Tunisian. ._.
campaign or immediately after it. Should a
landing in Sicily have been decided on, the
idea of decisively Influencing the fighting in
-82- CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Tunisia would make Tor an early start of
operations. It is plain, however, that a
pause of any appreciable length of time,
possibly after the conclusion of the Tunisian
campaign, is not to be expected.
d. Eastern Mediterranean?
The Anglo-American plans in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean have been considerably clarified and
confirmed, corroborating Enemy Situation Report
No. 6/43 of 15'i;iarcK~1943, -as a result, of the
announcement of the outcome of Turko-British
negotiations. It is now an established fact
that tho Anglo-American command is definitely
counting on inducing Turkey to enter the war,
and that it may well have concrete reasons for
doing so, despite all Turkish assurances to the
contrary. Only in this way. is it possible t.o
explain the Considerable assignments of shipping
and equipment which the British Government has
sanctioned within the framework of the Turko-
British negotiations . The value of Turkish
neutrality - actually already certain - would be
worth far more than the price paid for it by tho
British. It will, therefore, have to be kept in
mind that the entry of Turkey into the war is a
factor in probable Anglo-American operational
plans, the exact date of which alone is perhaps
still unknown to the British c omnia nd . Thus ,
all independent Anglo-American action in the
Eastern Mediterranean area will presumably be
reduced to the level of preliminary partial
operations? in other words a merely strategic
preparation for Turkey's entry into the war.
Clearing tho Aegean Sea of enemy forces, gaining
a good operational stronghold on the Greek main-
land, and pcrhaps'Th addition, establishing an
Anglo-American force in the Salonika area, would
presumably be preparations towards this end. An
•..,■ operation against the Dodecanese would thus bo
given priority in the Anglo-American plans. It
, ,_ is presumably in preparation, but there is,
....^.-however, no reason for believing it to be
imminent .
Adequate forces are available in the Eastern
Mediterranean for the battle for the Dodecanese .
-83- CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
(3 to 4 fully equipped infantry divisions, about
1 armored division, 1 to 2 armored brigades, and
3 to 4 commando units.) On the other hand, Anglo-
American shipping space in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean (Intelligence Division) is fully committed
owing to the large quantities of supplies needed
by the 8th Army in the Tunisian campaign and the .......
Anglo-American shipments to Turkey. A lull in
the fighting in Tunisia would immediately free
shipping for operations against the Dodecanese]
the possibility of transferring further tonnage
quickly and, in the initial stages, unobserved
by our own reconnaissance, from the Arabian and
East African areas to the Mediterranean therefore
also deserves attention. The enemy command is
thus capable of launching a surprise attack against -
the Dodecanese at very short notice. But measures
of a more far-reaching nature are not to be
expected for the present.
4 . Summary;
a. At present, the Anglo- American command has sufficient
shipping space and forces available for the execution
of several simultaneous, independent landing
operations .
b. The Sicily-Tunisia area as well as the northwest
coast of Prance continue to emerge as possible
focal points for landings.
c. Parallel operations on a smaller scale and with
a limited objective may be expected along the
Norwegian coast and in the Dodecanese.
d. Our own defenses must be made ready for imminent
operations . The need for further improvement in
the air reconnaissance against the launching
areas is urgent.
Intelligence Division's comments;
With reference to paragraph 2.;
a. No confirmation of extensive shipping space being
kept permanently in readiness in the British Isles •-. .
and vicinity was issued by Intelligence Division.
Agents' reports, which cannot be checked here as
-84- CONFIDENTIAL
6 ^pril 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
our air reconnaissance is inadequate for
obtaining a comprehensive survey of the shipping
in the harbors, nay possibly have been used as
evidence .
b. The statement that according to Intelligence
Division, shipping space for 11 - 12 divisions
is available in the British Isles and vicinity
and in the V/cstern Mediterranean, is misleading-.
Attention is drawn to the secret report of 24
March 1943 which was also submitted to the Army
General Staff, according to which 2.6 million
tons of shipping for carrying the weapons and
equipment of about 300,000 men would be available
^ in foreign waters, if the existing fresh troop
movements from the United States to Great Britain,
and from both these countries to North Africa and
the Near East vtrerc stopped. At present, the
greater part of this shipping space is being used
for the North African campaign.
With reference to paragraph 5. c.bb.
Prom captured material it was ascertained that the
following craft were used in Algiers and Oran for the
North African operations
13
LCT's
86
LCA ' s
346
fast LCP's
163
LCM I»s
52
LCM Ill's
660
It is assumed that these landing craft aro still in
the North African ports of the Mediterranean.
The following craft were added in February - March
1943;
13 landing craft not specifically
described (probably LCT's or LCI's)
53 LCI's
16 LST's
82
Thus, the 16 LST's wore a fresh addition in tho
Mediterranean. For the rest, the increase, based
-85- CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
on the number of vessels, does not yet amount to 15%
of the special landing craft lying in this area since
November 1942.
The landing craft stationed in the ports of Northwest
Africa should be able to carry two or three divisions.
With reference to paragraph 5. d.g
Intelligence Division knows nothing about the reported
and confirmed agreements , nor of the setting-up of a
Turko-British plan of campaign and the fixing of an
actual date for the entry of British troops into Turkey.
It is merely known that the expansion of the harbors
of Mersin and Alexandretta is being carried out with
the assistance of British engineers.
As far as is known here, five British 10,000 ton
vessels will be put at Turkey's disposal and will
sail under her flag.
5. The Intelligence Service has transmitted an authentic
sounding report from the Ostrow intelligence agency
describing the preparations being made in Great Britain
for an offensive, which concluded as follows?
Preparations for a fairly large-scale operation are
undoubtedly under way though not on the scale necessary
for an invasion of the continent. It is impossible to
ascertain, to any reliable degree, how the weather and
above all the stabilization of the eastern front will
affect, or has already affected, the scale of these
plans. The preparations were, of course, begun long
before the counter thrust at Kharkov. It is therefore
impossible to predict how the operation will be-
ad jus ted to this or whether, in view of the highly
unfavorable moment, it will still be carried out.
The preparations have, however, been made.
Copy of the report as per l/Skl 10413/43 geh. in War
Diary, files "Information on Enemy Situation'11.
6. Foreign Affairs/intelligence Division submitted
statements made by the Spanish General, Ivlunoz Grande,
on the occasion of a discussion with the Military
Attache on 23 March 1943. The Spanish General is
increasingly dubious of the possibility of Germany and
Spain ever coming to any real agreement, both sides
being to blame. Copy in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.
-86- CONFIDENTIAL
*
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Situation 6 April
I. Vi/'gr in Foreign V/atcrs:
1. Enoray Situation;
Nothing to report.
2 . Own Situation:
In view of the uncertain position of the REGENSBURG
on her passage north and the favorable enemy
situation in the Bay of Biscay, the Naval Staff has
decided that the IRENE is to be escorted back from
the Bay of Biscay. The ship, therefore, received
the following instructions s
11 a. As the situation in the .Bay of Biscay is
favorable, do not sail north, you will bo taken
under escort in that area. Exact orders will
follow. Passage from the vicinity of the
submarine rendezvous will probably take place
on 7 April. (See Teletype 1146.)
b. 1. Course cast on a latitude 2 degrees farther
north than "isegrimm" so that the now point
."lngcu is passed at 1800 G.S.T. on 10 April
at the latest. "Inge!? is 2° farther south
and 8° farther east than "Inselmeor" .
2. Four destroyers will take you under escort at
that point about 1800 and their orders to
proceed are to be followed. (See Teletype
1924.)
c. 1. If the rendezvous with the destroyers does
not take place, proceed via the new points
"Use" and "Irma" .
2. "Ilsc'! Is 1° 6' farther north and 1°_8'
farther west than HIrrenhaus'? . uIrma;i is
18' farther south and 6° 2' farther cast than
i?Irrcnhaus" . Escort forces will meet you
there. Should these forces not be met, patrol
up and down on a zig-zag course as far as 25
miles west of point "Irma11. Report position
by short signal or in a radiogram and await
further orders . On no account is the 50 m.
-87- CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
line to be crossed without escort. The inner
part of the Bay of Biscay' is endangered by sub-
marines.1' (See Teletype 2003.)
The Naval Staff informed all in foreign waters in
Radiogram 1035 that the PISTRO 0RSE0L0 sighted
nothing throughout her passage and in Radiogram
2001 that the British cruiser UGANDA, the auxiliary
cruisers CELICIA and QUEEN OP BERMUDA, and the French
cruiser GEORGE LEYGUES were in the Freetown area
on 3 April.
The Naval Staff has informed the Naval attache,
Tokyo that the information on the results achieved
by using the special code - of vital importance to
the Naval Staff - had been received with thanks.
II. Situation West Area;
1. Enemy Situation?
According to reconnaissance by the Air Commander,
Atlantic Coast, one destroyer and two escort vessels
were 400 miles west of Cape Ortegal at 0930, course
30°, speed 8 knots, obviously on escort duties.
2 . Own Situations
Atlantic Coasts
During an enemy air raid on Brest on the evening of
5 April barracks, depots and offices in the docks
vifcre destroyed. One plane was shot down.
The CONDOR rammed and sank a French tug sailing in
a smoke-screen at the harbor entrance. Two ground
mines were swept off the Gironde.
The 6th and 28th Minesweeper Flotillas made the
following report ;
a. According to statements by fishermen, most of the
bales of rubber were drifting towards Cape
Machicahco yesterday and the day before.
b. The Spanish Government is paying a higher price
every day and has categorically forbidden their
sale to other buyers. (The English marking is given
as the excuse . )
-88- CONFIDENTIAL
%
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
c. The British Legation is offering at least 200
pesetas per kilo.
d. Fifty-eight bales were taken over by minesweepers,
partly In exchange for oil and partly for cash
(RM 30.- per kilo). Food and luxury goods were
not accepted.
o. About 40 Spanish sardine boats have picked up
approximately 400 - 600 bales .
The Naval Attache, Madrid has been Informed. The
Spanish Government is being approached on the subject
through the Foreign Office.
For further details sec War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
Channel Coast;
Air reconnaissance did not throw any light on the
whereabouts of the boat WIKING which disappeared
from St. Brlcux between 2200 and 2400 on 5 April.
One patrol boat and four gun carriers of the 2nd
Gun Carrier Flotilla were attacked by enemy planes
off Le Touquct on the evening of 5 April. Among
those killed was the Commander of the 2nd Gun
Carrier Flotilla.
One ELM/ J mine was swept off Calais .
III. North Sea/Norway/Northcrn Waters s
1. North Seas
Convoys had to be postponed for 24 hours owing to
the weather.
For the report of Admiral, Netherlands on the results
of the enemy air raids on the Rotterdam shipyards on
31 March and 4 April see Teletype 1200.
2 . Norway/Northern waters;
Enemy Situations
According to radio intelligence, two ice breakers
left Molotovsk for the Gorlo Straits. Russian
planes reported one of our convoys in Kongs Fjord,
another in Bass Fjord. No reconnaissance activity
was observed over the North Sea. Four planes of the
Iceland squadrons were observed.
-89- CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Two enemy planes were sighted in the Vardoc area.
Air reconnaissance reported 13 merchant vessels in
Kola Bay and 28 medium-sized merchant vessels
between Vayenga and Murmansk v
Own Situation;
Eighteen ships were escorted north, twelve south, <■
In the course of a telephone ' conversation the
Commanding Admiral, 'Group North suggested to the
Chief of Staff, , Naval Staff that open water firing
(torpedoes) be ..discontinued. The Naval Staff cannot
sanction this. The necessary directive was issued. ~
For copy sec Teletype 1717.
The JxiCOBI and GALSTER were transferred from Narvik:/
to Alt a, the RIEDEL to Trondheim.
Group North advised the Admiral, Northern waters that
quite apart from the transfer of the destroyers in
the "Jos tern Area, the LODY and destroyer Z l'25H would
be transferred from homo waters to the Northern Area,
any time after 20 April.
The Commander, Submarines,- Norway drew the Naval •:
Staff's attention to the Instructions Issued to the
submarines detailed to bring in the KARIN, pointing
out, among other things, that the task must be kept
absolutely secret from the ere. ;s even after . putting -~ """"
In. See Teletypes 1029 anar-l'03l/43 Gkdos . Chefs. In .1.
War Diary, Part C, Vol. Ila. --"
For reports from Group North to the REGENSBURG and
KARIN on air reconnaissance and weather conditions
sec Radiograms 1125, 1535 and 1905.
Group North reported the attitude of 5th uir Force
Command to the orders for the commitment of naval
forces in Northern Waters as far as cooperation wi-th'-—
the Air Force was concerned, and remarked in this
connection that it could be taken for grant od--£romr''''
past experience that the Navy!s requests to the Air . •
Force would be fully recognized and understood.
Copy of the letter in accordance with l/Skl 1045/43
Gkdos. Chefs, in ,/ar Diary, Part C, Vol. Ila. ..to
-90- CONFIDENTIAL
«
%
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
IV. Skagcrrak/Baltic Soa Entrances/Baltic Sea;
Fifteen vessels and throe minesweeping planes were on';
duty sweeping the channels in the area of the Commanding
Admiral, Defenses, Baltic;. The steamer LUIvIIvIE was
refloated on 5 April -and entered Korsoor. Part of the
Skagerrak patrol anchored close inshore owing to the
weather.
On the suggestion of Baltic Station the Naval Staff
asked, the Naval Attache, Stockholm to request the
Swedish Navy to sweep and keep clear of mines that
part of a projected ' channel - about 1*3 miles of:' '■ ..''
which will lie in Swedish territorial waters -
connecting route 32 and Swedish territorial waters.
It will also bo. of advantage to the Swedes. The
■ execution of this measure is expedient to speed up
traffic. Copy of the letter as per l/Skl 10019/43
geh. in War Diary, Part G, Vol. XI.
The Foreign Office has transmitted the text of the ,
Swedish note announcing that the DIGTO and the LIONEL "
will definitely not sail for, six months. In view of
those circumstances,, the Swedish Government requested
that the Gothenburg traffic be provisionally resumed
and following 'further- agreements., permanently re-
established. For further reference 'to the political
aspects of the matter-see War Diary, -Part C, Vol. VIII.
On., the basis ~of ■ this communication, the Naval Staff
instructed Group North, Commanding Admiral, Defenses,
Baltic and Naval Command > Norway, to "stop the special
.patrol measures immediately, and to lift the night
traffic restrictions enforced by the Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, Baltic. Copy of this directive as per l/Skl
10340 and 10365/43 goh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.
The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that the
mino laying ope rat ions had to be broken off owing to the
woathcr. The leave transports to and from Finland arc
also being delayed. r:
The' Air Force attacked 'Leningrad on the night of 5 April
Otherwise Admiral, Baltic States had nothing to report.
V. S ubma r ino Wa r f a r c g
1. Enemy Situations
There was brisk air reconnaissance over the Bay of
-91- CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1945
CONFIDENTIAL
Biscay. Twenty- seven planes were intercepted.
2. Own Situations
The convoy operation southeast of Greenland was
considerably handicapped by the strong enemy air
cover. Only two shadowing reports were received.
Submarine U ''632'* is believed to have torpedoed a
destroyer at 1507. Sinking noises were heard.
Submarine U "270" heard two explosions at 0142 in
jn,
K 2838 after firing two single shots at two
VI
steamers. The submarines of Group "Loowcnhurz''
have been requested to display more energy and
persistancc in taking advantage of an opportunity
to attack a convoy. The Commander in Chiefs
Submarines has declared the results obtained so far
in fighting the convoy to be absolutely unsatisfactory,
despite favorable weather conditions. Three sub-
marines reported damage from air attacks. No
successes were reported by the remaining Atlantic
submarines. Nor were sinkings reported from the
southern group of submarines. For further individual
reports see the ''Supplement to the Submarine Situation51
in War Diary, Part 3, Vol. IV.
Aerial Warfare t
1. British Isles and Vicinit
y
261 planes of the 3rd Air Force, 232 of which were
fighters, were over the Western Area and 11 over the
Mediterranean. Attacks by light enemy forces were
made towards evening in the Namur area and in Western
France. There was brisk enemy air activity In the
area of the Channel Islands and off the Atlantic coast
as far as the mouth of the Girondc during the night
of 6 April, mine laying operations were presumably in
progress. It is now reported that 2,000 persons, 300
of whom were children, were killed during the daylight
raid on Antwerp on 5 April.
2 . Mediterranean Theater;
The 2nd Air Force had a total of 449 planes out on
operations. Their efforts were concentrated on
supporting the defensive actions -in the 1st Italian
Army sector. Enemy air activity increased. Further
attacks were made against airfields in Tunisia and
-92-
CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 .,";-. tS CONFIDENTIAL
Sicily. It was only with great difficulty that wc
wore able to press home our attack in the Tunisian
area in the face of strong enemy fighter defenses.
Six enemy planes and five of our own were lost.
Supplementing the reports of 5 April was the
information that a transport plane formation of 31
Ju 52' s was attacked by 40 enemy planes resulting
in the loss of 14 planes. Ten additional Ju 52 * s
were completely destroyed and 56 Ju 52 * s damaged
during a raid on the Sicilian airfields .
«
3. Eastern Fronts
•'Nothing to report. ■-■..
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:
.■■■■mi i ma., wlwiiiww »wwi«i nw in..^^^— ^w— «^— i ■■■ i— — ■ wnanw
1. Enemy' Situation Mediterranean;
According to an intelligence report, two convoys are
due to leave Gibraltar by 10 April, one for tho
Atlantic and the other presumably for Malta.
Shipping movements in the Oran area were lively.
Eleven steamers and two tankers were off Arzcu
steering various courses. Seven steamers were
sighted lying at anchor in the Gulf of Oran and 18
merchant vessels and two destroyers in Oran itself.
A surfaced submarine bombarded railroad installations
20 :uilcs east of Palermo at 1530.
% According to photographic reconnaissance, which was,
however, incomplete , one minelayer of the MANXMAN
class and four destroyers were in La Valetta. Tho
reconnaissance of tho coastal waters, likewise
incomplete, did not produce any sighting reports
from the area off the Cyrenaican coast.
According to an unconfirmed intelligence report from
Istanbul, an aircraft carrier and six U.S. destroyers
arc said to have entered Suez at tho" end of March.
An attempt is being made to check the report.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean;
11 ■ ' i i ii it nji i ii i i-i - ■ i ■ v -■
Four Italian submarines were reported in the
operational area. No reports of successes wore
received from our submarines. For further details
sec the "Supplement to the Submarine Situation'*.
-93- ■ CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
On the night of 5 April altogether seven boats of the
3rd end 7th PT Boat Flotillas carried out remote
escort for a convoy north and south of La Galitc.
There arc at present six operational PT boats in
Bizcrta. Nine men were killed and 21 seriously
wounded in the enemy air attack on our motor mine-
sweepers and auxiliary motor minesweepers off the
Tunisian coast on 5 April. One of the attacking
planes was shot down. Only one motor minesweeper
is still operational at present. The minesweepers
M iJ6021!? and n6023a and five auxiliary motor mine-
sweepers entered Naples on 5 April. On the same
day, the Italians swept three mines from the
Marettimo minefield in the Trapani area and attached
buoys to 14 mines in another minefield.
Reports of heavy damage to the harbor and harbor
installations of Naples during the air raid there
on the afternoon of 4 April have now been received.
The hospital ship SICILIA (9,646 G.R.T.) capsized. -
The steamer L0L1BARDIA is aground with a list. The
motorship ROSELLI, the steamers TERNI and SAN LUIC-1,
as well as four torpedo boats were damaged. Another
air raid on the same evening did not cause any
further damage.
Group West has requested the Immediate release of
the passenger steamer CALIBON and the steamer CONDE
from the blocked reserve for an urgent task of the
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South. The
representative of the Reich Commissioner of Laritimo
Shipping has requested an immediate examination as to
whether ships of the 50,000 G.R.T. class could not
be made available for a special operation and provided
with facilities for unloading heavy equipment and
trucks . These ships would also have to be released
ahead of time from the blocked, reserve. Group Woat ■
has already sanctioned the release of the CAMB'ON and
CONDE because Armed Forces High Command, Operations
Staff had agreed in principle. The Naval Staff
requested a decision from Armed Forces High Command
concerning the 50,000 G.R.T. class ships; the latter
ruled that in accordance with the Fuehrer's order,
blocked shipping space would be released for the
Sardinia operation. The Fuehrer refused to allow it
to operate in the Tunisian traffic. For copies of
the teletypes exchanged see Teletypes 1200, 1717 and
1910.
-94- CONFIDENTIAL
*
*
6 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
3 . Sea Transport Situations
The two steamers of the supply convoy ROVERETO and
SAN DIEGO wore sunk in an enemy air raid shortly
before entering Bizcrta. another steamer exploded
off the entrance to Bizcrta harbor after an enemy
air raid at 1730. One escort vessel was sunk. The
steamer SAN DIEGO also exploded after having boon
sunk. Thus, two more largo vessels totaling nearly
15,000 G.R.T. and fully loaded with supplies of all
kinds have been lost.
The convoy PIERRE CLAUDE - BSLLUNO entered Leghorn
from Tunis. The small craft traffic betv^cen Tunisia
and Sicily proceeded without any special incidents.
Pour French ships put out from French south coast
ports bound for Italy,
German Naval Command, Italy reported the outcome of
the conference with the Naval Attache, Rome and the
Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy to discuss the
competent authority for merchant shipping in the
'Western Mediterranean from Marseilles to Italian
ports and to the Aegean Sea, and also for effecting
the transfer of the former French and neutral ships
from Marseilles to the Italian area. It was agreed
that as from 15 April Gorman Naval Command, Italy
should take over the responsibility for this merchant
shipping from the Naval Attache, Rome. For copy of
the report sec Teletype 2020.
The arrangement, considered necessary all along by"""
the Naval Staff, has thus at last been made.
4. Area Naval Group South; "• - •-
Aegean Sea:
A submarine hunt from the air in consequence of the
sinking of the steamer SAN ISEDORO was unsuccessful,
as was also similar activity in the Attica and Milos
areas and along the cast coast of the Pcloponncsc.
Neither wore successes achieved in the northern part
of the Aegean .Sea. Intensified anti-submarine
patrols were carried out in the Gulf of Pctali and
in the Straits of Doro and Kcos . Convoy traffic was
handicapped by the weather. The auxiliary cruiser
BARLETTA returned to Greek waters from Italy.
-95- CONFIDENTIAL
5 ^pril 1945 CQITFIDF-TTIAI
^ | f. n
-lie:::" Situations
According to radio intelligence,, two destroyers and
one torpedo boat were off the central part of the
east coast.
fi 1 Si -h --<-> -f- -1 r>n a
U..U O-l'^... ul^.l a
Ho FT boats wore in operation owing to the weather.
The 7th Anapa convoy left Kerch. Although the ferry
service across the Strr.it of Kerch was carried out
without interference from oncny planes, it continued
to function slowly owing to the poor condition of
the roads on the Tair.anr Pcninsulr. . Furthermore s
vessels were unable to' tic up in Taman in the after-
noon owing tc the heavy seas. Two nines were swept
by mincswecping planes in the Strait of Kerch. About
90Q men were transported wost5 and about 800 tons of
supplies east.
Temriuk harbor and the northern exit of the Strait of
Kerch are free of ice. It is planned to resume the
Kerch - Tcmriuk traffic on 9 April.
-. -» — i : .~ — * *\ r-i - f- cr *t~ o n p &
Not hing to re p o r t .
-96- CONFIDENTIAL
«
7 April 1343 oo.:?.d^:~-^l
>ms of Jrclieical maccrtanc
According to c. United Press report, the U.S. Secretary cf
the Navy; Mr. Knox, "stated that it was difficult to ascertain
whether the pounding of German submarine bases by Allied
planes would have an? effect on the Battle of the Atlantic.
Commenting on the present situation, "The Times" expressed
the vie?/ that it was at the moment imperative to render
Russia ehe utmost assistance 07 dcalinz ijermany the -est
overwhelming blows .
Allied circles see in the postponement cf General de Gaulle's
visit to Algiers a sign that British policy is vcorir;
towards that of the United States 5 at the moment said te be
oeooscd to the establishment of a Trench central government.
• 1 •—
The official German news agency reported that meetings have
been held in Sweden at which resolutions to stop the C-erman
transit traffic through Sweden were made.
I. Quartermaster Division brought a. directive addressed to
our naval offiees en the question of responsibility for
eh: merchant- shipping in elm Mediterranean to the
attention of the leach Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.
The Reich Commissioner of, Maritime Shipping raise!
objections to itj referring to a Fuehrer directive,
which had given him full responsibility for all merchant
shipping, and reeve seed *\ discussion on the subject with
the Commander in Chief, Navy. The Commander in Chief, '
Hayy had for quite some time felt the heed for clarifying
several issues in discussions with the Reich Commissioner
of maritime Shipping, but it had unfortunately been quite
impossible, because the Reich Commissioner cf Maritime
Shipping had 'c^zn abroad. At ail events, the Naval
Staff's apprehensions at the creation cf the post cf a
civilian Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping were
entirely justified. Smooth cooperation, which could
have only been guaranteed by the Havy surrendering its
responsibility for merchant shipping for the duration,
was unfortunately inadequately achieved. In the fac:
of a further undoubtedly imminent straining of supply
lines in the various theaters of war - a decisive factor
in the recent plan to increase escort forces - a thorough
settlcment of this question cannot be evaded either.
-97- COH?IDZ::_i-.L
7 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
In a Highly Restricted Circle;
II. Report by Mine Warfare Section, -Operations Division on
the generr.l minefield plans in all theaters" of war in
accordance with the decree l/Skl I E 9741/43 Gkdos.
Copy in 7ar Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.
The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff concurred.
Special Items
r
I. The Naval Staff has sent the Commander in Chief, Air
Force, Operations Staff and Anaod Forces High Command,
Operations Staff for the attention of the permanent
representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer
Headquarters, and the Armed Forces High Command, Operations
Staff (Navy) a short report by Group West on Operation
"Elisabeth"', i .c . the sailing of four blockade runners
from the west coast of France, timed to coincide with the
bringing in of a homo./ard bound blockade runner. Naval
Staff felt that the operation could be considered a
success. In this connection, it particularly stressed
the part played by the Air Force in the common achieve-
ment. Copy of the communication l/Skl 1046/43 G-kdos .
Chefs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.
II. According to the Naval attache, Rome, Admiral Riccardi f>
intends to raise the question of the establishment of
an Italian submarine base in Batavia during Admiral
Nomura's stay in Rome on 8 and 9 April, and requested
pertinent information on the subject. Riccardi has the
impression that the Japanese arc placing obstacles in the
way of the Italian plan because they apparently do not
wish to sec the Italian flag flying in East Asia.
The Commander In Chief, Navy has not yet touched on the
subject of a base for Italian transport submarines with
Admiral Nomura. It is most advisable for the loading
and supplying of Italian submarines In Japan and the
Dutch East Indies to remain in our hands, because we
have the blockade runner organization there. The
Italian base ships are considered valuable support in
this connection.
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7 ;.pril 1943. CONFIDENTIAL
The Commander in Chief, Navy docs not intend to discuss
the matter with Admiral Nomura until after the latter1 s
return from Rome. The necessary instructions' are being
issued to the Naval Attache, Rome. Copies of the
teletypes exchanged with Rome in accordance with l/Skl
1041 and 1057/43 Gkdos . in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.
III. Intelligence Division was requested by Operations
Division to Investigate whether any signs of concentrations
for enemy operations in the Eastern Mediterranean could
be detected in the intelligence reports on shipping in
the areas Capetown - East African coast - India.
♦
Intelligence Division stated in this connection that
only sparse data had been received during the past few
months from the area in question and no conclusions of
the kind referred to could be drawn from it.
IV. Intelligence Division submitted a report based on
available intelligence material on the launching points
and bases for any landing operations which might be
started from the Great Britain - Iceland area. Copy
in accordance with l/Skl 10587/43 Gen. in War Diary
files ''Material on Enemy Situation".
Situation 7 April
I. War in Foreign Waters
1. Enemy Situations
Nothing to report.
2. Own Situations
m
The Naval Staff informed the KARIN in Radiogram 1345
that our submarines have received permission to
attack single vessels on the KARIN1 s route south of
56° N from 7 April on.
ROSSBACH received orders in Radiogram 2139 to report
her position should she be unable to reach Batavia
by 9 April.
Submarine U if174" reported that she had missed the
-99- CONFIDENTIAL
7 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
KARIN end- had handed over the personnel, equipment
and operational orders to the IRENE on 6 April. The
PORTLAND was sighted outward bound in BD 8737 on 2
April.
The PORTLAND was informed in Radiogram 2042 that she
was encountered outward bound in BD 87 by one of our
submarines .
According to a report from submarine U i!174r', the
maximum speed of the IRENE Is 11 '5 knots. The ship
is camouflaged as the HOEGT SILVE3TAR or the REINHOLTj
fuel supply 500 cubic meters .
The IRENE was informed in Radiogram 2330 of the
receipt of the report, and Instructed to steer course
86° from the west to Point !,Ingo" , so as to facilitate
the rendezvous with destroyers.
Group IVcst was informed of reports on the IRENE] her
arrival In time at Point "Inge" Is just possible.
Some delay must, however, be reckoned with.
II. Situation West Areas
1. Enemy Situation;
According to air reconnaissance, a convoy of 12
steamers and four destroyers was in BE 9792 at noon,
course 180°, slow speed.
2 . Own Situation;
Atlantic Coast;
Three British ELM/ J mines were swept on the convoy
route, one of them by a magnetic minesweeping plane.
Group West received instructions to take over control
of the IRENE at 1000 on 8 April; 'The ship has yet to
be informed of this by the Group, as also of our air
reconnaissance and of. the procedure to be adopted
during enemy air attacks on the basis of the
HOHENFRIEDBSRG ! s experiences .
Group V/est reported that the HIMALAYA would be ready
to sail at noon on 8 April. The Italians have
replaced the captain at the request of the Group. The
-100-
%
*
7 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Naval Staff asked to know the reason for this change.
The Group suggested that the ship be allowed to sail
on the evening of 8 April, escorted by the 8th
Destroyer Flotilla approximately as far as BE 8311,
and then to proceed alone at approximately 45° 30 f N
as far as 30° W.
The Naval Staff approved and gave orders that the
captain was to be briefed at ;'Betasom" (Italian
submarine station in Bordeaux, Tr. N.) on the Naval
Staff's sailing orders, the- execution of the task
and the necessary secrecy.
The Group reported that it had itself issued
instructions to the captain and gave the reasons for
the replacement of the interpreter and the radio
. ■ '" :: .officer, but not, however, of the captain. Further
details will follow as soon as reports have been
received from German and Italian offices on the
investigation of the -incidents which occurred aboard
the HIMALAYA during and after her encounter with the
8th Destroyer Flotilla.
The time fixed for sailing will make it possible to
synchronize operation HIMALAYA with the incoming
escort of the IRENE. Group West, therefore, received
.'_./ the following instructions s
The incoming escort of the IRENE is to be synchronized
with the outgoing escort of the HIMALAYA. The IRENE
was approximately in 3D 75 on 6 April, If the
HIliXAYA sails on the night of 8 April, the IRENE
will have to start passage cast on 7 April. Efforts
must be concentrated on the IRENE'S incoming escort.
Naval Staff anticipates that the take-over by the
destroyers will be similar to that of the PISTRO '
0R3S0L0 .
Channel Coasts
■ p i ■■■ — i ■ ■ ■
With reference to the loss of minesweeper M "3818" on •
4 April (see Teletype 2235), the short action report
from the 38th Mines wo op cr Flotilla reveals that on a
very dark night and from an altitude of 1,000 - 2,000
meters - judging by the noise of the engines - enemy
planes at once dropped' six bombs on' our vessels
which were proceeding without leaving much wake, and
scored a direct hit. If the estimated altitude is
correct, it would appear that a new and very
-101- CONFIDENTIAL
7" April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
effective radar bomb-sight or infra-red searchlight
gear was being used.
III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters;
1. North Sea;
With the exception of one convoy, escort and defense
duties had to be canceled owing to the weather.
Commander in Chief , Air Force, Operations Staff
informed the Naval Staff of the instructions issued
to the 3rd and 5th Air Forces , to the Air Force
Commander, Center and to the Commander, Operations,
England, concerning operations against Danish f
fishing vessels in the North Sea as reoxuested by
Naval Staff. For copy see Teletype 2230.
2 . Norway/Northern Waters %
Enemy Situation;
Radio intelligence intercepted, nine submarines off
the Arctic coast of Norway and in the Barents Sea on
6 and 7 April. Seven Russian submarines were
operating off the Arctic coast of Norway on 8 April.
These submarines were informed of the departure of
our steamers from Kirkenes .
Two planes were observed over the North Sea and two
over the Iceland ares.
According to photographic reconnaissance on 5 April
there were;
7 steamers and 1 floating dock in Murmansk, 1 C- class
anti-aircraft cruiser, 3 destroyers, 2 submarines, 1
torpedo boat and 16 steamers in Kola Bay.
Own Situation;
Enemy air raids on Petsamo and Kirkenes on 6 April
did not cause any damage. Enemy reconnaissance
covered the ships ' anchorages in Kaa Fjord.
Twenty-two ships wore escorted north and thirteen
south. The KARIN will be transferred to Group
North's command as from 1800 on 7 April.
-102- CONFIDENTIAL
f
7 April 1943 ;..;. CONFIDENTIAL
No reports had been received, either from the
RBGENSBURG or from the KARIN. Great anxiety is now
felt about the fate of the REGENSBURG.
For the precautionary instructions by Group North for
escorting the two ships In, see Radiograms 1128, 1137,
1142, 1245, 1556 and 1858. Three submarines were
given instructions to escort the ships, should they
encounter them, by the shortest possible route to
A8 9856. Weather permitting, it is planne-d to have
the convoy taken over by destroyers from Ears tad. A
patrol of the approach channels by torpedo boats has
been arranged.
^ IV o Skafcerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea
«
The patrol positions in the Skagerrak were not taken up
because the patrol boats were out on escort duties.
Five steamers and one submarine were escorted in the
area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.
Thirteen vessels and two magnetic minesweeping planes
were out on operations sweeping the channels . One
ground mine was swept off Anholt.
Group North asked that the Swedish Navy be requested to
carry out the following minelaying measures ;
"1. Not to lay the Swedish Oeland minefield until
specifically requested. The regulations for the
dummy minefield and the dummy declared area as well
as the barrage gap markings remain in force.
2. To lay Swedish minefields in the Swedish declared
area between Haevringe and Krakelund for protecting
the ore shipping in case of submarine danger. .
3. The Swedish minefield off Understen is to be
dispensed with, as it has not justified its existence
and, to judge from the experiences of the previous
year, is causing great navigational difficulties to •••
merchant shipping."''
As regards direction of shipping, Group North sees no
need for restrictions in the Baltic, unless the sub-
marine and mine menace were to become acute there. But
should submarines become a real danger, the following
plans have been made s
"1. Ore traffic and independently routed merchantmen
-103- CONFIDENTIAL ""
7 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
are to proceed through Swedish territorial waters
without any special Swedish escort.
2. Troop transports and important ships carrying
supplies for the armed forces are to sail along the
Baltic coast under escort of Commander, Minesweepers,
Baltic. These measures are also necessary for
security reasons. I?
In the area of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic, work
on the uNashorn" minefield and the searching sweep of
the 5iCorbethaw minefield were canceled ov/ing to the
weather. Otherwise nothing to report.
V. Merchant Shipping;
The Naval Staff made the following statement to the
Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping on the question of
shipping delays in the North Sea (see War Diary 24
March) %
liThe complaints of the Swedish Shipping Committee that
the North Sea passage Is taking too long, are not
unjustified.
During February it was not only the long spells of bad
weather, but also the exigencies of war - essential
special convoys, for instance - which forced the
temporary closing of the channels to general traffic.
Apart from the weather, further delays were caused
because, owing to the increased enemy PT boat activity
off the West Frisian Islands and in the Dutch area, It
is only possible to sail from approximately an hour
before dawn until an hour after dusk. The mining of
the channels with new types of mines, which has lately
increased to a marked extent, has further contributed
to convoy traffic delays.
The Naval Staff is fully aware of the North Sea traffic's
importance and is doing everything in its power towards
more efficient defenses and greater speed. . The enemy
situation and that of our forces, however, often prevent
requests for safety and speed from being met at one and
the same time.'*
VI. S ub ma r I ne W arfare ;
1. Enemy Situation;
Air reconnaissance in the Bay of Biscay was normal.
-104- CONFIDENTIAL
!
>
7 April 1943 ' ' CONFIDENTIAL .,
Twenty- nine planes were observed.
2. Own Situation;
The operation in the Northern Atlantic was broken
off after an unsuccessful search. Position reports
from two of the Group HLoewenherzr' submarines are
outstanding.
Submarine U i?185;?, belonging to the southern group,
reported having sunk a 5,550 C.R.T. steamer in
Windward Passage on 6 April.
For further details see the ;i Supplement to the
Submarine Situation1' in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV,
The instructions to Submarine Division on synchronizing
the escort of the IRENE into the Bay of Biscay with
the outward bound escort of the HIMALAYA, were
issued in a short dispatch l/Skl I K 1049/43 Gkdos .
Chefs. Copy In War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.
VII. Aerial Warfare;
!• British Isles and Vicinity:
Sixty-one planes belonging to the . 3rd Air Force were
on operations over the Western Area, five were over
the Mediterranean. Two enemy planes were shot down.
Enemy air activity both by day and night was only
slight.
2 . Mediterranean Theater;
The 3rd Air Force reported a total of 483 flights
which concentrated on beating off enemy air attacks
on Army Group Africa, .. particularly on the Italian
1st Army. Enemy air activity against airfields in
Tunisia as well as against towns in Sicily was
lively. Six enemy fighters were shot down for a loss
of nine of our planes. For reconnaissance results
see t ''Enemy Situation Mediterranean'5.
3. Eastern Fronts
Nothing to report.
-105- CONFIDENTIAL
7 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea;
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean;
Mineswoeping operations were observed off Tangier
on the afternoon of 6 April. A small convoy
consisting of two steamers, one escort vessel and a
British submarine left Gibraltar on the evening of
6 April bound for the Mediterranean. The cruiser
UGANDA entered Gibraltar on 7 April from the
Atlantic. Increased convoy traffic was observed
off the Algerian coast on the evening of 6 April,
and during the forenoon of 7 April. A convoy
consisting of 30 steamers and 15 escort vessels on
a westerly course was 60 miles west of Algiers at
1925 on 6 April; it is ostensibly the same convoy
reported north of Jijclli on the forenoon of 5
April.
Twenty vessels were located 50 miles north of Cape
Tenes at 0342 on 7 April, their course could not be
determined. Eight merchantmen were west of Cape
Bougaroni at 1045 heading east.
A submarine was reported northeast of -Point Stilo
in the afternoon.
According to photographic reconnaissance, eight
steamers and ostensibly 13 landing craft were in
Benghazi. One hospital ship and one tanker, tho
latter apparently aground, wore lying outside the
harbor.
Exhaustive reconnaissance of the coastal waters
between Mcrsa Matruh and Derna produced no sighting
results .
The number of ships lying in Alexandria harbor was,
according to photographic reconnaissance, unchanged
as far as the French vessels were concerned. In
addition, the following vessels wore counted,
2 light cruisers, 10 destroyers or corvettes, 1
submarine and about 40 merchantmen.
2 . Own Situation Mediterraneans
Four Italian submarines v/erc reported in the
operational area.
-106- CONFIDENTIAL
*>
7 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Our submarines were assigned now attack areas in the
Western Mediterranean. No successes have been
reported. For further details sees "Supplement to
the Submarine Situation1*. ; -,
PT boats of the 3rd and 7th Flotillas were not out
on operations during the night of 6 April because it
had been planned to use Italian PT boats.
There were no operations on the night of 7 April
owing to the weather.
3,500 tons of sulphur caught fire in Palermo after
the enemy air raid on 5 April. The submarine chaser
UJ "2202" and the steamer SKOTTPOSS were sunk during
an enemy air raid on Trapani on the afternoon of 6
April. The submarine chaser UJ "2210".. was damaged.
Three of the original ton German submarine chasers
have been sunk so far, only two of the remaining
seven arc fully operational.
Three mines were swept in the Bizcrta area by
Italian minesweepers on 6 April.
Operations 'by mincswecping planes were unsuccessful.
According to a situation report from the Commanding
General, Armed Forces, South, the Italian 1st Army
had to bo withdrawn to the Douacu-Skhirra line, where
the majority of the German forces arc ready for
defensive action. The situation of the 1st Italian
Army continues to be very serious owing to extremely
heavy casualties. The enemy also attacked with
strong armored' forces on the western front and made
a- breach about 8 kilometers wide and 2 kilometers
deep in our positions. An enemy attack west of
Pichon is also believed to be imminent. The Gafsa-
Gabcs road being in enemy hands, it is quite possible
that the enemy forces will shift the focal point of
their efforts in the hope of breaking through to
Kairouan. According to photographic reconnaissance
of 5 April, a section of the landing craft and equip-
ment which had so far been assumed in Or an, was
transferred to the Bougie - Bone region. Landing
craft spotted in Algiers and off Oran were, for the
most part, cither loaded or being loaded. The
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, therefore,
anticipates the possibility of a Commando operation
being launched against the coast of Northern Tunisia
-107- . ■ CONFIDENTIAL
7 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
as soon as a further transfer of landing craft to
the east is noticeable.
3 . Sea Transport Situations
The motor vessel TOMMASEO left Leghorn for Tunis on
the evening of 6 April escorted by a torpedo boat.
The convoy was diverted to Trapani owing to the
weather. Six Siebel ferries and two submarines from
Marsala entered Tunis on the afternoon of 6 April.
The putting- in report of eight Italian naval landing
craft on their return passage from Bizcrta to Trapani
has not yet been received.
The Gorman Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty
gave details of the convoy consisting of the steamers
SAN DIEGO and ROVERETO which were sunk by enemy bombers
from an altitude of 4,000 meters just outside Bizcrta
harbor despite their own strong fighter escort. For
copy see Teletype 1200. This report reveals that the
steamers had been shadowed £md repeatedly attacked by
enemy planes during the whole of their passage from
Naples. During the last attack our fighters were not
strong enough to prevent several bombers from breaking
through. Vice Admiral Ruge has therefore come to the
conclusion that it Is only possible for supplies to
reach their destination aboard fast, heavily armed
steamers, provided with the strongest possible fighter
escort. Even so, hopes of success still remain in
doubt, as the armament of our fighters is inadequate
against four- engine d enemy bombers .
4. Area Naval Group Souths
Aegean Seas
Nothing to report.
Black So a.;
Enemy Situation;
According to air reconnaissance, there was a small
number of single vessels under. escort off the
Caucasian coast.
Own Situation;
Operations by four PT boats planned for the night of
- 108- C ONFIDENTIAL
7 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
7 April in tho Tuapse -Sochi area had to be canceled
owing to the weather .
The 17th knap a convoy was carried out according to
plan; the 18th Anapa convoy has sailed. The ferry
service across the Strait of Kerch proceeded without
interference from enemy planes . The roads on the
Tar.ian Peninsula continue to be in poor condition and
can only be used by caterpillar vehicles. The rate
of discharge is correspondingly low. It is therefore
planned. to increase .supplies for Anapa on 8 and 9
April.
Tho first Tonriuk convoy with a cargo of 2,146 tons
put out on the night of 7 April.
Group South reported that Admiral, Black Sea was
informed by Army Group A of the Fuehrer's Operational
Order No. 5. This order stipulated that everything
be done to complete the reinforcement of the Crimean
coastal defenses. Army Group % has appointed fortress
commanders in Sevastopol, Fcodosia and Kerch.
The aim is to turn the provisionally fortified
peninsula into a Crimean fortress. The details of
the operational order are not known to the Group. In
the Group's opinion this means that the Navy will
have to effect fundamental changes in the prevailing
coastal defense system by confining itself to those
positions essential to naval operations . The focal
points for the Navy arc still the Strait of Kerch,
Peodosia including Ivan Baba, and Sevastopol. As a
precautionary measure the Group submitted its require-
ments as follows s nine 8*8 cm., five or six 10 cm.,
two- 12* 7 cm., eleven 15 cm. and eight 20*3 cm. guns,
one 30 • 5 cm. battery. This demand represents the
ultimate target for the naval artillery defenses of
the Crimea and has been calculated on the basis of
the fortress artillery in the west. For copy of this
report sec Teletype 1800.'
^X. Situation East Asia;
Nothing to report.
-109- CONFIDENTIAL
8 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Itcr.is of Political Ir.iporto.nco
According to Router, the Bolivian Government has announced
that Bolivia has boon at war with the Axis since 7 April.
General mobilization was ordered simultaneously* This
resolution was passed at a cabinet meeting and still requires
the approval of Parliament.
Ho further items of political importance wore received.
Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff
Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Divisions
Germany's natural rubber demands now only amount to 250 tons
a month and those of her Allies to 100 tons, a total of 350
tons. On this basis the PIETRO 0RSE0L0 would have brought
in supplies sufficient for at least six months .
According to information gained from the Spanish Naval Attache,
Berlin, Spanish fishermen stated that Gorman naval forces
forced them to surrender the rubber which they had salvaged.
A political demarche is anticipated. Spanish naval forces
were said to have orders to defend the rights of the Spanish
fishermen, if nocos.sary, by force of arms . The Spanish Naval
Attache and the German Naval Attache, Madrid were informed by
the Naval Staff that the German naval forces had standing
orders not to use force, and that therefore the statements
made by the. fishermen must be untrue. The German Foreign
Office has been approached in order to obtain its opinion on
the legal aspects of the situation. Group West has been
instructed that incidents must be avoided and that the text
of an order to our own forces not to apply force, for which
the Naval Staff gave instructions by telephone, is to be
submitted. The Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Head-
quarters was informed accordingly. For copy of the report
sec Teletype 1718.
Special Items ;
I. In accordance with the wishes of the Italian Admiralty,
the Naval Staff has agreed to an alteration In paragraph V
-110- CONFIDENTIAL
S x.pril 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
of Directive No. 1 of Commanding Admiral, Group South,
the paragraph in question to read as follows i
"In the event of an enemy offensive in the Aegean Sea,
Commanding Admiral, Naval Group South will assume
control of operations and, for that purpose, transfer his
headquarters to Athens. During the interval required for
this transfer, Admiral ^egeah* will issue the operational
orders which circumstances dictate , In the name and by
order of Commanding Admiral, Naval Group South, signing
them: "By order of Commanding admiral, Naval Group
South'V'
Copy of the dispatch addressed to the Italian Naval
Liaison Staff attached to the Naval Staff (I m 1042/43
Gkdos. Chefs.) in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.
It was c.nnounced in the same dispatch that Chief,
Organization and I.Iobilization Branch, Quartermaster
Division will visit Rome in order to report on the
attitude of the Naval Staff to the proposals on
organization submitted by the Italian Admiralty and to
discuss and settle the natter on the spot. Group South
was informed accordingly.
II. A compilation of the enemy intelligence obtained from
29 March to 4 April by radio deciphering and radio
intelligence is contained in Radio Nonitoring Report
No. 14/43.
Situation 8 <vpril
I • Nar in Foreign Waters s
1. En c my Situation;
Nothing to report.
2. Own Situation;
Blockade runner situations
a. No news of the REGEN3BURG. Air reconnaissance did
not extend as far as the approaches to the Denmark
Strait owing to ice formation trouble.
-Ill- CONFIDENTIAL
8 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
b. Group North took over command of the KARIN on the
. afternoon of 7 April.. The ship wr.s es tin" ted by
deed reckoning to be located in the eastern
approaches to Denmark Strait on 8 April. Visibility
was good with a stiff northerly breeze.
c. Group West took ov^r command of the IRENE as from
the forenoon of 8 April.
d. The HIMALAYA put out on the night of 8 April under
destroyer escort which will pick up the IRENE on
the afternoon of 10 April. The Chief, Naval Staff
at Fuehrer Headquarters has boon informed accordingly.
The 0RSE0L0 has been informed that Point "Echolot11 (^>.
is to be moved 5° cast (sec Radiogram 2218).
Through a submarine, tho IRENE reported camouflage
ships of which the Naval Staff, had no knowledge.
To avoid misunderstandings , the Naval Attache,
Tokyo has been requested to report exactly which
ships have been selected for camouflage, whenever
submitting general information on ships .
All outward bound blockade runners were instructed
in Radiogram 1009,
aa. to keep as far oast as possible between 10° 00'
N and 05° 00' 3;
bb . that the limit of the submarine area between 4
13° 00' N and 05° 00' to port of the advance
course had been moved east by 200 miles;
cc. to keep at least 250 miles away from Ascension
Island.
All vessels in foreign wators were Informed in
Radiogram 2001 that the auxiliary cruiser 3UL0L0
was at 08° 30 ! N, 27° 30' W, on a northwesterly
course, spv.cd 14 knots, on 2 April.
II . Situation 'Vest .'troc;
1. Enemy Siturtion;
At 1310 our air reconnaissance reported a single
funnel cruiser 280 miles west- southwest of Cape
-112- CONFIDENTIAL
*
8 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Ortcgal heeding north, and at 1550 two 5,000 G.R.T.
steamers end the passenger stor.ncr SAIlfcRIA escorted
by three destroyers 310 miles west of Gape Ortcgal,
course 30° .
2 . Own Situations
Atlantic Coasts '■•i
The approaches end roads of La Pallice, and the
approaches to Royan were closed on 7 April because
the presence of ground nines was suspected. At 1522
on 3 April, the nine exploding vessel "16" struck a
nine off La Pallice and was seriously damaged.
Group West informed the IRENE in Radiogram 1235 that
it had taken ov^r command and gave details of our
air reconnaissance operations as well as intelligence
on e homy air r c c onna i s s a n c o .
Channel Coast;
A detonation of the explosive cutter aboard mine-
sweeper r.t '"'3620", caused by faulty operation,
inflicted considerable damage as well as casualties.
On the sane day a raft was found by the eastern
breakwater of Le Troport from which enemy agents are
believed to have landed during the night.
III. North Sca/lTorway/lTorthern Waters ;
1. North aea;
Escort duties were postponed for 24 hours and mine-
sweeping activity and patrol boat duties canceled
owing to the weather. An enemy plane was shot down
by naval anti-aircraft guns in the Dutch area on the
night of 8 April, as numerous enemy planes passed
ovur the area making for the industrial area of
Wo s t e m Gc rne ny .
It is planned to tow the ADMIRAL HIPPER from
y.Vilhe lms haven to Brunsbucttel some time after 10
April. For further details. see Teletype 1553,
2. Norway/Northern Nators s
Enemy Situations
Radio intelligence intercepted an urgent tactical
-v...-..-. -113- CONFIDENTIAL
8 April 1943 , . CONFIDENTIAL
radio moss age from a British vessel which was also
relayed to-- Murmansk by a British home radio station.
.Four patrol boats and three minesweepers were
intercepted on their way from Murmansk to Varangcr
Fjord. Aerial activity was moderate ov^r the North
Sea. It was confirmed that six planes of the Iceland
squadrons were out on operations. On 27 March an
unidentified vessel received Instructions to avoid
a certain area off Reykjavik.
Our air reconnaissance reported a submerging enemy
submarine 240 miles northwest of Trondhcim at 1805.
Own Situations
A mine of an unknown typo was cut at the entrance to
Brci Sound, west of North Cape. It sank immediately.
The area was closed owing to the suspected presence
of mines. Raids by small numbers of enemy planes were
carried out on Kirkcnos on 6 April.
What is believed to have been a gas explosion occurred
aboard the SCHARMHORST at 1755 on 8 April in the
compartment containing chemicals for boiler maintenance.
The cause remains a mystery. The between deck above
the compartment was bent upwards, and the gun deck
above it was slightly bulged. The ship's fighting
qualities are in no way impaired, but 16 men were
unfortunately killed and two seriously Injured.
The NEUIvLJRK Is being transferred to Lang Fjord to be
at the disposal of the SCHARMHORST.
The steamer ANTJB FRITZEN (6,582 G.R.T.) sprang a
leak from an unknown cause west of Egorocy, but reached
Stavangcr under her own steam. The cargo consisted
of 9,400 tons of coal,
Nineteen ships were escorted north and twenty- two
south.
Instructions to the RARIN and RSGENSBURG were issued
by Group North in Radiograms 1150,1201, 1503 and 1525.
IV. Skc.pcrrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:
The gaps through the minefields off Hanstholm and
Kristiansand South wore each guarded by one patrol boat.
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8 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
S^vcn steamers end five submarines v/crc escorted in the
area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.
Thirteen vessels wore out sweeping the channels. The
narking of route i?38si with buoys has been started.
The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that mine-
field iJNashorn IVW consisting of 172 nines had been
completed, and that nNa.shorn Va!?, to contain 324 nines,
had been started. The sweeping of minefield "Corbctha
III" was continued as well as the work on the net of the
,JVi/>lrossil barrage. The marking of route r'Gelf" with
buoys was started.- The 24th Landing Flotilla reported
that all. the naval landing craft were available. The
25th Minesweeper Flotilla is swooping the si'';/artburg,?
minefield, i The minelayer liAISER is at Tallinn.
The Compandor, Minesweepers, Baltic has transmitted the
'report of the Connandcr, Net Barrage Unit on his
'. inspection of the Finnish net north of Porkalla. The
ncts_arcof poor quality and consist of captured supplies
from V/orld War I. Contrary to official statements
repeatedly made in the preceding year, Finnish officers
declared that it was north of Porkalla that Russian
submarines frequently broke through in 1942. The
. . Connandcr, Minesweepers, Baltic has therefore suggested
closing this 3-4 mile long, 25 meter deep section with
a Gernan. ant i- submarine bottom net, foregoing, if
necessary, the section south of Nargocn. Group North
concurred, with the suggestion of the Commander, Mine-
sweepers., Baltic and requested a decision from the
Naval Staff. (S^c Teletype 1534.)
The Commanding Admiral, Baltic States reported that it
was planned to have three 4 cm. guns for anti-aircraft
defense, which will be mounted by the beginning of May,
A few 2 cm. anti-aircraft guns will most probably be
added.
V. Me r ch ant S hi p p i ng i :
Group South advised the Naval Staff for information of
its demand to the Shipping and Transport Branch,
Quarto master Division to make up the deficit of 20,000
tons of shipping space which still exists after allocation
of 20,000 tons of captured French vessels. This is
necessary if the demands of the Armed Forces High Command,
Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces
Overseas for supplies for April and May at a monthly
average of 135,000 tons are to be met (sec Teletype 1850).
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8 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
VI . S ubma r i no \ * crfc.ro i
1. Enemy Situations
Vory brisk air reconnaissance was confirmed as far
as 15° Vij in th
2. Own Situations
as 15° \j in the Bay of Biscay
Now that the convoy operation in the North Atlantic
has been broken off, the submarines will be newly
assigned. Group i?i'xdleri? will be made up of 16
submarines which arc to take up positions in the
reconnaissance line from AK 7257 to 3D 1959 from 11
April onwards and lie in wait for the convoy making
for the northeast, course 225°. The Group "Locwenhorz"
submarines will be mainly assigned to supply operations.
The rest of the submarines arc to make for AK 85.
Submarine U "123'' of the southern group reported the
sinking of a 4,500 G.R.T. steamer in ET 2452. This
was possibly a Spanish ship, although neither a flag
nor neutrality identification marks were recognizable.
In the "u/est Indies submarine U 'l,155n sank a 3,000
G.R.T. steamer in DM 4288 and a 9,973 G.R.T. tanker
in Dl.i 2883. Further reports arc contained in the
"Supplement to the Submarine Situation'"' in ,/ar Diary,
Part B, Vol. IV.
VII. Aerial warfare:
1. British Isles and Vicinity;
The 3rd ^ir Force had 137 planes on operations over
the Western Area and four over the Mediterranean.
Two Spitfires were shot down during daylight sorties.
Nine of our planes laid mines in the Thames on the
night of 8 April. A total of 244 enemy planes wore
reported to have penetrated Gorman or German occupied
territory on the night of 8 April, 150 - 170 of which
broke through to the Ivlucnstcr - Paderborn - Gicssen -
Mctz area, dropping numerous bombs on cities and
towns in the Rhine - 'jcstphalian industrial areas and
Dutch border districts. There did not appear to be
any definite focal point. Eight enemy planes wore
shot, down by anti-aircraft guns, one by naval
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3 ^pril 1943 COIImlDjllTTiAL
anti aircraft guns, and one by fighters.
2 . Modi to rrr.no an Theater ;
The 2nd Air Force reported 298 flights which wore
concentrated on the western pert of the Tunisian
front during the day, and on the southern front
during the night and evening. The transportation
of fuel supplies had once more to be assigned to
bombers . Two onony planes were shot down. Enemy
attacks against our air and supply bases wore less
heavy than on the previous days .
3 . Eastern Fronts
Reconnaissance activity in the Black Sea by the 4th
Air Force did not yield any appreciable results.
VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea;
1. Bncri" Situation Mediterranean;
A minelayer of the ABVEMluTtE class which entered
Gibraltar from an unknown direction on the evening
of 7 April, left again for an unknown destination on
the evening of 8 April. According to an Italian
report, about 21 large and medium-sized vessels
passed Tangier at approximately 2300 on 7 April,
coming from the Atlantic and making for the Straits
of Gibraltar. Visibility was poor. A confirmation
of this report has not yet been received from German
sources. A transport escorted by three destroyers
entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean on the
afternoon of 8 April.
Convoy traffic in the Western Mediterranean was
normal. At 0718 our air reconnaissance sighted 12
steamers, 6 destroyers and 6 escort vessels west of
Cape Bougaroni, making for the cast.
Photographic interpretation of the exhaustive air
reconnaissance of the Algerian ports on 5 April
showed that the following vessels were in these ports
and Gibraltar] 3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier,
6 cruisc-rs, including a large cruiser, 1 minelayer,
2 large destroyers, 17 destroyers, 16 submarines,
23 patrol boats and smaller naval craft and about
25 PT boats . Reports of an additional battleship
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8 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
being in Mors ol Kcbir have been clarified. The
large cruiser had obviously been mistaken for a
battleship.
Submarines were reported west of Elba, southeast
of Catalina and northeast of Point Stilo. '
There was nothing to report from the Eastern
Me di t er ranc an .
The German Embassy in Ankara reported that the two
PT boats purchased from Groat Britain wore taken
over by the Turkish Navy in Aloxandrctta on 2 April
2. Own Situation Mediterraneans
Four Italian submarines were reported in the
operational area. Our submarines submitted no
reports of successes. No PT boats were out on
operations owing to the weather. Thus, only
four boats are at present operational. Another
mine was swept east of Cape Zebib on 6 April.
An auxiliary motor minesweeper ran aground off La
Goulctte. Mine sweeping operations in the Trapani
area were canceled owing to the weather. The
submarine chaser UJ ''2207'' shot down an enemy
plane on the afternoon of 7 April while making for
Reggio .
3. Sea Transport Situation;
The motor vessel TOMIJASSO entered Trapani on the
night of 3 April. The steamer FOGGIA is on passage
from Sousse to Pantelleria. Twelve Italian naval
landing craft dropped anchor off Favignana on
account of the bad weather. Four of these are
bound for Bizcrta, the remaining eight are on their
return passage to Trapani.
4. Area Naval Group South.
Aegean Sea;
The anti-submarine patrol by planes and naval craft
was without result. Escort duties were carried out
according to plan and without. incident .
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8 Apral 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Black Seas
Encny Situations
According to air reconnaissance, only slight
shipping traffic was observed off the Caucasian
coast. Radio Intelligence intercepted a destroyer
in the area west of Sochi-Adlor In the afternoon.
Own Situation;
PT boats were not out on operations . The convoys
sailing along the Crimean coast and lumber trans-
ports fron Yalta to Kerch wore detained owing to
the weather. The 18th and 19th ..napa convoys were
held up at Kamish Burun for the sane reason. The
motor minesweeper R i!30w with four naval landing
craft and two freight train ferries is on her
return passage to Kerch after having unloaded at
Temriuk.
The ferry service across the Strait of Kerch was
not handicapped by any enemy air activity. Low
flying enemy planes dropped mines on the Senaya
ferry route. The quantities landed on the Tainan
Peninsula have for days been more than the Army
could deal with. 1,682 tons of supplies and 217
tons of engineer equipment were shipped east.
According to a report from Group South, it is
planned to increase the supplies to the Taman
bridgehead, partly by a new method and partly by a
change-over from naval landing craft to lighters.
On the conclusion of present operation, it has been
planned to ship still about two- divisions west, and
to transfer personnel returning from leave cast.
The Schcurlen Operational Staff cannot be disbanded
until the second half of May when It is proposed to
draw on it to reinforce the Kerch Naval Shore
Command for current ferry operations.
IX. Situation East .^sia;
Nothing to report.
•119- CONFIDEITTIAL
9 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
On 3 April Mr. Edon gave the House of Commons an account of
his journey to the United States. He revealed no facts of any
particular interest. His statements gave the impression that
it had not so much been a natter of concrete resolutions having
been passed butrather of opinions on all current, and also on
a number of future questions having been thoroughly discussed.
Secretary of State Hull has been invited to visit London. For
further details sec the daily situation report of Intelligence
Division, No. 84, paragraph 2 c and the Foreign Press Report
of 9 April No. I, paragraph 2 a.
Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff
I . Report by Quartermaster Division;
a. By Armed Forces High Command making a special allocation
from Army and Air Force stocks, it will be possible
to increase the oil supply to the Italian Navy by
11,400 tons, making a total of 51,000 tons for the
current month. To this will be added 7,000 tons
available in Italy, The requirements for supplies
for Africa , if carried through according to plan,
amount to 45,000 tons per month. For further details
see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.
b. The Fuehrer has decreed that the Army be given priority
allocations of small arms and machine-guns.
c. The permanent representative of the Commander in Chief,
Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters reported that in the
course of the discussions at the Bcrghof the Italian
Navy requested the allocation of a workshop in the
Toulon arsenal .
d. The possibility of using Ship '?14iJ as a night fighter
control vessel in the. Skagorrak Is being investigated.
II. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff stated that the Commander in
Chief, Navy has successfully settled the steel allocation
question.
No details arc yet available.
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9 April 1943 :- CONFIDENTIAL
Special I tens
I. According to" tho Underwater Obstacles Branch, Naval
Ordnance Division, a new device in the forn of a delayed
action contact was found in a salvaged ELM/J nine. The
nine switches off tho firing mechanism for seven seconds
after the first impulse, and after that period has
elapsed remains ready for' firing for a further nine
seconds. Consequently such mines cannot be swept by
single magnetic .nine sweeping planes,. .but all other. hinds
of mineswecping gear can bo used.
Two Ju 52 magnetic mine-sweeping planes will therefore
have to cover the same stretch at an interval of 10 -
12 saconds, if they arc to clear British ELM/J mines
fitted with do laved action contacts.
*u
Details will be relayed to all operational stations for
information, pointing out that as a normal ELM/ J mine
might .possibly endanger the second plane, the advisability
of tho sweeping procedure is to be investigated once
more by the Ivlinelaying Experimental Command, and that
the tactical commitment of the mineswecping planes is to
be directed by tho Commander in Chief, Air Force, Aerial
Ivlinc Inspectorate. - ;
II. Group North advised the Naval Staff of the request made
to the 5th Air Force for a reconnaissance of Denmark
Strait and the ice areas because of the REG-EN3BURG- and.
EAR IN which arc overdue .
The Naval Staff emphatically supported this request in
the following teletype to the Commander in Chief, Air
Force, Operations Staffs
,?Two blockade runners are in Denmark Strait area; one of
these, THUSNELDA, has boon overdue for the past eight
days. Naval Staff assumes that she has cither run into
Ice or been damaged in it. Reconnaissance of part or
6-f- the entire Denmark Strait, if possible, is requested
in order to clarify the situation. Results will be of
decisive importance for further measures. ;!
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9 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Situation 9 April
I . War in Foreign Waters;
1. Enony Situation;
Hothing to report .
2 . Own Situation:
Our Attache In To ley o reported that the RIO GRANDE and
the BURGENLaND entered Yokohana on 31 March and 2 . _ .
April respectively, and the ROSSBACH Batavia on 8
April.
Thus, all the blockade runners which wore turned -
round have returned to port.
Situation of the blockade runners in the Atlantic;
1. No reports fron the REGENSBURG and AARIN. Air
reconnaissance was canceled.
2. The homeward bound IRENE is today between 24°
and 20° ¥ according to dead reckoning.
3. The HIMALAYA put out on the night of 8 April
.. escorted by destroyer.
The Chief, Naval Staff at Fuehrer Headquarters will
be informed accordingly.
All vessels in foreign waters were Informed in
Radiogram 1822 of the position of the auxiliary cruiser
ALCANTARA on 3 April with a group in 5° 23' N, 52° 09'
W, course 117 , speed 12 knoits .
II • Situation West Area;
1. Enemy Situation;
Reconnaissance by the Air Commander, Atlantic
produced the following information;
a. 1135; three destroyers about 350 miles west of
Lorient, course 200°, high speed.
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9 April 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
b. 1205s Warship group consisting of 4 cruisers, 2
destroyers, and 2 escort vessels, 350 miles off
Brest, course 360°, moderate' speed. A plane was
over the formation. This group had, at the same
time and in the same position, been interpreted
as a group of four merchant vessels with two escort
vessels and one plane. . , „■ .......
o. 1332s one destroyer in BE 8384, course 100°, highr,.j
speed. A plane was in the vicinity.
d. 1147 j one destroyer and one vessel (a light cruiser,
according to subsequent photographic evaluation) "•
in BE 9147, course 100°, medium speed.
The information contained in paragraph d) did not ■
come to the attention of the Naval Staff during 9
April o .
2* Own Situation;
Atlantic Coast;
The heavily damaged mine exploding vessel l?16a was
towed in to La Pallico. The mouth of the Gironde is
closed as far as Pauillac owing to the suspected
presence of aerial mines. A total of 15 British
ELM/ J mines was swept off La Fallice on 7 and 8 'April.
The roadstead and approaches to La Pallico and the-
approaches to Bayonnc arc once more open to shipping.
Group Wost reported that the outgoing escort of the
HIMALAYA sailed at midnight according to plan. In
place of the destroyer Z a375', which is out. of aatxon, .
two boats of the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla were
assigned and these were to turn back on the evening
of 9 April at the latest.
At 2145 Group Wost reported that the HIMALAYA assign-
ment has so far been proceeding according to plan.
Channel Coasts
Harbor defense vessels off Lo Havre were machine-
gunned by nine enemy pianos at 1930. Damage and
losses were negligible.
Because of the known shortage of urgently needed fast
-123- CONFIDENTIAL
9 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
escort vessels , the Commanding Admiral-, Defenses ,
"West has requested the assignment of the LOTIIRING-EN
and fitting up as a fast escort vessel. Further
steps will be taken by Quartcrnastcr Division.
III. North Soa/Norway/Northcrn Waters i
1. North Sea;
Escort duties were carried out according to plan.
In the forenoon a battery on the Dutch coast opened
fire against enemy planes; hits were observed. There
were otherwise no special incidents to report.
2 . No rway/Nor thorn Waters %
Enemy Situations
According to radio intelligence, five Russian
destroyers were heading towards the Kola Bay exit
on what were believed to be maneuvers. There was
considerable air reconnaissance over the North Sea
in the direction of the west coast of Norway. Five
planes belonging to the Iceland squadrons were
observed. Our air reconnaissance in the area of the
Faeroes and the Shetland Islands was without result.
The drifting bow of a ship was sighted 300 miles
northwest of Trondheim. A submarine with a black
conning- tower was seen submerging 240 miles west of
Mosiocn. A patrol boat reported sighting submarines
In the area of Naval Shore Command, Moldc . Further
details have not yet been received .
Own Situations
Our convoy, castbound for Pctsamo, was fired on from
the Rybachi Peninsula. Slight damage was caused by
a hit on the steamer TROSTBURG-. Our guns returned
fire with 139 salvoes.
The tanker 17EISENBURG- was attacked by six enemy
torpedo bombers north of Stadlandct at 1741. The
tanker sustained a torpedo hit. The fire which it
caused was extinguished, and passage resumed. Two
of the attacking bombers wore shot down.
It Is feared that a considerable amount of oil has
boon lost as a result of the hit - a particularly
regrettable fact in view of the critical oil situation.
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9 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Twenty-three ships were escorted north and twenty-
five south.
The Naval Staff has informed Group North that the
IRENE is not to bo expected in Northern Waters, as
she will be escorted home via the Bay of Biscay, and
that further incoming oscort operations , apart from
those of the RSGE.NSBURG and KARIN, arc not to bo
. expected.
Group North continued to transmit instructions to
the KARIN and RSGENSBURC in Radiograms 1055, 1107,
1110, 1232 and 2023.
No special reports were received from the submarines
In Northern Waters .
IV. Skagorrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea;
Seven steamers and four submarines were escorted in the
areas of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.
Thirteen sea-going vessels and three mine sweeping planes
were sweeping the channels .
Following a collision with a patrol boat, submarine
IT i!733" sank without any casualties In water 9 motors
deep in Gdynia on 8 April. Salvage operations arc in
progress .
The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that
'2Nashorn ValJ has been laid according to plan. The
laying courses for ■ "Vila1' and ''Villa'5 have been swept
clear. The swooping operations In the nCorbetha III''
and i?Wartburg IIa minefields arc being continued. The
3rd Minesweeper Flotilla was transferred to Homol to
assist in the latter task.
The Naval Staff has' assigned thc.net material requested
by the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic for strengthening
the Finnish barrage near Porkalla (see Teletype 1718).
From Kronstadt Bay, the Commanding Admiral, Baltic States
reported the usual activity. Throe Hurricanes were shot
down by our planes, on the afternoon of 8 April. Numerous
lines in Glinki were destroyed by the gunfire from
Seiskari.
V. Merchant Shipping;
The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping stated that
-125- CONFIDENTIAL
9 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
owing to the inadequate harbor facilities it would be.
impossible to effect the immediate transfer of the
Spanish fruit and ore traffic to Port Vendrcs. The
necessary arrangements were being made as quickly as
possible
The Naval Staff notified the offices concerned. The
Naval Staff has informed the Naval Attache., Madrid of
its apprehensions lest the six Spanish ships should be
attacked by the British. But if the Spaniards insist
on the ships being independently routed beyond Port .
Vendrcs j the Naval Staff will raise no objections apart
from pointing out the risks involved, as the traffic
is also of importance to us.
VI, Submarine Warfare;
1. Enemy Situation!
Air Reconnaissance over the Bay of Biscay was very
brisk- 36 planes were observed.
2 . Own Situation;
No reports of successes were received. For further
details sec ''Supplement to the Submarine Situation'
in V7ar Diary Part 3, Vol. IV, -:- - •-
Four submarines were detailed to BE 7527 to take over
the IRENE. The submarines have been given the task
of closing in and taking over anti-aircraft defense
or torpedo action against surface forces in close
escort .
VII. Aerial ,/arfaro
1. British Isles and Vicinity;
The 3rd Air Force had 117 planes out over the Western
Area, four over the Mediterranean. Four F.7 190' s
carried out a nuisance raid on Folkestone in the late
afternoon. One plane was shot down by anti-aircraft
fire. For the results of the reconnaissance by the
Air Commander, Atlantic Coast sees '"Situation West
Area" .
There was great activity by enemy fighter and fighter
bomber formations during the day. Railroad stations
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*
*
9 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
and traffic installations in the Dicppo and Amiens
areas wore attacked. Many engines were lost and
casualties wore heavy. Two enemy fighters and one
four-cngincd bomber were shot down. The number of
planes shot down on the night of 8 April has risen
to 16. On the night of 9 April a total of 172 enemy
planes flew over German territory. 100 - 150 planes
raided the Rhine - V/estphalian industrial district,
Duisburg being the main target area. For damage see
the daily situation report. According to reports
so far received, eight of the attacking planes were
shot down by fighters .
2. Mediterranean Theater;
Operations were mainly concentrated on supporting the
severe defensive fighting along the entire Tunisian
west front.
3 . Eastern Front :
Thirteen enemy planes virere shot down over the Army
lines .
According to photographic evaluation, a 1,000 G.R.T.
steamer was anchored near Novorossisk at 0946.
VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea;
1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean;
■ According to an intelligence report from Portugal,
emanating from diplomatic sources, a large formation
of British warships is to put out from Milford Haven
and Devonport on 14 April for Gibraltar to reinforce
the Mediterranean forces .
The transfer of a large number of heavy bombers from
Great Britain to North Africa is scheduled for
15 April.
Both reports would suggest the imminence of a large-
scale enemy operation.
Three loaded U.S. steamers and one cable layer
entered Gibraltar from an unknown direction early
on the forenoon of 9 April; a further four steamers
put in from the Atlantic in the course of the fore-
noon. A large convoy consisting of one transport
and twenty-eight steamers, two with hoisted torpedo
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9 April 1943 . CONFIDENTIAL
nets , entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean before
noon. Further vessels from the Mediterranean arrived
later. Four transport vessels, 99 steamers, 10
tankers and numerous small craft in addition to naval
craft, were in Gibraltar at 1400. A total of 154
planes was counted in the harbor and on the airfield.
Only slight shipping activity was observed in the
Western Mediterranean.
At 1018 3 landing craft were 12 miles west of Cape
Tenes heading west; at 1045 2 destroyers were 30
miles southwest of Cape Tenes heading north; at 1135
7 destroyers were 30 miles south-southwest of Almeria
heading east. Twelve steamers were in Oran roads at
1615; and 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier and 2
cruisers were in Mers el Ivebir at 1915. What was
believed to be an additional cruiser was lying off
the harbor entrance.
A submarine was sighted southeast of Cagliari.
An exhaustive reconnaissance of the coastal
approaches from Tobruk to Appollonia resulted in the
sighting of a steamer lying stopped 24 miles north-
west of Derna.
According to a report of the Naval Intelligence
Center, Istanbul from a reliable source in Adana,
confirmation has been received of a British aircraft
carrier already reported as having .entered Tripoli
(Syria) on 2 April. The Naval Intelligence Center,
Istanbul, however, considers this report to be of
a doubtful nature or deliberately spread.
2 . Own Situation Mediterranean;
Four Italian submarines were in the operational area.
No reports of successes were received from our sub-
marines. Submarine U !?602n entered Toulon.
Weather conditions put a stop to all PT boat
operations, nines weeping activity and shipping
traffic also had to be canceled.
The auxiliary minesweeper HR "66125? which ran
aground off La Goulette will have to be considered
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9 April 1943 -_ C01TFIDENTIAL
a total loss. It proved impossible to unload any
of the ships which ran aground off Cape Zebib.
The motor minesweepers R i?3u and R ;i4" arrived in
Chalon on 8 April.
The Reich Minister for Air and the Commander in
Chief ,. Air Force, General Staff have ordered,
effective immediately, that the nine ferries in
operation in the area of the 3rd Air Force and the
twoferries attached to the Perry Anti-Air craft
Training Command be allocated to the 2nd Air Force
for use as transport ferries. The ferries will be
turned over to the Navy.
3. Sea Transport Situation;
The steamer Tommaseo, the only supply ship on
passage, lay off Favignana during the northwesterly
gale in the Sicilian Channel. The transport
operations of war transports and naval landing
craft had to be postponed.
The German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty
reported that of the only two approach routes to
Tunisia, our own and enemy minefields have narrov/od
the Zembretta route down to three miles. Because
of the unpredictable cross current, which has caused
the loss of several vessels, including the two troop
transport destroyers, any approaching ve-ssels must
be piloted by torpedo boats from Zembretta. This
passage can.be used only if weather conditions
improve. The Pantelleria route cannot bo used in
heavy seas, 'as the channel near Cape Bon is only a
few hundred meters wide. In addition, the evaluation
of the operations of the A3DIEL cruiser on the night
of 30 March has led to mines being once more suspected
in- the area. The Italians, however, intend to take
the risk. In view of these navigational difficulties,
we will, unfortunately, be unable to exploit the bad
weather to the desired extent.
4. Arc- a Naval Group South;
Aegean Sea;., .
Transport and convoy traffic proceeded according to
p Ian and wi the ut ■ i nc i don t .
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9 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Black Sea;
Enemy Situations
According to air reconnaissance, shipping off the
Caucasian coast was negligible.
Own Situations
Our PT boats were not out on operations . An enemy
convoy consisting of one steamer and two patrol
boats was attacked by our planes on the evening of
8 April; results were not observed.
The patrol boat duty off Taganrog was carried out
with one motor fishing vessel. Convoy traffic In
the Black Sea was carried out according to plan.
The 18th Anapa convoy sailed from Kamish Burun in
the evening.
As for the ferry service across the Strait of
Kerch, the passage to Senaya was closed because of
the danger of mines. 300 tons of supplies were
transported cast, none west.
IX. Situation East Asia;
Based on a communication from the Japanese Admiralty,
the Naval Attache, Tokyo made the following reports
160 Japanese fighters and 70 dive bombers based at
Rabaul and Buka, attacked about 15 escorted U.S. trans-
ports between Tulagi and Guadalcanar on the forenoon
of 7 April. According to reports so far received, the
following vessels were sunk? 1 light cruiser, 1 anti-
aircraft destroyer, two 10,000 G.R.T,, six 8,000 G.R.T.
and two 4,000 G.R.T. transports. Three additional trans-
ports wero severely damaged. Thirty-six planes were
shot down during aerial combat. Japanese losses were
as follows t 6 planes shot down, 14 missing.
The claim made by enemy propaganda that a Japanese
cruiser was sunk during an air raid on Kavieng (New
Ireland) is quite unfounded. The Japanese cruiser
was merely hit aft, but did not sink.
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10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Nothing of any value to naval warfare has been received.
A statement by Litvinov to the effect that Spain had been at
war with the U.S.S.R. ever since Spanish volunteers left for
the cast, is worth noting. This act of aggression was said
to have made a formal declaration of war by Russia quite
superfluous .
Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff
I. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division reported
that i •■...•
a. Lack of escort and defense forces had again made
itself very much felt during the past few days.
In Norway, following the loss of the ALTAIR and the
PAiTRIA on 3 and 4 April, the tanker Y/EISSEITBUKG was
damaged by aerial torpedo hits off Stadlandet on 9
April. The two steamers which made up the 7/EI3SENBURG
convoy could only be escorted by one patrol boat.
The Naval Staff felt that in view of the special
Importance of the tanker fs cargo, a heavier escort
should have been provided at all costs. The Chief
of Staff, Naval Staff ordered that this view be
brought to the attention of the Naval Command, Norway.
It is imperative to control Danish fishing vessels
off the west coast of Jutland and in the Kattegat,
where they are suspected of contacting the enemy and
sometimes, the enemy air force.
b. Group V/cst transmitted the following summary of the
situation In anticipation of the sailing of important
Channel convoys?
1. Our flanking minefields arc no longer effective.
2. British long-range batteries arc continually
improving their firing by radar. These batteries
will become increasingly dangerous .
3. Night operations by British fighter bombers have
so increased in efficiency that effective attacks
will even have to be anticipated on dark nights.
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10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
4. Sweeping is being considerably complicated by the
use in mixed minefields of a new type of mine,
Mark XIX, fitted with snag lines, especially as it
has been again proved by the fighter attack on the
8th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla that mine clearing
by day will frequently lead to losses. Of 52
motor minesweepers, only 22 arc still operational.
Group West, therefore, urgently requested a
considerable increase in the day and night fighter
strength of the 3rd Air Force for the protection
of the minesweepers and convoy operations of the
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West and has promised
a detailed report on the situation.
In addition to pointing out the necessity for
reinforcing fighter cover, this summary also stresses
the general lack of naval forces in no uncertain terms.
The details to a) and b) were transmitted to the Chief,
Naval Staff at Fuehrer Headquarters. Copy of this tele-
type in accordance with l/Skl 1082/43 Gkdos. Chefs. In
War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b and l/Skl I a 10422/43
Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.
II . Report by Quartermaster Division?
a. On the basis of the instructions transmitted by the
permanent representative of the Commander In Chief,
Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters, German Naval Command,
Italy was provided with the following Information and
instructions on 9 Aprils
1. In ^pril, the Italian Navy will receive a total of
58,000 tons of oil from Germany and Rumania; i.e.
6,000 tons more than originally proposed.
2. Those 6,000 tons are only to be used for the
specific purpose agreed upon between the Fuehrer
and the Duce. German Naval Command, Italy will
make certain of this by discussing it with the
Italian Admiralty,
b. Fieldmarshal Milch has called a meeting of all the
civilian and military offices concerned for 14 April;
It is proposed to discuss the necessary steps for the
evacuation of public and military offices and
authorities from Berlin In view of the growing number
of air raids. In the case of the Naval Staff, the
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10 April 1943 CQNFIDENTIaL
Commander in Chief, Navy has discussed with the
Chief, -Army General Staff, ?/ho has promised to
investigate the matter, the possibility ,. of evacuating
to the Zosson Command Post," actually intended for
the ii.rmy Command.
III. The Naval Attache and Foreign Affairs Section, Operations
Division have reported on the Swedish request to permit
Swedish shipping to be escorted by Swedish vessels in
the northern part of the North Sea because of the mine
menace. Germany cannot comply with such a request.
For further details see Yfor Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
Special Items
In a report dated 29 March, the Deputy Military Attache,
Madrid shares the Spanish and Italian point of view prevailing
in Tangier, namely that the Anglo-American military
preparations perceptible in Northwest Africa arc not being
planned for an operation in Tunisia alone. The attache points
to the sudden very obviousrcticcnce of all the Spanish
authorities where information on the enemy situation is
concerned, information which had until now, been always
freely given. It has been definitely noticed that Spanish
concern over military events outside the borders of the
Protectorate has ceased. Several Instances have gone to
prove that the Spanish know more about American plans than
they care to admit. The Spanish High Command in North Africa
has probably concluded that the numbers of men and material
landed, which considerably exceed the requirements of the
Tunisian front, would be more than sufficient for an operation
at another, point - in the Western Mediterranean. In a situation
report submitted to Madrid at the end of March, the Chief,
General Staff stated that the area chosen for an operation
of this kind would probably lie within the triangle Oran -
Sicily - Marseilles. The Attache recalls that during
September - October 1942, the Spanish were clearly living in
great fear of the British landing in Oran. He is of the
opinion that, given these facts, the view repeatedly
expressed of late by leading Spanish authorities, that the
coming attack will be directed against Franco, should not
be underestimated.
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10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Situation 10 April
I . V/ar in Foreign Waters ;
1 . Enemy Situation 2
The French cruiser PRIHAUGUET was out on patrol at
a speed of 19 knots in 09° 30 ' H, 27° 20 « IV on 8
April.
2. Own Situation:
The Naval Attache, Tokyo transmitted the ROSSBaCH's
report from Batavia, according to which three
Norwegian members of the crew deserted on 26 March
after an unsuccessful attempt at sabotage,, but had
been re-captured. 1*11. twelve Norwegians aboard were
consequently locked up. The Naval Attache, Tokyo is
trying to have the prisoners transferred to Ship
l!28" to have them court-martiallod.
No reports have been received from the KARIN and the
REGENSBURG. Air reconnaissance over Denmark Strait
has consequently been requested of Commander in
Chief, Air Force.
All ships in foreign waters wo-bq informed of the
enemy situation in Radiogram 1557.
II. Situation West Are
o e
1. Enemy Situation:
Air reconnaissance by No. 19 Group over the outer
part of the Bay of Biscay and over the Eastern
Atlantic was extremely lively.
The reconnaissance report of the Air Commander,
Atlantic, made at 1147 on 9 April on the sighting
of a destroyer and a light cruiser in BE 9147 was
not transmitted by C-roup V/est until 0125 on 10 April
and was received by the Naval Staff at 0313.
Our air reconnaissance reported an enemy minelaying
cruiser in 63° 51' N, 24° W heading north at 1250
on 10 April (obviously the ADVENTURE] which had loft
at 200.0... on -8 April on an unknown course).
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10 April 1943 ...... • '.■' CONFIDENTIAL
The cruiser was once more reported' at 1440, course
30° to 40°, speed 15 to 20 knots, position not given.
Radio intelligence intercepted numerous British, air
reconnaissance reports by No. 19 Group on our forces,
in connection with the HIT.lij.LAYA, the IRENE and the
8th Destroyer Flotilla. The HIMALAYA, together with
the destroyers, was continually intercepted from 08°
00 ' W onwards .
Atlantic Coasts !"*■:;
1. Blockade runner operations ;
On the basis of any enemy reports, Group West
recalled the HIMALAYA group to draw the enemy's
attention away from the IRENE. The formation
received orders to return to La Pallicc. The IRENE
has received instructions to make for Vigo immediately
as it will be impossible for her to be picked up by
destroyers. The Group intends the ship to steer an
inconspicuous course and withdraw to the south.
Three or four of our torpedo boats of the Brest
group have received orders to put out for BP 5857
for a rendezvous with the HIMALAYA group at 2000.
The convoy is. to be picked up by mincswcopiiig forces
at Point 438. The IRENE has been informed that she
is being sought by four of our submarines on her
approach route to Vigo, which are waiting to close
in and take her under close escort. At 1315, the
IRENE received a radio message from Group West that
our air reconnaissance had reported an enemy mine-
laying cruiser at 42° 30' N, 16° 00' vl at 1250,
course 360°, speed about 20 knots. A change in the
course of this cruiser to 30° -'40° was notified in
Radiogram 1435. ' The position .of the minclaying
cruiser was, according to our air reconnaissance,
transmitted as being 42° 45' N, 15° 35' ¥ course
40°, speed 20 knots at 1520.
The matter was brought to the attention of the Chief,
Naval Staff at Fuehrer Headquarters by teletype at
1055. Tclctyec in l/Skl I k 1086/43 7/ Gkdos . Chefs.
"In files l/Skl I k III.
At 1719, the IRENE reported her position by short
signal as 43° N 14° Wj a battleship was attacking;
secret documents had been destroyed. The Chief,
Naval Staff at Fuehrer Headquarters was informed of
this report at 2140.
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10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
At 2330 Group West reported that., [ in accordance with
orders the three torpedo boats from Brest had, in all
likelihood, met the HIMALAYA group in BF 5857 and
that it had been decided to allow the HIMALAYA to
enter by channel "Mustergatto'1 ,. letting' the destroyers
sail for Lc Vcrdon roads and the HIMALAYA for Bordeaux.
The HIMALAYA group reported bombers- at a high altitude
and a torpedo bomber attack in BF 5883 at 2100. The
first wave of attacking planes was beaten off; three
planes wore shot down.. Further attacks were
anticipated. An air sea rescue operation for the
IRENE has been put Into operation by the Air Commander,
Atlantic Coast. In addition, the HIMALAYA group will
be provided with a close escort of heavy forces from
daybreak on.
Group West has submitted the order for the escort by
the 8th Destroyer Flotilla of the outgoing blockade
runner HIMALAYA and the incoming blockade runner
IRENE (keywords? "Pontcs? and nBuchi?).
Copy In accordance with l/Skl 1080/43 Gkdos . Chefs,
in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.
2. Miscellaneous s
One 12 G.R.T. motor fishing vessel has been missing
in Douarncnoz since the morning of 8 April.
Investigations by the German Intelligence Substation
arc In progress .
A French passenger steamer plying between Ushant and
Brest was attacked by four enemy planes at 1520.
Four German and three Frenchmen were injured.
Four low flying enemy planes also attacked two patrol
boats In BF 5213 at 1525. One commander was seriously
injured, the other only slightly. One of the attacking
planes is believed to have been shot down. The boats
wore slightly damaged and consequently non operational.
The Chief, Armed Forces High Command conveyed the
Fuehrer's decision on the instructions proposed by
the Commanding General, armed Forces, West for the
Commander, Defenses ^rca, La Rochcllc. Except for a
actual land engagements, the Fuehrer has made the
Navy...responsiblc for the training and commitment of
all coastal batteries. Naval coastal defenses,
-136- CONFIDENTIAL
§
10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
including all Army coastal batteries, arc, therefore,
to remain under the Naval Shore Commander, and no
other stations shall have the right to issue orders
to the battalions and batteries independently of the
Naval Shore Commander.
The proposed paragraph 3 of the instructions is to
be altered, therefore, as follows:
a. Naval coastal defense forces, including Army
coastal batteries, will remain under the orders
of the Naval Shore Commander during preparations
for action. The Commander, Defense Area will
submit his rcquos-ts to the Naval Shore Commander
who will issue the necessary orders to the
stations under his command. The Naval Shore
Commander is likewise to allow the Commander,
Defense Area to participate in defense preparations
affecting land defense in general at an early
stage. In cases of doubt, the Divisional
Commander will take the necessary decisions within
the limits of his power, in accordance with
Directive No. 40. Local offices arc once again
ordered by the High Command, Navy and the
Commanding General, Armed Forces, West to work In
the closest collaboration, regardless of these
assignments of actual authority.
b. Local naval coastal defense forces have been
placed under the Commander, Defense Area for land
engagements. But as far as the local situation
permits , he Is obliged to comply with the Naval ..;,
Shore Commander's demands as regards all matters
concerning naval warfare (e.g. opening the harbor „
booms for outgoing submarines or PT boats etc.).
c. Naval forces in any case remain under the Naval
Commanders, in accordance with Directive 40,
section III, paragraph 5.
Channel Coast;
Enemy targets located of Lc T report were fired on by one"
of our batteries from 0201 to 0302. At the same time
and In the same area, five vessels belonging to the 38th
Minesweeper Flotilla were engaged In a skirmish with
three PT boats, two of which were severely damaged. We
suffered no casualties. For the snort report on the
engagement" "sec-- Teletype 1353 .
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10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
The harbor defense vessel Po !,16" was attacked by PT
boats off Dunkirk at 0415 and chased aground. Salvage
operations are thought possible.
The 5th PT Boat Flotilla left Cherbourg on the night of
9 April for a torpedo operation in the area southeast
of Falmouth. The convoy channel was unsuccessfully
rocbnnoltcrod. Cooperation between a shadowing enemy
plane and gun boats was observed during the approach.
For the short report see Teletype 1440.
III. North Sea/Norway /"Northern Gators;
1. North Seas
The patrol boat l,3406i? was attacked by four enemy
fighters off Ijmuidon at 1106 and suffered casualties,
One of the attacking planes was shot down.
One ELM/ J mine was swept by a harbor defense vessel
off Heligoland.
Convoy duties were carried out according to plan.
Numerous enemy planes were fired on in the area of
Admiral , Netherlands between 1054 and 1226. One
Hurricane was shot down, the pilot was taken prisoner
At 1105 enemy planes machine-gunned the Amsterdam
petroleum wharf , a tug in the North Sea Canal and a
strong point north of Nordvik.
2 . Norway /Northern Waters i
Enemy Situations
According to air reconnaissance, five steamers wore
lying in Yokongo; a convoy of two steamers and one
escort vessel was northeast of Yokongo on a north-
westerly course ; two steamers lay at anchor cast of
Kildin.
According to radio intelligence, two tankers, the
destroyer URITZKI and three minesweepers left Kola
Bay for the Gorlo Straits. The following vessels
were observed? 6 submarines off the north coast of
Norway, 16 small craft In the Murmansk area, 4 ice-
breaker and 13 small craft in the Gorlo Straits and
the Archangel area.
-138- CONFIDENTIAL
%
10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation;
In connection with the aerial torpodo attack on tho
convoy of the tanker WEI S SEN BURG , the Naval Command,
Norway reported that three tanks had been damaged
• but it was estimated that only 200 tons of oil had
been lost.
Convoy traffic on 10 April proceeded according to plan.
Twenty ships were esdortcd north and twenty-two south.
Group North informed the REGENSBURG and tho KARIN on
air reconnaissance and weather conditions in Radio-
grams 1125, 1625 and 1855.
Group North transmitted a report "from .Admiral,
Northern Wators which stated that on the basis of a
report from an officer of submarine U ii212iI it was
to be presumed that Operation uThusneldaH was known
to most of the vessels in Harstad and also to the
shore stations there. While in Harstad the officer
learned from the civilian crew of the tug ATLANTIK
of the operation of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla and
of tho assignment to escort in a ship' homeward bound
from Japan.
A prompt investigation for a court-martial is to be
carried out by Group North.
The Chief, Naval Staff 'wished to be informed of the
results of the investigation at the earliest
opportunity.
IV, Skagorrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Seas
Tho Finnish steamer KALEVA (381 G.R.T.) sank off
Langeland at 0130, and the Danish steamer EMANUEL
(1,290 G.R.T.) off Laaland at 1541, both as a result of
striking mines.
Escort and channel sweeping operations in the area of
tho Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic were carried
out without incident. Tho Swedish steamer VIRIL was
left by our patrol boat escort off Kristiansand South.
The Commander, Minoswoopors, Baltic reported the
execution of minefield operations "Nashorn VII a" by the
24th Landing Flotilla according to plan. Loading for
tho assignments ''Secigcl 2U to ls5n was in progress. The
rest of the mine-laying and notlaying operations were
carried out according to plan. Given favorable weather
■ . -139- CONFIDENTIAL
10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
conditions, it is estimated that tho swooping of the
"Hartburg" barrage will take 3 to 4 weeks to complete.
The Commanding Admiral, Baltic States reported the usual
activity. (See Teletype 0935.)
V . Submarine warfare i
!• Enemy Situations
Submarine U ;J176:i made the following report from
BE 9495 at 2232s one cruiser or destroyer and one
unidentified vessel, northwesterly course, high
speed.
There was brisk reconnaissance activity over the Bay
of Biscay, For further details sec ,?Encmy Situation
West Are a" .
2 . Own Situations
In the North Atlantic, submarine U r,404H intercepted
a convoy of at least ten steamers believed to be
heading south, in AK 4768 at 1400. Nino of tho Group
"Actio r" submarines were detailed to attack tho enemy.
The remaining seven submarines of this group have
boon formed into a now Group "Incise1* and arc to take
up patrol positions from AK 7593 to BD 1617 at 0800
on 11 April.
Six of the G-roup ''Adlcr" submarines established
contact with the enemy. The heavy defenses, however,
prevented all attempts at gaining an initial success .
Outside tho group, in AK 4840, submarine U i?615'? scored
a hit on an independently routed 10,000 G.R.T. vessel
he adi ng nor tho a s t .
Ten additional submarines, formed Into the new Group
nLcrchciJ, have taken up patrol positions from AK 5489
to 8916.
Tho four submarines detached to escort the IRENE are
to bo Informed on the situation, as far as known, and
arc proceeding to BE 9884 to render assistance.
In the Capo area submarine U 'ii182i1 sank the South
African steamer x.LOE (5,047 G.R.T. ) carrying a cargo
of wheat from Australia for the African Theater.
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10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
No reports of succosscs have been received from the
submarines in the West Indies .
For further details sec ''Supplement to the Submarine
Situation'1 in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.
The Naval Attache, Madrid transmitted a. report from
the commander of submarine U !?167'? from Las Palmas
that some of the confidential and secret matter was
washed ashore by the ground swell , two days after
the sinking. It was definitely to be assumed that
the Spanish Armed Forces had seen a certain amount,
but he had subsequently personally destroyed most of
it. The following material was either retained by the
Spaniards or else lost; operational order and
supplements, communication orders, warhead pistol
Pi II specifications, War Diary up to 29 March, disks
for the recognition signal setting disk, recognition
signal table 3rd Air Force, code book l?Ei? , crew list,
and the special officers' code. The red print of the
latter ran, with consequent illegibility.
The Naval Attache, Madrid is taking steps to discover
exactly what material is in the hands of the Spanish
Navy and will then request its return.
For further details ox" our negotiations with the
Spaniards see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
The Chief, Naval Communications Division has taken
up the matter.
VI. Aerial Warfare;
1. British Isles and Vicinity?
Altogether 92 planes of the 3rd Air Force were ovgr_._„ .:.
the Western Area and 15 over the Mediterranean.
About 30 enemy planes made daylight attacks on traffic
installations in occupied areas of the west. For
further details see "Situation West Area'1' and "North
Sea". During the night of 10 April 220 enemy planes
penetrated; 25 of them came from the east. Bombs
dropped In the Koenigsberg - Eydtkuhnen district
only caused slight damage. The raids In the west
were on targets in the Rhine - Main area. For
further details of the damage In Mannheim, Darmstadt,
Frankfurt, Wiesbaden and Mainz see ""'Daily Situation
Report'*' .
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10 April 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
2 . Mediterranean Theaters
The 2nd Air Force reported a total of 310 planes on
operation, concentrating on the Tunisian battlefield.
According to an Italian report, hits were scored on
a fuel dump and a cruiser during an enemy air raid
on Lladdalena (Sardinia) on 9 April.
3. Eastern Fronts
Seven enemy planes v/ere reported to have been shot
down over the Army lines on 9 April. The 4th Air
Force's Black Sea reconnaissance spotted no fresh
developments .
VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Seas
1. Enemy Situation Mediterraneans
No further reports have been received of the 21
vessels which, according to an Italian report, v/ere
said to have passed Tangier, making for the east on
the night of 7 April. They may well be the large
number of landing craft reported by an agent. Two
steamers were towed in to Gibraltar on the afternoon
of 9 April and a damaged tanker and freighter also
put in. Three empty U.S. tankers left the harbor the
same evening, making for the west. The cruiser of the
FIJI class which put in on the evening of 9 April
coming from the west, put out with a destroyer on the
forenoon of 10 April, making for the east. The
cruiser UGANDA put out, making for the west.
Very brisk convoy traffic has been confirmed in the
Western Mediterranean.
A submarine was lying east-southeast of Cagliari.
Despite an exhaustive reconnaissance of the inshore
waters between Dema and Solium, the enemy was not
sighted during the forenoon .
According to an intelligence report, 1 heavy cruiser,
1 aircraft parent ship, 10 torpedo boats, 6 mine-
sweepers and 8 submarines are said to have entered
Aden on 8 April from Great Britain, bound for the
Mediterranean.
2. Own Situation Mediterranean:
Four Italian submarines wore in the operational area.
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10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Mr
No special reports have been received from our sub-
marines. PT boats and minesweeping vessels did not
go out owing to the weather.
A supplementary report stated that Italian mine-
sweepers swept five mines from the ^Arsinelli''
minefield on 6 April, and that a sixth mine exploded.
Ten auxiliary motor minesweepers entered Marseilles
on 7 April from the Western Area. The first five
boats are to proceed onwards, probably in ten days,
after a short overhaul.
An Italian motor sailing vessel was sunk by an enemy
submarine 8 miles west of Cape Carbonara at 1328 on
9 April.
The cruiser TRIESTE sank during a severe enemy raid
on Maddalena at 1500. The cruiser GORIZIA and the
naval arsenal were severely damaged.
In connection with the land fighting in Tunisia, the
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported
that the enemy attacks were continuing and fresh
reinforcements were constantly being brought up.
Our main line of defense has had to be moved 10
kilometers back in order to straighten out the front
in the area northwest of Medjez el Bab. The switch
position southwest of Kairouan has so far stood up
to enemy pressure. The German Africa Corps and
German troops of the 1st Italian Army retreated to
a general line 15 kilometers south of Sousse,
Battery Madia and the Port Commander', Sousse have
received demolition and evacuation orders.
In connection with the loss of the submarine chasers
w2201iJ and "2204w in Palermo the German Staff
attached to the Italian Admiralty reported that the
vessels had been forbidden to remain in harbor owing
to the danger of air raids. The Commander, 22nd
Submarine Chaser Flotilla, relying on the torpedo
hydrophone gear, considered It reasonable, therefore,
to drop anchor outside the harbor for a short time.
Contact with the local Italian naval command was not
established as ordered. Relief of the Flotilla
Commander and a court-martial inquiry are requested.
(See Teletype 1835.)
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10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
3« Sea Transport Situation;
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported
that despite a heavy fighter escort, a formation of
Italian transport planes on its way to Tunis was
again attacked and suffered severe losses . The air
and sea situation is turning the supplying of Tunis
into an increasingly difficult task because adequate
means of transport, such as supply submarines, fast
dispatch boats and small craft, are lacking. Means
of communication between Italy and Sicily are also
being seriously threatened by attacks on the Messina
ferry. The transfer of the Rhone tankers, barges and
tugs must be speeded up. The German Staff attached
to the Italian Admiralty reported on the convoy of
the steamer T0MMASE0 which arrived In Tunis at 1515
with supplies. For copy see Teletype 2125.
The steamer FOGGIA was to have entered Pantelleria
from Sousse on the evening of 8 April. Investigations
have so far been without result. The transport
vessels KT "5", "7" and "9" are due to put out from
Reggio for Trapani on the night of 10 April the
convoy of the FASRIANO and CASERTA from Naples at 0300
on 11 April, and the steamer CAR30NELL0 from Messina
for Tunis at 0530.
4. Area Naval Group Souths
Aegean Seas
Nothing to report.
Black Sea;
Enemy Situation;
The reconnaissance was uneventful. According to an
agent's report, dated 8 April, Group Command,
Krasnodar has been Informed that the enemy has
finished re-grouping his forces in preparation for
the opening of the offensive on Novorossisk from the
south and the east, and on the Taman Peninsula from
the cast and the north. The attacks are to be
supported by the Fleet as well as by naval landing
forces and airborne troops .
A Russian reconnaissance plane was over Constantza
on the forenoon of 9 April.
-144- CONFIDENTIAL
m
10 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation;
Submarine U ;i24u loft Peodosia for the operational
area in the forenoon. PT boats were not operating
on the night of 10 April.
An unsuccessful enemy air attack on the convoy of
the tanker DRESDEN southwest of Peodosia was carried
out at 0700. During an aerial torpedo and bombing
raid on the convoy of the PR0DR0M0S off Eupatoria,
the ship was slightly damaged by splinters. Another
unsuccessful attack took place against a towed convoy
sailing from Peodosia to Yalta. It was repulsed by
the action of the naval landing craft in the escort
'■ forces.
Twenty PMB mines were laid in. the harbor entrance
and the harbor basin of Novorossisk.
The 18th Anapa convoy was carried out according to
plan. The 19th unit is on the return passage to
Kerch; four naval landing craft of the 20th unit put
in during the afternoon.
The 2nd Tcmriuk convoy also left Kerch with a 1,550
ton cargo. The steamer TISZA (1,022 G.R.T.) entered
Kerch from Peodosia.
The ferry service across the Strait of Kerch was the
target of unsuccessful enemy air attacks against the
fish-salting factory, Taman and Kossa Chushka on the
night of 8 April. The ferry service proceoded
without incident., on 10 April. Only the channel to
Senaya was closed because, mines were suspected there.
Forty- one men and 15 tons of war material were
ferried westwards, 200 tons of supplies and 19
vehicles eastwards .
VIIT. Situation East Asia;
The Naval Attache, Tokyo reported that the Japanese
Navy has given 316 ships totaling 1,854,000 G.R.T. as
the total tonnage sunk in 1942.
In January 1943, one 5,000 G.R.T. ship and in February
six ships totaling 54,000 G.R.T. wore sunk by submarines
and one 7,000 G.R.T. ship by the Air Force. None o-f
the ships sunk have been identified. The grand total
amounts to 324 ships totaling 1,920,000 G.R.T.
-145- CONFIDENTIAL
11 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Mr. Eden's report to tho House of Commons on his visit to
the United States was the subject of lively Allied and
neutral press commentaries . A Swedish newspaper, discussing
the main subject of the talks - Anglo-American relations with
the Soviet - states that Mr. Eden failed to obtain any binding
commitments from the United States Government. All that he
achieved was a rapprochement between the British Government
and President Roosevelt. In particular, this means that the
United States is now willing to recognize the Russian frontiers
of 22 June 1941. The Russian Government apparently avoided-
involving itself in any post-war commitments by announcing that
it was at present far more interested in the military issues
than the political ones. It felt that the immediate
establishment of a second front in Europe was of far greater
importance than any post-war problems. The idea of a
conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin was discussed
on President Roosevelt's suggestion. The Russian attitude to
the matter has not yet been ascertained.
The British press expressed concern lest the United States
revert to isolationism should Roosevelt fail to be re-elected.
Britain was determined, however, not to relinquish her friend-
ship with Russia again as the peace of Europe depended on it.
According to Router, tho Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs
has announced that Brazil has joined the United Nations.
According to a London report in the Swedish press, the Spanish
Ambassador in London has been very busy lately. It also
revealed that the Allied food conference in the United States
has been postponed until 18 May.
The 3. B.C. reported that General Catroux has arrived in London
from Algiers to submit General Giraud's proposals for the
re-establishment of French unity to the French national
Committee. They were said to cover the following four main
points: termination of the armistice with the Axis powers j
formation of an administrative committee for the French
possessions overseas; rejection of any provisional government;
abrogation of the oath of allegiance, in cases where it had
been made to Individual persons. General Glraud has sent a
liaison staff to General de Gaulle in London.
-146- CONFIDENTIAL
11 April 1943 GOl^irnlJllAL
Special Items
According tc an intelligence report of 8 April, the British
and Americans arc planning to land heavy "f -ore os in Sicily at
the close of the Tunis offensive. The Anglo-American troops
arc said to have spent almost their entire winter training
for landing- operations. Considerable reinforcements have
been brought up via the Straits of Gibraltar during the past
weeks .
According tc another intelligence report based on information
from diplomatic sources , a large-scale raid against the
French Atlantic coast is imminent, in order to wipe out the
submarine bases at Loricnt, St. Nazaire and Brest following
their systematic destruction by air attack. The raids tc
be carried out with a total disregard for losses in men and
material. -.
Situation 11 April
I. Vvar in Foreign Waters :
1. Enemy Situations
On 8 April the position of the auxiliary cruiser
3UL0L0 was 24° IT 31° \i s southeasterly course, speed
14 knots . .
2 . Own Situations
ivfo news has been received from our vessels. The
Naval Staff- informed all ships in foreign waters of
the position of the 3UL0L0 in Radiogranf 1351, and of
shipping movements in the South Atlantic, gained from
intercepted. and decoded radio messages, in Radiogram
1351 j laying particular stress on the importance of
secrecy where information obtained from decoded radio
messages was concerned.
I I . Situation '.Vest Area i . " _■
1'. ~'Bnerny Situation t .
According to our air reconnaissance, a cruiser on
course 300°, high speed, was in GF 3346, and a
destroyer on course 30°, medium speed, in 32 6910 at
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1 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
0940. A British destroyer was sighted in CF 3332
making for the north at 1140.
2 . Own Situation;
Atlantic Coast;
1. Operation "Fonto";
A short report from the Commander, 8th Destroyer
Flotilla gave information on the return passage
of the HIMALAYA escorted by the 8th Destroyer
Flotilla. For copy see Teletype 1200. The group
was continuously escorted from 0845 until dark on
10 April by two to four Ju 88 ' s which failed,
however, to shake off or shoot down the enemy
shadowing pianos. The combined aerial torpedo and
bombing attacks already reported occurred between
2030 and 2128. Four of the attacking planes were
shot down. Tho destroyer Z "24" was machine-gunned
and the forward radar gear and the search light,
as well as the aft range finder were damaged, and
it is announced with regret that five men were
killed, five seriously injured and 27 slightly.
Defensive action on the part of the Ju 88 ' s was
not noticeable during tho raids. The destroyers
Z "23" and Z "32" arc fully ready for action.
The destroyer Z "24" is once again ready for
action to a limited extent now that her complement
has been made up again by the destroyer Z "37" .
Our air reconnaissance gave the following clues as
to the fate of the IRENE; a big oil patch, boxes,
bales and parts of the cargo floating in the water
as well as six cutters, one motor boat and several
rubber dinghies were sighted in BE 9739 at 1100.
All the boats wore empty and gave the impression
of having been left in complete order.
It is therefore to be assumed that the crew was
picked up "by the enemy warship.
Group West requested the Air Commander, Atlantic
to continue the search.
Group V/cst intends to transfer tho 8th Destroyer
Flotilla to Bordeaux.
-148- CONFIDENTIAL
?
11 April 1943 .' CONFIDENTIAL
The Naval Staff has informed Group V/cst that it
is not planned to send out any more vessels once
the HIMALAYA has put In.
> •
2. Further Items t
One ELM/ J mine was swept off Loricnt. The ■'.
entrances to Bayonne and St. Jean dc Luz arc
closed because minolaying operations have boon
observed. The Gironde is now open to navigation.
Armed Forces High Command,.: Operations Staff has
opened the following offices as from today;
Commander, Defense, Area, ..Brest ; Commander, Defense
Area, St. Nazairc, and Commander, Defense Area,
Lorient .
The establishment of the offices is to bo carried
out by Army High Command. As offices of the
Armed Forces, they will be responsible to the
Commanding General, Armed Forces, West who will
give them their service Instructions and organize
other subordinate offices.
Channel Coast.
Nothing to report.
III. North Sea/Norway/ Nor thorn Waters;
1 . North Sea ;
One ELIvl/j mine was swept off Heligoland and one off
Borkum, both ahead -of a convoy. Escort and patrol
duties were carried out according to plan.- The patrol
positions wore occupied.
On 10 April four enemy planes searched the convoy
channels between Terschclling and the -mouth of the
Ems between 2250 and- 2350. Our cas.tbound convoy was
unsuccessfully attacked.
2. Norway /Nor thorn V/aters ;
Enemy Situation;
According to radio intelligence, six Russian sub-
marines operating off the Arctic coast of Norway were
informed of our convoy in Varangcr Fjord. A .
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11 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
submarine left Polyarnoc for the Barents Sea on the
evening of 10 April. Three Russian Ice-breakers were"
observed operating in the Gorlo Straits exit.
Five planes were detected over the North Sea towards
the west coast of Norway and two over the Iceland
area.
Air reconnaissance spotted the following vessels?
one special purpose steam trawler 120 miles south of
Jan Maycn one enemy submarine 28 miles northeast of
the Shctlands and one submarined submarine 40 miles
east of Nordkyn. The latter was bombed.
Own Situation;
260 rounds were fired against our westbound convoy
by an enemy battery on the Rybachi Peninsula on 9
April. No damage was inflicted and the fire was
answered with 105 rounds . What was believed to be
a hit on the enemy battery was observed. Ammunition
in the Battery Pctsamo was set on fire. In addition,
one of our cutters was repeatedly fired on in the
entrance to the fjord. This fired was also returned.
G-roup North sanctioned the 5th Air Force attacking
the special purpose steam trawler (approximately
1,000 G.R.T. ) spotted by air reconnaissance in AE 31,
as there was no possibility of mistaken identification.
As the Naval Staff felt that there were serious
objections to this, the Group was Immediately contacted.
Escort duties were carried out according to plan.
Thirteen ships were escorted north and twenty-four
south on 10 April.
ij.
gun barrel for the heaviest battery (40*6 cm.) was
unloaded at Harstad on 25 March. The second barrel
is expected to leave Trondhcim on 15 April. The
transport situation for battery construction depends
on the present tug situation improving.
The. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reported in
connection with the damage to the tanker WEISSENBURG,
that it was only possible to provide one escort
vessel, as no further vessels were available. A
minesweeper had to be used for torpedo firing
practice owing to the unexpected breakdown of another
-150- CONFIDENTIAL
11 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
vessel. It did not prove possible to reinforce the
escort for the passage round Stadlandot, ' as the
patrol boat stationed there had to be withdrawn
owing to boiler damage , and there was no time for
the Naval Shore Command, Ivloldc to recall the two
patrol boats on duty off Haugsholm. Naval Command,
Norway also reported details of the damage to the
tanker which had already discharged 500 of its 8,000
cbms of furnace oil in Kris tians and South. Contrary
to the report of 11 April, not 200 cbm but 2,174 cbm
of the remaining 7,500 cbm of oil were lost; 1,925
cbm were ruined by water, leaving only 4,450 cbm of -
furnace oil and 996 cbm of gas oil fit for use.
As a precautionary measure, Group North is continuing
to provide the RSOENSBURG and the KARIN with air
reconnaissance and weather reports. (Sec Radiograms
1300, 1405, 1545, 1905 and 1913.)
The Admiral, Northern Waters had nothing to report.
IV. Skagorrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea;
The experimental vessel DORPAT of the Mine laying
Experimental Command struck a ground mine and sank in
Aarhus Bay outside the channels while attempting to
sweep a mine thought to be an ELl/l/A mine.
Eight ships . and one submarine were escorted in the area
of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Sixteen
vessels and three mineswocping planes were out swooping
tho channels .
The Danish steamer DUORO (840 G.R.T.) sank north of
Wamcmucndc as a result of a collision with the destroyer
of Dutch origin ZH III". ZH;il:i was slightly damaged.
Aerial mines Y/erc suspected along the 8 ami and coast
following -enemy flights over this territory on the night
of 10 April.
Tho Naval Attache, Stockholm was instructed to advise
the Swedish Navy of the Naval Staff's wishes as regards
escort and patrol duties in- tho Baltic. Copy of the
instructions in l/Skl I Nord 10232/43 Gkdos . in War
Diary, Part C, Vol. III.
Tho Commander, Minoswoopors, Baltic reported that the'
mino swooping and minclaying operations were discontinued
-151- CONFIDENTIAL
.1 April 1943 ., CONFIDENTIAL
owing to the weather. The Net Defense Unit has laid
the first not of the "Walross" barrage. The laying of
the second net is to be started on 13 April.
The Admiral, Baltic States reported the usual activity
in Kronstadt Bay. Line faults and other slight material
damage were caused to Battery "Bismarck1' by shells falling
in the area. Our air attacks wore directed against the
airfield and harbor of Lavansaari.
Submarine Warfare i
1. Enemy Situations
There was brisk air reconnaissance in the Bay of Biscay;
36 planes were observed.
2. Own Situations
In the North Atlantic the submarines of Group "Adlcr"
wore able to maintain contact with the southwest
bound convoy in AJ all day long despite the appearance
of a heavy air escort. The last position was reported
from BC 2634. Altogether seven ships totaling 49,500
G.R.T. were sunk, and six hits were scored on other
ships. Submarines U ;i571;i, ?t84i?, :i188i? and "613" took
part in this successful operation. The two first
named submarines and submarine U "613" had to withdraw
owing to depth charge damage. The operation was still
in progress .
Submarine U "516" reported from AK 5417 the sinking
of what is believed to have been a 12,000 G.R.T.
auxiliary naval vessel.
A convoy, on course 60°, was intercepted by submarines
of Group "Lorcho" in AK 8213 towards noon. The
submarines are to take advantage of the hours of
darkness to carry out a surprise attack.
Four submarines arc to continue rendering assistance
to the blockade runner IRENE until midday on 12 April.
Submarine U "515" of the southern group of submarines
reported the sinking of a 3,500 G.R.T. steamer in
AK 5633 on 9 April. For eight days the submarine has
observed only light traffic off the harbor entrance
to Dakar. Submarine U "181i! sank the U.S. steamer
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11 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
>NASSES (5,983 G.R.T.) in ST 8881. One man was
killed and two seriously injured by a barrel burst
Sccticns trA"j "3" and "C" of route "Anton" have now
, been sanctioned until further notice for attacks
independently routed vessels. For further reports
sec "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War
Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.
VI. Aerial Warfare ;
1. British Isles and Vicinity;
The 3rd Air Force had 105 planes on operation over
the Western Area, 19 over the Mediterranean.
Altogether four enemy planes were shot down by anti-
aircraft guns and three by fighters. An eighth plane
crashed.
During the night of 11 April 61 of our planes laid
mines in the Thames.
Numerous enemy planes crossed the coast on daylight
raids on occupied western territory. Hcngclo in
Holland, and traffic installations and trains in the
area of Bentheim and Mccholn were attacked. During
the night of 11 April three British courier planes
bound for Sweden and six bound for England were
observed. Ton planes laid mines In the area of the
West Frisian Islands. Two large groups of planes
wore also observed off the west coast of Franco, .
presumably on minolaying operations . Anti-aircraft
gun emplacements wore machine-gunned several times.
The number of planes shot down during enemy raids
over Reich territory on the night of 10 April has
now been given as 20.
2. Mediterranean Theaters
In Tunisia our forces concentrated their operations
on the western front. The enemy attacked ports in
Sicily and Italy as well as transport pianos, and
supported the fighting in Tunisia on a large scale.
Kits wore scored on two ships in Trapani . Slight
damage was caused In Marsalla. A heavy raid on
Tunis caused no damage to the shipping there, but
the harbor will have to be closed for the time being.
The steamer ROSELLI was hit forward during an attack
-153- CONFIDENTIAL
11 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
on Naples. A Gorman naval food depot was sot on
fire. It was further reported In connection with
the raid on Maddalena, that In addition to the
vessels already enumerated, one submarine was damaged
and two PT boats were destroyed. Furthermore, the
submarine dockyard, the torpedo repair shop and other
port installations wore severely damaged. Five Ju
52 i s and throe Me 323' s belonging to our transport
formation and eleven planes and two fighters belonging
to an Italian transport formation were shot down on
10 April. According to reports so far received, 18
of our transport pianos were lost on 11 April.
3 . Eastern Fronts
Apart from air reconnaissance reports nothing of
interest has been received.
For information on the strength of the Russian Air
Force regiments sec Daily Situation Report. The
total strength of the Russian Air Force as on 1 April
1943 was estimated at 6,000 pianos (Including 800
foreign types), comprising 2,600 fighters, 1,300
ground-attack planes, 1,500 bombers and reconnaissance
planes and 600 others. Given a 60 per cent
operational readiness, 3,600 planes will have to be
reckoned with in the battle areas. Additional planes
produced at home and imortcd, amounted to about 2,000
In March.
VI I . Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea ;
1. Enemy Situation Mediterraneans
Five escort vessels loft Gibraltar for the Atlantic
at 2000 on 10 April. Thirteen vessels were sighted
leaving Tangier for the Atlantic at 2200. This is
possibly an underestimation as visibility was poor.
The LSI of the QUEEN EMMA, class which entered
Gibraltar with two destroyers from tho Mediterranean
on the evening of 10 April loft tho harbor again on
tho morning of 11 April bound for the Mediterranean.
A convoy of twelve U.S. and two British steamers, a
British transport with allegedly 1,500 men aboard
and two destroyers left Gibraltar for the Atlantic at
0715. The group joined a convoy of 15 steamers coming
from the Mediterranean. A small convoy of four
steamers with four escort vessels and two tugs loft
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11 April 1945 CONFIDENTIAL
■ ^Gibraltar for the Mediterranean at 1330. The number
of vessels in the harbor showed an increase of 14
tankers, 16 steamers , and 12 escort vessels.
Convoy traffic in the Western Mediterranean was
normal. The presence of 15 new LCT's was confirmed
in Ji jclli .
Submarines wore reported 29 miles cast of Fcrro
(northeasterly point of Sardinia) , off Capri and
Cagliari.
. No. important sighting reports have been received
from the Eastern Mediterranean.
According to radio intelligence, a steamer was
torpedoed within the wave range of Algiers at 1442.
The Naval attache, Madrid reported intelligence from
a Norwegian source which may not be absolutely
reliable, namely that three Canadian divisions have
been transferred from Casablanca into the Oran -
Algiers area in the past few days, where they are
ready for embarkation, and that an enemy landing in
Sardinia and Corsica is planned to take place in
about two weeks ' time.
2 . Own Situation Mediterraneans
Four Italian submarines wero in the operational area.
At 1400 on 10 April, the submarine U "617u (Lieutenant
s.g. Brandi) sank an eastbound cruiser of the FIJI
class, speed 24 knots, in CH 7546 after two hits,
and torpedoed a destroyer of the TRIBAL class half
an hour after submarine U ',?596n had unsuccessfully
fired a spread of throe against the cruiser.
For the assignment of operational areas in the
Western Mediterranean sec "Supplement to the
Submarine Situation".
Submarine U n414!i passed through the Straits of
Gibraltar Into the Mediterranean on the night of
11 April. - ~-;:
The 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas carried. cut the"
mine laying operations off Soussc harbor according to
plan.
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11 April--1943 CONFIDENTIAL
• There wore no minesweeping operations owing to the
weather.
According to the Army situation report from the
..Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the enemy
broke through the new main defense line in the area
northwest of Medjes el Bab on 10 April. It seems
probable that the enemy will continue his attack
with numerically superior forces in the direction
of Tunis. Owing to strong enemy pressure and our
own considerable losses, we evacuated Kairouan on
the evening of 10 April but succeeded in withdrawing
to the north. The fuel supply for these movements
is ensured, whereas the ammunition situation is
critical.
Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation
Office of the Armed Forces Overseas has requested the
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South to accelerate
the transfer of Rhone tankers, pinnaces and tugs as
the shortage of mine-sweeping vessels in Tunisia is
causing shipping losses. j-
The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has, on
the Instigation of the Supply and Transportation
Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, for days been
endeavoring to secure the release of motor launches
and small craft suitable ..for the required purpose,
at present in German ports. About 20 harbor launches
are on their way by rail from Hamburg.
German Naval Command, Italy reported the commissioning
of the following former French torpedo boats in La
Spozia on 5 April s BOMBARDS as FR "41", POMONE as FR
n42i?, IPHIGENIE as FR u43" .
According to a report from the Naval Attache, Madrid,
It has been discovered in connection with the Spanish
phosphate traffic from Safi and Casablanca sanctioned
by Germany, that the British have promised to
sanction this traffic only as from May or June. This
British decision deserves special attention by reason
of the stipulated date.
3 . Sea Transport Situation;
The steamer FABRIANO (2,943 G.R.T.) was sunk by a
torpedo bomber while sailing in the convoy proceeding
from Naples to Tunis. No further details have yet
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11 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
been received. The steamer CARBO HELLO Is en route
from Messina to Tunis according to schedule, -The
arrival of the transport vessels KT i!5'!, ll7.il and "9U
bound for Bizerta, which were' "to have put in to
Trapani during the afternoon,, has not yet been
reported. The sailing reports of four German and
twelve Italian naval landing craft which were to
leave Trapani and Pavignana respectively for Bizerta,
are also still outstanding. Two Siebel ferries and
one submarine are on passage from Marsala to Tunis,
and four Slcbel ferries and six infantry landing
craft from Tunis to Marsala.
4. Area Naval Group Souths
Aegean Sea;
Nothing to report on the naval situation.
Group South reported that shipping and dockyard
activity in Piraeus will have to be suspended in
the next few days , as the efforts of the Group and of
the Admiral, Aegean to increase the coal supply, have
so far continued to be unsuccessful. At the moment,
13,000 tons of eoal are stored in Trieste, and about
1,800 tons are in transit to Piraeus.
Black Sea;
Enemy Situation;
Nothing to report.
Own Situation;
The Crimea convoys and the 20th and 21st Anapa
convoys woro carried out according to plan. Tho
22nd convoy has put out from Kerch. The 2nd Temriuk
convoy entered Temriuk. About 700 men were ferried
west across the Strait of Kerch and 700 tons of
supplies cast.
The following were ferried across the Strait of
Kerch from 1 to 10 April: A total of 18,000 tons
of war material and 9:, .000 men oast, with approximately
8 , 500 tons aboard naval craft, and about 90,000 men
west. The Anapa convoy carried 2 ,,900 tons oast and
the Temriuk convoy 3,700 tons. For further details
sg'c "Daily Situation Report'' .
-157- CONFIDENTIAL
11 A-oril 1943
CONFIDENTIAL
VIII. Situation East Asias
Nothing to report.
<*
Qs
-158-
C0NFID3HTIAL
12 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
. .1 ■ i i r l III III II i / III. .
Nothing to report.
Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff
I I I l« I i.i. ii in ' i in
I. The Chief, Naval Staff returned to Berlin from Fuehrer
Headquarters on the afternoon of 11 April.
II. Quartermaster Division reported that a preliminary
discussion between the Services on evacuating their
offices from Berlin is to take place at A^mcd Forces
High Command on 13 April. Armed Forces High Command
is also of the opinion that the evacuation of the Service
staffs should not be entertained until the very last.
The Chief, Naval Staff announced that the Chief of the
Army General Staff will report on the possibilities
for billetting the Naval Staff in Zosscn. The Chief
of Staff, Naval Staff Is to investigate and report
whether, and to what extent., the Naval Staff should be
evacuated as a precautionary measure.
Among other things, Quartermaster Division also
reported that the visit of the Reich Commissioner of
Maritime Shipping to the Commander In Chief, Navy is
scheduled for 21 April.
m • Report by Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section
on the unreasonable request of the United States to
evacuate Red Cross personnel and supplies from Bizerta.
The note concerned has been returned to the Swiss
Government. For further details sec t War Diary, Part C,
Vol. VIII.
IV. The Commander In Chief, Navy stated that the question of
the iron quota for constructions has been settled.
Minister Spccr will immediately grant an allocation of
20,000 tons per month and devise means of supplying the
remaining 8,000 tons.
m
The Fuehrer is absolutely in favor of the suggested
submarine program, including the program for auxiliary
vessels. and PT boats. The experiences In Tunis have
not failed to serve as a note of warning. Future
-159- CONFIDENTIAL
April -1943 — CONFIDENTIAL
developments are hard to foroscc but under no circumstances
must they be allowed to lead to reverses similar to
those suffered in the Mediterranean. The submarine
program has the Fuehrer's unreserved approval. Ho will
discuss the remaining requests with Minister Specr. The
Navy has no need to take any further part in the pro-
ceedings for the time being. The Fuehrer will discuss
the - sub jcet- of increasing steel production for the
current year with the steel industry on 12 April. The
"Chief, Naval Staff stated that it now at last appeared
to be a recognized fact that this was a war against the
great sea powers, and that naval expansion had become an
obvious necessity which, if neglected, would have the
direst consequences.
Report by the Chief, Naval Intelligence Divisions
The text of the Adana agrcomont has been received from
reliable official Turkish intelligence sources. The
agreement deals primarily with the delivery and ship-
ment of military equipment to Turkey. Furthermore,
the immediate dispatch of British General Staff officers
to Ankara to investigate with the Turkish General Staff
the possibilities of British support in the event of
Turkey being drawn into the war, was also agreed on.
Plans for sending British forces to Turkey are being
prepared should this contingency arise.
The plans for this assistance have been drawn up in
great detail and have no restricting conditions or
reservations. In this way the British are offered a
-pretext for bringing about a state of war thorns elves.
It should be borne in mind, however, that the resolutions ^s
date back to a time when the situation on tho Eastern
Front was so unsettled that the Turks probably had
Russia rather than Germany in mind in case of war.
Group South was Informed accordingly by the Naval Staff.
For further details sec l/Skl I c 1124/43 - Gkdos Chefs.
in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
The Chief, Naval Intelligence Division also reported
the request of the German envoy in Athens for action
by German troops In Thossaly whore, as a result of the
failure of the Italian occupation forces and authorities,
insurrections were proving an ever growing menace, the
effects of which had already spread to Athens.
-160- CONFIDENTIAL
12 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
In a Highly Restricted Circles
VI. Report by Auxiliary Cruiser Section, Operations Division
on the attempts to bring out the HIMALAYA and bring in
the IRENE .
The Chief, Naval Staff was of the opinion that., on the
basis of the then existing enemy situation, the HIMALAYA
group should not have been made to turn about. It would
perhaps have been more expedient to have maintained a
northwesterly course in the hope of decoying the enemy
away from the far more valuable Incoming blockade runner.
The IRENE should have tried to turn about and withdraw
to the west the very moment the enemy was reported.
This in Itself would not have guaranteed a successful
break-through, it is true, but the chances would have
been greater. The exceptional value to the war economy
of a cargo of several thousand tons of rubber gave the
escorting of the IRENE the significance of a major
action, Y/hich was all the more reason for exploiting
every conceivable possibility.
In accordance with the policy so far adopted, the Naval
Staff had refrained from interfering in the command of
Group West. Neither could the Chief of Staff, Naval
Staff nor Operations Division see any reason for doing
so, as they assumed that the Group was In a far better
position for obtaining a quick and accurate survey of
the enemy situation. Both from the point of view of
personnel and material, the Staff of Operations
Division as constituted at present is by no means
adequately equipped for taking over direct operational
c ommand .
The Chief, Naval Staff admitted that there could be
differences of opinion on questions of this kind. He
was against taking the direct control of operations out
of the hands of the Groups and putting It into those of
the Naval Staff; he thought It desirable however, that
contrary to the prevailing practice, proper use should
In future be made of the prerogative of the Chief s
Naval Staff and of the Naval Staff to intervene, if
necessary, in the operation of the Groups.
The Chief, Naval Staff agreed that no further blockade
running operations should be undertaken for the time
being, but that with the lessons of the past In mind,
preparations for resuming this important task In the
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12 April 1943 CONFIDENTIAL
fall should not be neglected. The Naval Staff suggested
In this connection that -the best plan would.be so to
arrange the sailing dates of the blockade runners that
they cross " the- danger -zones during the- periods of the
longest nights, and that, if necessary, the ships should
have longer waiting periods In order to complicate enemy
plotting.
It Is extraordinary that the REGENSBURG and the KARIN
seem to have vanished without a sound. The permission
given by Group North to attack the special purpose steam
trawler reported in Northern Waters by air reconnaissance
(see War Diary 11 April) was considered with some mis-
givings by the Naval Staff who pointed this out to Group
North by telephone.
Finally the Chief, Operations Division made a further
report on the subject of the blockade runners; this time
on the dismissal of the captain of the HIMALAYA and the
mutiny of the Norwegian seamen aboard the R0SS3ACH.
VII. At the request of the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, the
Chief, Naval Staff decided that Submarine Section,
Quartermaster Division was to be responsible for the
preparation of Italian transport submarines. So that
these submarines could be converted as quickly as
possible, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines was
instructed not to use them for any further operations.
VIII. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division?
a. On the request submitted to the Commander in Chief,
Air Force, Operations Staff for reconnaissance In
the Denmark Strait in accordance with War Diary,
11 April. In addition to this air reconnaissance, a
submarine has now been ordered to sail through
Denmark Strait.
b. On the conclusion of the blockade runner operations,
it had been planned to withdraw the 8th Destroyer
Flotilla from the Western Area and transfer it' to
the Northern Area. According to a report from Group
West and the Commander, Destroyers, It will no' longer
be possible to take advantage of the prevailing new
moon period because only one vessel would be available
for immediate transfer, as the remainder must undergo
repairs and have their degaussing equipment checked.
The Chief, Naval Staff has agreed to the suggestion
-162- CONFIDENTIAL
,
CONFIDENTIAL
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i
CONFIDENTIAL
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